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This dissertation reveals the underlying reasons behind the rise and 
fall of contemporary maritime piracy (1990–2005) in Southeast Asia, focusing on 
the three littoral states of the Straits of Malacca, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore, together with China.  The dissertation examines three sets of 
interactions amongst the non-state actors and state actors: pirates and the shipping 
industry, pirates and states, and interstate relations on anti-piracy cooperation in 
Southeast Asia.   
The dissertation argues that the booming seaborne trade since the 1990s, 
which has generated large volume of cargoes passing through the Straits of 
Malacca, has provided easy prey for pirates, and that dilemmas in the shipping 
industry have facilitated piracy.  Poor economic conditions and unstable political 
situations in Southeast Asia, especially during and after the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997–1998, have caused a surge in incidents of piracy.  Furthermore, corrupt 
officials in the littoral countries, who are alleged to be in collusion with pirates, 
have abetted piracy.  Anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia has been 
hampered by differing incentives and priorities in littoral states regarding anti-
piracy operations.  A lack of capabilities in some littoral states, especially 
Indonesia, have further reduced the effectiveness of anti-piracy cooperation. 
 x
In the aftermath of 9/11, the littoral states have made policy shifts in response 
to the enormous external pressure to suppress piracy.  The incentives in and 
capabilities of the littoral states on anti-piracy cooperation have been enhanced, 
together with the implementation of international maritime security measures, and 
for these reasons, piracy in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea have 
significantly declined, with this trend continuing up to the present.   
This dissertation reviews the history of piracy in Southeast Asia, and 
identifies four main variables behind the rise and fall of piracy: “prey, pirate, 
politics and place”, as well as other factors, such as incentives in and capabilities of 
anti-piracy operations.  The dissertation concludes with a summary of the historical 
continuity and transformation of piracy in Southeast Asia, and offers a prediction 







Reports on sea raiders and sea raiding activities pepper the pages of 
Southeast Asia’s long maritime history.  According to the earliest historical record 
for the region, this phenomenon has existed since the first century.1  Making their 
way into these waters in the early 16th century, the European colonisers—the 
Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Dutch and the British— successively seized the 
main entrepôts and set up their colonial domains in Southeast Asia.  From 1717, the 
British began to use the word “piracy” to refer to those indigenous people who 
attempted to impede their trading in the Straits of Malacca.2  This meaning of the 
term “piracy” reflected a European perception of indigenous people as barbarous, 
primitive and in need of civilising.  The word “piracy”, as a loose term for crimes 
that take place at sea, is still commonly used today, as will be discussed in the 
following section that covers the definition of contemporary piracy. 
The European colonizers took pains to suppress piracy, and at the same 
time, anti-piracy operations could be used to justify and expand their colonial state-
                                                        
1 Ban Gu (b.32-d.92), Hanshu Dili Zhi Huishi  [The Annotated Geography Book of Annals of 
Han Dynasty] (Anhui: Anhui Jiayu Chubanshe, 2006), 518. 
2  Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 2nd ed. (Irvington-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Transnational 
Publishers, 1998), 241. 
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building activities.3  With the help of coercive measures and new technology, such 
as steamships and powerful firearms, the Europeans eventually gained the upper 
hand over indigenous pirates.  Piracy on a large scale had dwindled by the 
beginning of the 20th century.4  This decline will be detailed in the following 
chapter. 
After the end of the Cold War, however, piracy in Southeast Asia and the 
South China Sea made a spectacular comeback.  According to the International 
Maritime Bureau’s ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report’, the 
number of piracy incidents worldwide increased rapidly after the mid 1990s.  The 
number peaked in 2000 at 469 incidents, more than five times that of 1991.5  The 
most piracy-prone areas were in Indonesian waters, the Straits of Malacca and the 
South China Sea.  
After the terrorist attacks on New York on 11 September 2001, piracy in 
Southeast Asian waters has been seen in an even more serious light, as the 
possibility that piracy and terrorism might become synonymous in Southeast Asia 
has been expressed by the mass media as well as in academic journals. 6  
Intriguingly, three years later, piracy incidents had declined significantly, 
particularly in the Straits of Malacca, and this trend has continued up to the 
                                                        
3 Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World: A Study of British Imperialism in 
Nineteenth-Century Southeast Asia (Singapore: D. Moore, 1963), 2. 
4 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast 
Asian Frontier, 1865-1915 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), 115. 
5 ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January –31 December 
2004)," (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2005), 4. 
6 Adam. J. Young and Mark. J Valencia, "Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 





This study looks into what constitute the main variables in the rise 
and fall of contemporary maritime piracy in Southeast Asia between 1990-2005.   
Piracy is a complex field of study, with its causes and effects intertwined 
between the interactions of state actors and non-state actors.  The rise and fall of 
piracy reflects the political and economic transformation of the various states of 
Southeast Asia.  After examining the rise and fall of piracy in colonial Southeast 
Asia (as discussed in the following chapter), I realised that an in-depth 
understanding of piracy could be reached from the analysis of two processes: the 
evolution of piracy itself, and anti-piracy operations carried out by governments. 
The evolution of piracy demonstrates the political and economic transformation of 
interactions amongst the related state actors and non-state actors, while anti-piracy 
operations reflect the incentives and capabilities of states in dealing with piracy 
issues.  These two processes are examined by analysing the following three sets of 
interactions. 
                                                        
7 ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 January –31 December 
2006," (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2007), 5. 
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Analytic Framework and Arguments 
 
The three interlinked sets of interactions amongst state actors and non-state 
actors are: pirates and the shipping industry, pirates and states, and interstate 
relations on anti-piracy cooperation, as shown in the following “Chart of Analytic 
Framework”.  This dissertation examines these interactions in the three littoral 
states of the Straits of Malacca, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, 
together with the part played by China as a major destination of pirate booty. 




The large triangle in the Chart illustrates the three interlinked relations that 
will be examined in this dissertation.  From these three sets of relations, I identify 
three variables: Pirates, Prey and Politics.   
The blue background indicates one more variable, “places”, or the crime 
scenes of piracy.  These are the Straits of Malacca and the Indonesian waters, 
which include the seas around many islands and river networks, the perfect 
hangout for piracy.  These variables are elaborated on in Chapter 2. 
 
Pirates and the Shipping Industry 
Pirates and the shipping industry are key adversaries in contemporary 
maritime piracy in Southeast Asia.  They are both non-state actors, unlike their 
counterparts during the colonial period, when many pirates were state actors, and 
the shipping industry was in some cases a part of the colonial state machinery, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Generally speaking, East Asian and Southeast Asian countries have enjoyed 
remarkably high and sustained economic growth since the Second World War.8  
The booming economic situation in East Asia has given a fresh impetus to seaborne 
trade, and generated a huge cargo flow of oil and industrial materials through the 
Straits of Malacca, providing ready prey for pirates.  
                                                        
8 East Asia in this dissertation mainly refers to Japan and China, while Southeast Asia mainly 
refers to the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore. 
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Since the shipping industry is the direct victim of piracy, the surge in the 
number of piratical incidents is therefore of great concern to this industry.  The 
analysis of the nexus between the shipping industry and pirates provides practical 
insights into contemporary piracy.  For instance, modern technology now used on 
board ships greatly reduces the number of crew needed on board.  However, this 
also makes it easier for pirates to seize control of such ships.  Bad security 
administration in some ports provides opportunities for pirates to commit crimes 
against ships, and, furthermore, lax practices in ship registration, such as the “Flag 
of Convenience” practice, facilitates the re-registering of hijacked ships by 
international criminal syndicates, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Pirates and States 
The nexus between pirates and states is more complicated than the 
relationship between pirates and the shipping industry, involving political and 
economic factors, which are the driving forces behind the evolution of piracy and 
anti-piracy operations.   
A booming seaborne trade and the development of the shipping industry are 
the external prerequisites for a surge in piracy.  The boom in seaborne trade has 
brought about a host of problems for the littoral states.  For example, the 
degradation of fish habitats has resulted in a tremendous decline in fish stocks and 
a slump in fishermen’s income, with Indonesian fishermen suffering considerable 
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losses.  This has driven some Indonesian fishermen in fishing villages along the 
Straits of Malacca to turn to piracy for a living.  They have attacked ships in ports 
and at anchorage as a source of easy money.  Worsening economic conditions in 
Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, which was hit hardest during the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, have also played an important role in the 
recrudescence of piracy.  
Apart from petty piracy in ports and anchorages, there are criminal 
syndicates in Southeast Asia, whose aims are to rob and hijack ships and cargo 
travelling though the Straits of Malacca.  These criminal syndicates consist of well-
trained personnel using fast boats, modern weapons and sophisticated 
communications.  These criminal syndicates have established links to the black 
market, where they are able to dispose of their stolen cargoes.  They also engage in 
other transnational crimes, such as smuggling, marine fraud, drug and human 
trafficking, and even illegal fishing.  Corrupt officials in the littoral countries, 
especially in Indonesia, are alleged to be in collusion with these syndicated pirates. 
In this study, I will discuss anti-piracy law enforcement agencies and 
domestic laws against piracy in the littoral states, and draw attention to patterns of 
collusion between pirates and corrupt law enforcement agencies.  The analysis 
focuses on Indonesia and China, for Indonesia is the most piracy-prone zone, and 
China was the main destination of pirates’ booty in the 1990s.  As shown in 
Chapter 4, corrupt officials in Indonesia and China have aided this process by 




Interstate Relations on Anti-piracy Cooperation 
Piracy in Southeast Asia is generally a transnational crime involving parties 
or processes in more than one country.  As such, the suppression of piracy requires 
related states to cooperate.  Since the early 1990s, the littoral countries have been 
cooperating in anti-piracy operations.  However, divergences in national interests in 
the littoral states have resulted in different priorities and incentives regarding anti-
piracy operations.  The national interests of the littoral states have formed the basis 
for building anti-piracy policies.  For example, in the eyes of Indonesian officials, 
piracy in Southeast Asia is petty theft, which does not have a great impact on its 
national interests. In contrast, Singapore, which is highly dependent on its ports, 
considers piracy as a threat to its national security.  Such perceptions, in turn, are 
reflected in the states’ priorities in and incentives for combating piracy.  
In terms of priorities in and incentives for combating piracy, Indonesia has 
given the lowest priority to anti-piracy operations, Singapore the highest, while 
Malaysia falls in between these two countries.  These differences are reflected in 
anti-piracy policies and agreements.  For example, the Indonesian government was 
reluctant to spend money on combating piracy, which was not their priority 
concern as they had more important maritime issues to deal with, such as illegal 
fishing in territorial waters. 
Anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia can be divided into two phases, with 
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the turning point being the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America 
(hereafter, 9/11):  
Phase One (1992-2001). Anti-piracy cooperation was characterised by low-
profile, bilateral and multilateral cooperation amongst ASEAN and East Asian 
countries.  Japan played an important role in anti-piracy initiatives.  However, these 
initiatives were not effective in suppressing piracy.  On the contrary, piratical 
incidents continued to rise in number. 
Phase Two (2002-2005). In the aftermath of 9/11, the possibility of a terrorism 
and piracy nexus raised worldwide concern.  The United States attempted to 
integrate anti-piracy operations into its global anti-terrorism framework, through 
the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), together with the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), created by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO).  At the same time, the Untied States dominated 
international conferences on maritime security issues, such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asian Security Summits (known as the “Shangri-la 
Dialogue”).  Against this backdrop, regional anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast 
and East Asia was enhanced.  The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was concluded in 
2004.  The ReCAAP is the first government-level organization amongst 16 Asian 
countries, with an aim to enhance multilateral cooperation in anti-piracy operations 
(as will be elaborated on in Chapter 5).  
Following 9/11, the littoral states have been under considerable external 
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pressure, mainly from the United States, to combat piracy. As the incentives to 
combat piracy were thereby raised, there were some policy shifts, more patrols 
began to be carried out, and piracy incidents began to decline.  After three years’ 
efforts (2002-2004) by the littoral states and other stakeholders, piracy in the Straits 





Piracy in Southeast Asian history 
Accounts of piracy in early Southeast Asia are scattered throughout Chinese 
historical records.  This dissertation draws heavily on these records, many of which 
will appear in the English language for the first time.  Western scholars are familiar 
with Shi Faxian’s accounts of piracy in the Straits of Malacca, and Wang Dayuan’s 
account of piracy in Temasek (Singapore).9  However, there are other Chinese 
records of piracy in Chinese travel notes and imperial archives: for example, Ying 
Ya Sheng Lan, Zhu Pan Zi and The Imperial Archives.  This study presents insights 
drawn from these newly translated materials in Chapter 2. 
                                                        
9 Shi Faxian, Faxian Zhuan Jiaozhu [Annotated Faxian Autobiography] (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Guji Chuanshe, 1985), and Wang Da-yuan, Dao Yi Zhi Lue Jiao Shi [Notes on Barbarian 
Islands](Beijing: Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1981). 
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Much solid work, based on colonial records, has been done by scholars on 
piracy during the colonial period.  For example, Nicholas Tarling discusses the role 
of anti-piracy operations in British policy in the nineteenth century.10  Carl Trocki 
has examined the role of the Temenggong, known as the “Prince of pirates”, and 
the development of Johor and Singapore between 1784 and1885. 11   Timothy 
Barnard has studied maritime violence and Malay identity in Siak.12  James F. 
Warren and Laura Junker have investigated maritime raiding and pirate-state 
relations in the Spanish Philippines.13  Eric Tagliacozzo has discussed piracy and 
state building in the Dutch Indies.14  Joseph à Campo has analysed piracy in the 
Dutch Indies.15   
These scholars have provided insights into piracy in colonial Southeast Asia 
from different perspectives, which will be set out in the following chapter.  The 
reason for devoting a whole chapter to discussing piracy in Southeast Asian history 
is that we can draw lessons from the past, that will in turn inform an analytic 
framework for understanding contemporary piracy.   
                                                        
10 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 2. 
11Carl A. Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and 
Singapore, 1784–1885 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979).  
12 Timothy Barnard, “Texts, Raja Ismail, and Violence: Siak and the Transformation of Malay 
Identity in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies: Special Issue on Malay 
Identity, vol. 32, no. 3 (2001), 331–42. 
13 James Francis Warren, The Sulu Zone 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, 
and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 1981); Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: The Political 
Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999). 
14 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders. 
15  Joseph N. F. M. à Campo, "Discourse without Discussion: Representations of Piracy in 
Colonial Indonesia 1816–25," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34, no. 2 (2003):199–214. 
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From an analysis of the rise and fall of piracy during the colonial period, I 
have developed the analytic framework for studying piracy, which examines the 
interactions between the three pairs of actors.  Furthermore, I have identified four 
variables that influence the rise and fall of piracy: Pirates, Prey, Politics and Places, 
as will be explained in the following chapter.  Later, I will reveal several 
interesting historical continuities and transformations, by comparing these 
variables in the contemporary period with their parallels in the colonial period.  
Furthermore, the studying of these variables makes it possible to predict piracy 
trends in the near future, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
 
Piracy in Contemporary Southeast Asia 
 
There are many scholarly accounts of contemporary piracy, written from 
various perspectives.  Jack Gottschalk and Brian Flanagan provide a historical 
perspective on piracy worldwide, introduce its modern dimensions, and present 
possible solutions to suppress piracy.  However, they focus on piracy in the golden 
ages of America and the Mediterranean, rather than on piracy in Southeast Asian 
history, and the parts regarding contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia leave 
several important gaps.16 
Peter Chalk, one of the pioneering scholars of contemporary piracy in 
                                                        
16 Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian P. Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of 
Modern Piracy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000). 
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Southeast Asia, emphasises that state sponsorship and support has contributed to 
modern piracy in Southeast Asia.  He notes that a variety of maritime bodies have 
long asserted that certain gangs in Southeast Asia are operating with official 
backing and training, which accounts for the quasi-military and ‘professional’ style 
of contemporary piracy.  This dissertation incorporates these claims into its 
analysis. However, Chalk’s claims about a “Chinese Conspiracy” appear to be 
spurious, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.17 
Barry H. Dubner, Alfred P. Rubin, Hasjim Djalal, Robert C. Beckman and 
Zou Keyuan have studied piracy from an international law perspective.  Dubner 
has made a thorough exploration of laws relating to international maritime piracy, 
compiled much relevant information and responded to some of the questions posed 
by legal publicists.18  Rubin has looked into the origins and the evolution of the 
concept of piracy in England and the United States, discussed British practice on 
piracy in the 19th century, and has discussed the international law on piracy in the 
20th century.19  Djalal has discussed the articles relating to piracy in the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and their implications, and 
investigated the piracy situation in Indonesia, as well as international anti-piracy 
cooperation. 20   Beckman has analysed the reported piracy incidents and the 
attempts by the international community to deal with this problem.  He concludes 
                                                        
17 Santo Darmosumarto, "The P.R.C. and Piracy in the South China Sea," (MA Thesis, University 
of Victoria, 1997). 
18 Barry Hart Dubner, The Law of International Sea Piracy: Developments in International Law, 
V. 2. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff Publishers 1979). 
19 Rubin, The Law of Piracy, 241–263. 
20 Hasjim Djalal, "Piracy in Southeast Asia: Indonesian & Regional Responses," Jurnal Hukun 
International[Indonesian Journal of International Law] 1, no. 3 (2004): 419–440. 
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with various recommendations on steps that should be taken by the international 
community and states in Southeast Asia.21  
Zou Keyuan has discussed the international legal regime regarding piracy, 
such as the UNCLOS, the UN Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Convention), and the Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf (the SUA Protocol).  Zou has also considered 
domestic laws regarding piracy in China, Japan and the three littoral states of the 
Straits of Malacca (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), as well as in other ASEAN 
countries.22  This dissertation espouses several insights from Zou’s studies, such as 
the linkages amongst, and implications of, legal instruments.   
Sam Bateman, who has given insights into the obstacles facing anti-piracy 
cooperation in Southeast Asia, also inspires this study.  The present study applies 
his methods on the analysis of maritime security, as shown in chapter 5.23 
Jason Abbot and Neil Renwick, John Mo, John F. Bradford, and Adam J. 
Young and Mark J. Valencia have examined piracy from an international relations 
perspective.  Abbot and Renwick considered contemporary piracy in the light of 
theoretical developments within international relations and new definitions of 
                                                        
21 Robert C. Beckman, "Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Southeast Asia: 
The Way Forward," Ocean Development & International Law, no. 33 (2002): 317–341. 
22 Zou Keyuan, Enforcing the Law of Piracy in the South China Sea, EAI Background Brief, No. 
19 (Singapore: East Asian Institute National University of Singapore, 1998), Zou Keyuan, 
"Seeking Effectiveness for the Crackdown of Piracy at Sea," Journal of International Affairs 59, 
no. 1 (2005): 117–131. 
23 Sam Bateman, "Piracy and the Challenge of Cooperative Security and Enforcement Policy," in 
Ocean Governance and Sustainable Development in Pacific Region, ed. Douglas M. Johnston 
and Ankana Sirivivatnanon (Bangkok: Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean Law Policy and 
Management, 2002), 354. 
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security. 24   Mo focused on the efficiency of suppressing maritime piracy in 
Southeast Asia. 25   Bradford discussed the causes of the Japanese anti-piracy 
initiatives and the responses of the littoral states.26  Young and Valencia asserted 
that the conflation of “piracy” and “terrorism” in Southeast Asia has become 
common since 11 September 2001.27  These works all give some insight into piracy 
in Southeast Asia, but differ in certain respects from the approach and argument 
made in this dissertation. 
 
Contribution of this dissertation to the literature 
 
This dissertation seeks to understand the logic behind the rise and fall of 
the phenomenon of piracy in Southeast Asia, by using an analytic framework that 
examines the interactions between the three pairs of actors.  Furthermore, I think it 
is important to elucidate contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia by drawing 
comparisons with piracy in Southeast Asian history.  To the best of my knowledge, 
few scholars have applied this approach, except for Adam Young, Ger Teitler and 
                                                        
24 Jason Abbot and Neil Renwick, "Pirates? Maritime Piracy and Social Security in Southeast 
Asia," Pacific Review 11, no. 1 February (1999): 7–24. 
25 John Mo, "Options to Combat Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia," Ocean Development & 
International Law, no. 33 (2002): 343–358. 
26 John F. Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and 
the Coastal State Responses," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004): 480–505. 
27 Young and Valencia "Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and 
Utility," Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 269–83. 
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James F. Warren. 28   However, these pioneer scholars have not systematically 
addressed the sets of interactions covered in this dissertation.  
Many scholars have discussed anti-piracy cooperation and its problems, 
but few scholars have examined the divergent national interests, incentives and 
capabilities of the littoral states, which explain the long-standing ineffectiveness of 
anti-piracy cooperation.  
Another distinguishing feature of this dissertation is the attention it pays to 
the ‘China factor’ in Southeast Asian piracy.  Unlike western scholars who have 
relied almost exclusively on colonial records, I present many findings from 
Chinese sources in the dissertation, which might be new for many English readers. 
This presents the piracy phenomenon from a fresh angle; for example, from the 
point of view of the Chinese “pirate traders” in the South China Sea and their 
interactions with Southeast Asian traders and subsequently with European 
colonizers.  
During the 1990s, China became a significant destination for pirates’ 
stolen ships, and many Chinese nationals were involved in piracy in Southeast Asia.  
For this reason, factors relating to China’s involvement in piracy in the region 
cannot be ignored if we are to understand the whole picture and network of 
contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia.  However, apart from Zou Keyuan, few 
                                                        
28 Ger Teitler, "Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Historical Comparison," MAST 1, no. 1 (2002); 
Adam J. Young, "Roots of Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia," in Piracy in 
Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, ed. Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, 
IIAS/ISEAS Series on Maritime Issues and Piracy in Asia (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005); 
James Francis Warren, A Tale of Two Centuries: The Globalisation of Maritime Raiding and 
Piracy in Southeast Asia at the End of the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ARI Working 
Paper No. 2 (Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, 2003). 
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scholars have carried out sufficient research in this area.29  This dissertation, using 
first-hand data collected in China during fieldwork, will throw new light on the 
Chinese dimension of Southeast Asian piracy.  
 
The Definition of Piracy  
 
A definition of piracy presents considerable controversy, both during the 
colonial period and the contemporary era alike.  In the colonial period, the 
definition of piracy was mainly driven by political demands, as a justification for 
expansionary state action.  Piracy, as maritime crime, also has many definitions in 
the contemporary era.  Currently, two definitions are well known. One is derived 
from international law, and the other is the IMB definition.  
Piracy is defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
1982 (UNCLOS), Article 101, which states that:  
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed; 
                                                        
29 Zou, Keyuan, “Piracy at Sea and China's Response,” Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly, August, (2000): 364-382. Also see Xu Ke, "Anti-Piracy Dilemma in Southeast Asia," 
in China-ASEAN Relations-Economic and Legal Dimensions, ed. John Wong, Zou Keyuan, and 
Zeng Huaqun. (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Pte.Ltd, 2006); Xu Ke, "Maritime Piracy 
in Southeast Asian Waters and Regional Security," Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asian Affairs], 
2003. Xu Ke, "Piracy, Seaborne Trade and the Rivalries of Foreign Sea Powers in Southeast 
Asia" in Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing Maritime Southeast Asia, ed. Graham Gerald 
Ong-Webbs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006). 
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(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).30 
This definition applies only to any of the described illegal acts committed 
either on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state.  Thus, technically, 
any violent and illegal acts against ships or property and people on board ships 
taking place in ports or inside territorial waters do not fall under the definition of 
Article 101.  Those illegal acts taking place in ports or within territorial waters, are 
defined as “armed robbery against ships” by the UN International Maritime 
Organization (IMO): 
Armed Robbery against Ships means any unlawful act of violence or detention or 
any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy”, directed 
against a ship or against persons or property on board the ship, within a State’s 
jurisdiction over such offences.31 
The second definition of piracy is the definition by the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce of (ICC).  The 
                                                        
30  International Seabed Authority. The Law of the Sea: Compendium of Basic Documents 
(Kingston: International Seabed Authority, Caribbean Law Publishing, 2001), 39. 
31  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January –31 
December 2004)," 2. 
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IMB defines piracy as “an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit 
theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the 
furtherance of that act”. 32   This definition is much wider than the UNCLOS 
Convention Article 101.  
However, many scholars argue that the current definitions are inadequate 
for policymakers.  For example, Dillon suggests that piracy should be categorized 
into four types: 
1. Corruption—Acts of extortion or collusion against marine vessels by 
government officials and/or port authorities;  
2. Sea robbery—Attacks that take place in port while the ship is berthed or 
anchored;  
3. Piracy—Actions against ships underway and outside the protection of port 
authorities in territorial waters, straits and the high seas; 
4. Maritime terrorism—Crimes against ships by terrorist organizations.33   
In my view, these categories might cause further confusion.  Corruption, for 
example, is surely one of the factors behind piracy, which will be elaborated on in 
Chapter 4, but it is difficult to identify and report this kind of crime.  Furthermore, 
maritime terrorism is a completely different kind of violence at sea, with political 
aims and implications.  Labelling piracy as maritime terrorism is dangerous and 
could lead to the abuse of anti-piracy operations, with its obvious parallel 
precedents during the colonial period. 
                                                        
32 ICC-IMB, Piracy Report 1992 (Kuala Lumpur: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1993), 2. 
33 Dana Dillon. “Maritime Piracy: Defining the Problem” SAIS Review 25.1(2005): 155–165. 
 20
Piracy is not a static crime, in that the jurisdiction that governs the crime 
scenes changes when pirates commit the crime within the territorial waters of one 
state and then move onto the high seas, or vice versa.  This means that the lines 
drawn between piracy (as defined by UNCLOS) and armed robbery are sometimes 
blurred.  Therefore, this dissertation adopts the most common definition of piracy, 
the IMB definition; that is that “piracy” refers to both “piracy” as defined under 
Article 101 of the UNCLOS and “armed robbery against ships”, as defined by the 
IMO. 
 
Data Sources on Contemporary Piracy 
 
Statistics 
Piracy data are difficult to acquire, and currently there is no inter-governmental 
organization to compile such information. 34   Furthermore, some littoral 
governments consider piracy as a sensitive issue, and are reluctant to publicise their 
data.  The IMB and IMO Piracy Reports are the only two time-series reports on 
contemporary piracy available to the public.  
The statistics data on piracy (1990-2005) used in this dissertation come from 
the ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
                                                        
34  According to the ReCAAP agreement, Information Sharing Centre (ISC), a government-
government level organization, will compile official piracy data.  The ISC was set up in 
Singapore in November 2006.  
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Annual Report” (IMB Piracy Report), and the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) piracy reports.  However, the IMB and IMO reports only present statistical 
figures, which are not sufficient to cover the full dimensions of piracy, as the 
specifics of many cases only end up being written down after pirates have been 
caught.   
Clues about piracy and its relationship with the shipping industry and 
governments can also be derived from various sources.  Newspaper reports and 
international magazines, shipping columns, government gazettes, treaties, court 
cases, photographs, video reports and witness testimonials are also important 




Most of these accounts are based on first-hand encounters with pirates.  
One example is the book written by Captain Ken Blyth of MT PETRO RANGER. 
This vessel was attacked by a group of pirates in the South China Sea in 1998.35  In 
another book, Robert Stuart wrote “an eye-opening account” of his meetings with 
real pirates in Indonesia.36  John Burnett provides first-hand accounts of piracy 
                                                        
35 Ken Blyth and Peter Corris, Petro-Pirates: The Hijacking of the Petro Ranger (St Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 2000). 
36  Robert Stuart, In Search of Pirates: A Modern-Day Odyssey in the South China Sea 
(Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2002). 
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from the point of view of the victims.37  These sources reveal some first-hand 
information on pirates’ origins, organization and modus operandi. However, some 
accounts are fictionalized and possibly exaggerated, and should be treated with 
some scepticism.  
 
Author’s Interviews  
 
Oral accounts acquired in interviews have also been extremely helpful 
sources.  When I was doing my fieldwork in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
China, I interviewed a number of people from the shipping industry, governments, 
non-governmental organizations, law enforcement agencies and academic circles, 
and acquired a great deal of first-hand information related to piracy.  Fieldwork 
also provided documentary material.  For example, during my fieldwork in China, I 
acquired court records of the MV CHEONG SON case and the letter of a pirate who 
was involved in this case.  These documents provide insider views on how a pirate 
gang operates and help us to understand the real thoughts of pirates, as will be 
shown in chapter 5. 
I met some informants who alleged that they had close connections with 
pirates, and even that they had been a member of a pirate gang.  In terms of the 
interviews with victims of pirates, many victims were reluctant to recall the whole 
                                                        
37 John S. Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas (New York, 
N.Y.: Plume, 2002). 
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story: one of my informants told me his feeling was similar to that of a girl being 
raped; it was too painful or shameful for them to talk about the tragedy.  Since 
piracy is a sensitive issue in these countries, most of my informants do not wish to 
mentioned by name; thus in the dissertation, some names of informants have been 
omitted, but the information in the interviews has remained unchanged.  
 
Outline of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation has six chapters.  Chapter 2 reviews the history of piracy 
in Southeast Asia, focusing on relations between piracy, seaborne trade and the 
rivalry of foreign sea powers, and discusses the European colonizers’ suppression 
of piracy in Southeast Asia.  This chapter also considers the four main variables 
behind the origins of piracy: “prey, pirate, politics and place”, as well as other 
factors, such as national interests, incentives and capabilities, which influence the 
outcome of anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asian history. 
Chapter 3 explores the shipping industry-piracy nexus in Southeast Asia.  
This chapter reviews the shipping industry and piracy in colonial Southeast Asia, 
examines the development of the contemporary shipping industry in Southeast Asia, 
discusses the trend of contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia, and analyses the 
dilemmas of the shipping industry in anti-piracy operations.  
Chapter 4 looks at how state actors respond to piracy.  This chapter reveals 
different aspects of piracy, such as its origin, modus operandi and organization.  It 
 24
uses the famous “CHEUNG SON Case” to illustrate pirate-state relations.  The 
chapter then goes on to reflect on anti-piracy agencies and their capabilities in the 
littoral states, and the domestic laws and policies on anti-piracy cooperation.  
Finally it further analyzes pirate-state relations by discussing the collusion between 
pirates and law enforcement agencies.   
Chapter 5 analyses inter-state anti-piracy cooperation.  This chapter begins 
with an overview of anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia, then moves on to 
exploring various international instruments in anti-piracy operations, such as the 
international legal framework and the measures required by international 
organizations.  Finally, it analyses anti-piracy dilemmas amongst the Southeast 
Asian countries.  
Chapter 6 reviews this dissertation’s explanation for the rise and fall of 
contemporary piracy.  It explains why piracy remained at high levels from the mid-
1990s to 2003, and why it has declined from 2004 up to the present.  This chapter 
discusses the historical turning point, 9/11 in 2001, and its impact on anti-piracy 
cooperation in Southeast Asia.  After 9/11, the incentives and capabilities of the 
littoral countries with regard to anti-piracy cooperation were enhanced, which has 
led to the subsequent significant decline in the number of piracy incidents.  The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the historical continuity and transformation 
of piracy in Southeast Asia, and offers a prediction regarding piracy trends in the 
near future.  
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CHAPTER 2 





Piracy and seaborne trade are clearly interrelated.  Seaborne trade provides 
the prey for pirates, and shapes the patterns and scope of piracy.  This chapter 
examines piracy and seaborne trade relations and discusses the logic behind the rise 
and fall of piracy in Southeast Asia up to the twentieth century.1  The chapter is 
divided into five parts: the first part reviews the history of piracy and seaborne 
trade in the pre-colonial period of Southeast Asia; the second part introduces the 
European colonisers’ piratical activities in Southeast Asia and their relations with 
the Chinese empires; the third part discusses Chinese pirates in the South China 
Sea; the fourth analyses piracy in the Malay Archipelago and how the European 
colonisers suppressed piracy, and the final section discusses the variables in the rise 
and fall of piracy in Southeast Asian history.  
 
                                                        
1 Southeast Asia in this dissertation mainly refers to the Malay Archipelago and the South China 
Sea. 
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Part I.  Piracy and Seaborne Trade before the Colonial 
Period 
Nanhai Trade and the Chinese Tributary System 
Three centuries before the Christian era, the Chinese were already trading 
in Southeast Asia (hereinafter often called its Chinese name, the Nanyang) in what 
was termed the Nanhai trade. 2   Historical records show that this trade route 
extended from China’s southern ports to western Borneo, Palembang, the Indian 
Ocean and eventually all the way to countries in the Roman Empire.3   
In the age of sail, seaborne trade was highly dependent on the monsoons.4  
In answer to marine merchants’ needs to wait out the period between monsoons and 
safely conduct business, many entrepôts and kingdoms sprang up around Southeast 
Asia—in the Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, the Java Sea and the Straits of 
Malacca.5  
From the fifth to the ninth century, Chinese Buddhist pilgrims began to use 
the seaborne trade route via Southeast Asia to India.  Some of them headed for the 
                                                        
2 Nanyang [literally the southern ocean] and Nanhai [literally the southern sea] are the Chinese 
terms for Southeast Asia and Indian Ocean. 
3 Wang Gungwu, The Nanhai Trade: Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 2003). 
4 From April to August, monsoon winds blow northwards towards the Asian land mass; from 
December to March they blow southwards, from the Asian continent to the Indian Ocean and South 
China Sea.  Traders made their long journeys during times of favourable winds and returned on the 
opposite monsoon.  Chinese ships sailed south to the Nanyang following the northern monsoon in 
January or February, and returned home in June, July or August with the southern monsoon.  South 
Indian ships sailed eastward between April and August under the southwest monsoon of the Indian 
Ocean. They remained in the region to trade, returning in December with the southward blowing 
monsoon.  
5 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680, vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988), 64–65. 
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Indonesian empire of Srivijaya for language study before continuing on to India 
(see Map 1).6  
 
Map 1 Monsoon seaborne trade in Souteast Asia in early fifteenth century 
Source: Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet? (London: McGill-
Queen’s University Press 
 
In the Song dynasty (960-1279), China’s Nanhai trade boomed.7  The Yuan 
Dynasty that followed (1271-1368) continued to promote Nanhai trade after their 
                                                        
6 Shi Faxian, Fa Xian Zhuan Jiao Zhu [The Travel Notes of Faxian] (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji 
Chuban She, 1985). 
7 Zhao Rushi, Zhu Pan Zhi [Description of the Barbarians] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2000).  
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conquest of China.  The Yuan government even provided loans to Chinese traders, 
taking a percentage of their trading profits in return.8 
In 1368, the Mongol Yuan Dynasty was overthrown by the Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1664).  The founder of the Ming Dynasty, Emperor Hongwu, suspected that 
the Mongol-sponsored south sea trade might be a threat to his new empire, and 
consequently imposed severe restrictions on any trade with Southeast Asia.  Private 
trade with the Nanyang was banned; however, illicit trade with the Nanyang still 
continued, and piracy was rampant.9  This period will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
       When the Emperor Yongle came to the Ming throne in 1402, the official 
tributes system of trading was revived and enhanced.  The Emperor Yongle 
dispatched Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho) to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.  
From 1405 to 1433, Zheng He conducted seven legendary voyages of diplomacy, 
commerce and scientific exploration.  These voyages ranged as far west as the east 
coast of Africa, almost a century before Christopher Columbus set foot in the 
Americas or Vasco da Gama’s first caught sight of the coast of India.10 
 
Piracy in the Early History of Southeast Asia 
 
                                                        
8 Wang Dayuan, Dao Yi Zhi Lue Jiao Shi [Notes on Barbarian Islands] Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 
1981), 21. 
9 Wang Gungwu, Community and Nation, Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, (Singapore: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1981), 14.  
10 Frank Viviano, "China's Great Voyager," National Geographic 208, no. 1 (2005): 28–53. 
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The earliest historical record of piracy in Southeast Asia dates back to the first 
century.  A famous Chinese historian in the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220), Ban Gu 
(b.32, d.92) recorded that piracy existed along the seaborne trade route that 
stretched from China via Du Yuan Guo (Singapore) all the way to Yi Cheng Bu Guo 
(Sri Lanka).11   
The well-known Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, Shi Faxian, who travelled to India 
overland in 399 A.D. and returned to Guangzhou by sea via Sri Lanka in 412 A.D. 
recorded many incidents of piracy in the Straits of Malacca in his travel journals.  
He recorded that, “[in the Straits of Malacca], the sea is infested with pirates, and 
any passengers who encounter them will lose everything”.12  
The kingdom of Champa (192-1832) in modern-day southern Vietnam was 
notorious for its seagoing population who engaged in piracy.  For fear of attack, 
many seaborne traders steered clear of passing too close to the Cham coast when 
they travelled from the Straits of Malacca to China.  This weakened the appeal of 
Cham ports for foreign traders.13  
Even the great Srivijaya—the powerful Buddhist kingdom in South Sumatra 
during the late seventh to twelfth centuries, and whose trade links spanned from 
Arabia to China—was victim to the pilferage of sea marauders.  Srivijaya’s 
monarchs were unable to keep these pirates in check, and eventually had to 
surrender a portion of their port revenues to some of the pirates in return for a 
                                                        
11 Ban Gu (b.32-d.92), Hanshu Dili Zhi Huishi  [The Annotated Geography Book of Annals of 
Han Dynasty] (Anhui: Anhui Jiayu Chubanshe, 2006), 518.  
12 Shi Faxian, Fa Xian Zhuan Jiao Zhu, 167. 
13 Wang, Dao Yi Zhi Lue Jiao Shi, 55. 
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promise to refrain from raiding ships in the open sea.14  
At the end of the thirteenth century, Srivijaya was conquered by the 
Javanese Hindu Empire, Majapahit, whose centre was in East Java.  Piratical 
attacks in its waters were recorded in a Chinese monograph on the Nanyang, Zhu 
Pan Zhi, published in 1225.  The author, Zhao Rushi, was a Chinese official who 
was in charge of foreign seaborne trade with the Nanyang in Fujian province.  “The 
foreign ships were often attacked by pirates [near Sujiadanai, Kalimantan]”, Zhao 
recorded. “The captives were the favourite of pirates, since one captive can sell for 
2 liang or 3 liang of gold, and this piracy inhibits merchants from visiting these 
ports”.15  
As seaborne trade increased, the southern end of the Straits of Malacca 
became a pirate-prone area.  A famous Chinese traveller, Wang Dayuan, who 
visited Southeast Asia several times during the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), 
described pirate attacks near Temasek [Singapore] in 1349: 
The Dragon-teeth Strait [Longyamen] which resembles ‘dragon’s teeth”, lies 
between the two hills of the Temasek barbarians. 16  Through the centre runs a 
waterway.  The fields are barren and the rice harvest is poor.  The climate is hot, 
with heavy rainfall in April and May.  The inhabitants are addicted to piracy… 
When junks sail to the Western Ocean [Indian Ocean], the local barbarians allow 
them to pass unmolested, but when the junks reach the Jilimen [Karimun Islands] 
                                                        
14 Ibid., 202. 
15 Liang: A Chinese weight unit for gold or silver bullion.  See Zhao, Zhu Pan Zhi, 61. 
16 The Dragon teeth Strait was the present-day Keppel Harbour passage between the south coast of 
Singapore island. The dragon teeth were the twin rocks overlooked the European entrance to Keppel 
Harbour.  One of the rocks, known as Batu Belayar, was demolished in 1848, during the widening 
of the Strait.  
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on their return voyage, some 200-300 pirate prahu will converge on and attack 
the junks for several days. The crew of the junks have to fight with their bare 
hands, and raise up a cloth screen to protect themselves from arrows.  Sometimes, 
the junks are lucky enough to escape on a favourable wind; if not, the crew are 
butchered and their merchandise becomes the pirates’ booty.17  
In the first decade of the fifteenth century, Chen Zuyi, a Cantonese outlaw 
of the Ming Dynasty, fled to Palembang in Sumatra, where there was a large 
Chinese population.  Chen became the leader of the Chinese community there, and 
frequently robbed ships that passed through the Straits of Malacca.18  The Ming 
Dynasty became concerned about the maritime security in the Straits of Malacca.  
In 1405, the Ming emperor ordered Admiral Zheng He to suppress any pirates he 
might meet during his voyage to the Indian Ocean.  The Admiral succeeded in 
defeating many pirates, and Chen Zuyi, the pirate chief, was captured and 
beheaded in the capital of the Chinese Empire.19 
                                                        
17 Wang, Dao Yi Zhi Lue Jiao Shi, 213–14. 
18 Feng Chengjun, Ying Ya Sheng Lan Jiao Zhu [the Annotated Notes on Overseas Islands] 
(Taibei: Taiwan Shangwu, 1970), 17. 
19 Ming Shi Lu, (Taiwan: Zhongyang Lishi Yanjusuo, 1966), Vol.11, 987. 
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Part II.  The Advent of European Colonisers in Southeast 
Asia 
 
The Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511, marking the advent of European 
colonisation in Southeast Asia.  Spanish, Dutch and British traders successively 
penetrated Southeast Asia.  They used all means to maximise their profits, first 
launching piratical attacks on indigenous people in the Nanyang and merchants 
from China, and subsequently setting up colonies in Southeast Asia to develop a 
secure trade network between Europe and China. 
 
Portuguese   
A major impetus for Portugal’s overseas expansion was the spice trade—
pepper, cinnamon, and the most precious and highly prized three—cloves, nutmeg, 
and mace.20  In the second half of the fifteenth century, Turkish control of the 
Levant forced traditional spice routes to shift, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.  
In order to avoid dependence on and to cut out the Muslim middleman, so as to 
participate directly in the highly lucrative spice trade, the Portuguese searched 
relentlessly for a new sea route to Asia.  Prince Henry the Navigator in particular 
lent strong support to a campaign of overseas discovery and expansion.   This 
                                                        
20 Charles Corn, The Scents of Eden: a Narrative of the Spice Trade (New York: Kodansha 
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culminated in Vasco da Gama's successful landing in Calicut, on the west coast of 
India, in 1498. 21   In 1511, the Portuguese captured Malacca, the lynchpin of 
seaborne trading, and began to seek domination of the spice trade.22 
 
The Spaniards 
The earliest Spanish contact with Asia was in March 1521, when 
Magellan’s expedition reached the Philippines.  The Philippines was then under the 
direct jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Nueva Espana.23  Governor Miguel Lopez 
de Legazpi realised that there was great potential for Spanish participation in the 
thriving seaborne trade between these islands and China.  In 1571, Legazipi moved 




After the Dutch declared independence from Spain in 1579, Dutch 
merchants began to compete with the Portuguese in the Spice Islands.  Unlike the 
Portuguese and Spanish expeditions, which were paid for by their crowned heads 
                                                        
21  M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian 
Archipelago between 1500 and About 1630 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962). 
22 Chang Tien-tse, Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644: a Synthesis of Portuguese and 
Chinese Sources (New York: AMS Press, 1973), 33. 
23 Nueva Espana: New Spain, present-day Mexico. 
24Leonard Y. Andaya, “Interactions with the Outside World and Adaptation in Southeast Asian 
Society, 1500-1800,” in  The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Nicholas Tarling ed. Volume 
One, Part Two, [paperback edition] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12. 
 34
of state, Dutch merchants had to collaborate to raise sufficient money for their 
voyages.25  
In 1602, the Dutch formed the Vereenigde Ost-Indische Compagnie 
(Chartered East India Company, also known as the VOC), an amalgamation of six 
regional trading firms.  The company charter secured a commercial monopoly in 
the Far East, and conferred its members with quasi-sovereign powers to declare 
and wage war, conclude peace treaties and alliances, acquire colonies and establish 
settlements.26  
In 1619, the VOC seized the port of Jakarta (Djakarta), renamed it Batavia, 
and made it the company's headquarters.  A decade later, the VOC succeeded the 
Portuguese stranglehold on the spice trade.  The Dutch took Taiwan in 1624 and 
captured Malacca from the Portuguese in 1641.27  They also besieged Manila, but 
failed to defeat the Spaniards.  Spain remained in control of the Philippines and the 
Portuguese held onto Macao, Goa, and East Timor.  Apart from these strongholds, 
all commerce in the Far East came under the VOC’s control.  However, in 1661, 
the Dutch lost Taiwan to the son of a Chinese pirate, named Zheng Chenggong.  
His story will be discussed in a later section.  
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While the Dutch were forcing their way into Southeast Asia, Britain was 
busy forming its own East India Company, (EIC), which was founded in 1600.28  
After several voyages to Southeast Asia, the British realised that British goods 
would not be profitable in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, but Southeast Asian 
goods were essential for the barter trade with China.29  
In 1786, the British leased Penang Island in Malaya from the local sultan 
and seized the port of Malacca from the Dutch in 1795. 30   In 1819, Thomas 
Stamford Raffles set up Singapore as a colony, and gave Britain a dominant role in 
Far Eastern commerce.  Raffles turned Singapore into an attractive free port, where 
anyone could bring cargo without paying the duties imposed in Batavia and at 
other Dutch ports.  However, the waters surrounding Singapore soon became 
pirate-prone, and this will be dealt with later in this chapter.31  
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The Relations between European Colonisers and Chinese 
Empires  
Sino-Portuguese Relations 
After the Portuguese seized Malacca in 1511, the King of Portugal sent his 
ambassador to China to establish a direct trade link with China.  The King of 
Malacca, Sultan Mahmet, begged for assistance from his patron, the Chinese 
Emperor for help.  His son, Tuan Mohammed, was sent to Peking (Beijing) to 
report the Portuguese outrage on Malacca:   
The Franges [Portuguese] robbers audaciously came to Malacca with many men, 
took the land and destroyed it, killed many people, plundered them, and took 
others prisoner.  The people that remain are under the jurisdiction of the Franges.  
For this reason, the king of Malacca had a sad heart and was oppressed with a 
great fear.  He took the seal of the King of China and fled to Bentao where he 
remains.  The ambassador of the King of Portugal who is now in the land of China 
is a sham.  He does not come in earnest, but to deceive the country of China. In 
order that the King of China may show grace to the King of Malacca whose heart 
is oppressed, he sends a present, and begs for succour and men so that his land 
may be restored to him.32  
The Chinese Emperor was unwilling to help the Sultan of Malacca, since 
the priority of the Ming dynasty at that time was to expel the Mongol raiders from 
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Northern China, and to protect its coastal provinces from attacks by the Wokou, or 
Japanese pirates.  In the absence of any strong action from China’s ruler, the 
Portuguese took every opportunity to loot and extort money from all the ships 
bound for and coming from China’s ports.  According to Chinese historical records, 
the Portuguese ravaged Chinese coastal settlements, raping women, and seizing 
males for slaves.  “The Portuguese committed the most licentious acts of piracy, 
and demonstrated the most shameful dissoluteness.  They regard trade and piracy 
as almost identical: a concept which was certainly not shared by most of the Asiatic 
and other European peoples.”33 
 
Spanish Colonisers and the Chinese Empire 
In 1571, the Spanish colonial government moved from Cebu to Manila and 
established direct trade ties with Chinese traders.  Five years later, Chinese trade 
with the Spanish in the port of Manila began to flourish. Chinese merchants 
brought silk, cotton fabric, and other wares to trade with merchants from Acapulco, 
who in return offered silver from their American colonies.  This so called “galleon 
trade” continued until the late eighteenth century.34 
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Dutch Colonisers and the Chinese Empire  
In 1601, the Dutch sailed to Macao in an attempt to establish direct trade 
links with the Ming governments.35  However, the Portuguese proved stronger and 
prevented the Dutch from contacting Chinese officials, thus thwarting Dutch aims.  
The Dutch planned to drive the Portuguese out of Macao and defeat the Spanish 
fleet in Manila, with the aim of eventually establishing a monopoly on trade with 
China and Japan.  In 1622, a Dutch fleet attacked Macao, but it was defeated by the 
Portuguese.36   
However, the Dutch seized the Pescadores (Penghu), islands off the coast of 
Taiwan, from China, proceeded to rob Chinese merchant ships and loot the coastal 
cities of Fujian.  Dutch Captain Willem Bonteko, recorded these raids in his travel 
notes:   
[1st May 1623] On our way we met with another Chinese junk, richly laden to the 
value of thousands, that was bound for the Manillas [Manila].  We took it, which  
had as much as 250 souls [on board]…We brought them all to the Pescadores; 
there, with the other Chinese we had brought in other ships and sloops, and we tied 
them together in pairs.  We used them to carry earth to the fort, yea, when the fort 
was built, they were as much as much as 1,400 in number, who were afterwards 
taken to Batavia and there sold. 37  
More than half of the captives died on Pescadores in 1623; only 571 were 
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left to be shipped to Batavia, and no more than 33 disembarked alive.  The 
commander of the expedition, Dr. Sonck, wrote to the Governor-General De 
Carpentier: 
Our proceedings on the coast of China have so embittered the whole of China 
against us that we are looked upon as no better than murderers, tyrants and pirates.  
Our dealings with the Chinese have indeed been very hard and cruel, and in my 
opinion such that the desired trade could never be obtained by them.38 
However, the Dutch did not occupy Pescadores for long.  In 1661, the Dutch were 
defeated and driven out of the islands by Zheng Chenggong.39 
 
British Colonisers and the Chinese Empire 
After several frustrated diplomatic contacts with the Chinese Empire, the 
British also faced commercial problems with the Chinese Empire.40  In order to 
contain European commercial expansion, the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) set up the 
Canton System to administer China’s trade with the Europeans.  From the 1720s, 
Britain’s rapidly increasing tea consumption made tea its foremost import from 
China.  As there was virtually no market for European products in China, the 
international tea trade saw a large amount of silver bullion flowing into China. To 
solve the trade deficit and re-establish the balance of Sino-European trade, the 
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British smuggled opium into China using it to purchase tea.  However, the 
increased inflow of opium inflow caused considerable and serious social problems.  
The Qing government eventually took firm measures against opium smuggling.  
Since the profit from the opium trade was the main income of the East India 
Company, the British did not hesitate to abandon its commercial efforts and resort 
to military force so as to protect this highly lucrative trade.41   
 
Part III. Chinese Pirates in the South China Sea 
 
Illicit Seaborne Trade and Chinese Pirate merchants  
During the Ming and Qing dynasties, private seaborne trade with the Nanyang 
was largely prohibited or strictly monitored by the Chinese Emperors, or with the 
use of the Haijin policy.42  The principal reason was that the Chinese Emperors 
wanted to monopolise trade with the Nanyang.  Official trade was conducted using 
the tributes system.  Foreign countries first paid tribute to the Ming emperor, and 
the Emperor in return showered the visitors more lavishly than the real value of the 
foreign tributes.  This display of wealth and power was a political gesture to 
demonstrate that the Chinese Empire was generous and superior to the “barbarian 
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states”.43  In short, all overseas kingdoms wishing to trade with China were made 
to recognise the Chinese Empire’s suzerainty.44 
The Chinese Emperors treated the European colonial sea powers in the same 
way and expected them to follow the tribute system.  Thus European requests to 
establish regular seaborne trade relations were refused. In consequence, European 
colonisers resorted to dealing with illicit, profit-oriented Chinese private traders.45 
These Chinese private merchants came from Southern China’s coastal 
provinces of, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong.  These traders had been engaged in 
the lucrative Nanhai trade for centuries.  During the Haijin period, spurred by high 
profits, Chinese private traders armed themselves, looted sea coasts and robbed 
ships, and then used the booty in their illicit trade with the Nanyang.  These private 
merchants were known as “Pirate merchants”, who had paradoxical dual identities, 
being merchant and pirate rolled into one.  In the Ming dynasty, Chinese coastal 
provinces also suffered attacks the Wokou, or Japanese pirates. 46   The Wokou 
phenomenon was caused by the illicit trade which stretched from Japan and China 
to Southeast Asia. 47  In reality, over seventy percent of the Wokou were actually 
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Chinese pirates from Fujian and Zhejing provinces; they simply pretended to be 
Japanese pirates, known for their brutality, so as to terrify coastal peoples.48 
In the Ming Dynasty, there were many pirate merchant groups who had direct 
trade links with Southeast Asia, the most prominent groups being Zheng Zhilong 
and his son Zheng Chenggong (Coxingya), Lin Feng (Limahong) and Lin Daoqian.  
 
Zheng’s Pirate-Merchant Group 
Zheng Zhilong’s pirate merchant group was the most famous and powerful 
in all of China’s private seaborne trade history.  Zheng Zhilong was born in a 
fishing village in Fujian in 1604.  On reaching adulthood, he went to Macao to look 
for a better life.  In Macao, Zhilong was baptised and accepted into the Portuguese 
Catholic Church, and bore a Christian name, Jaspar, also known as Nicolas Iquan.49  
From the Portuguese, Zhilong also learned Lusitanian, which was the common 
language used by European merchants in the Far East.  Zhilong worked under the 
Dutch as an interpreter in Taiwan for a while and went to Japan.  In Japan, Zhilong 
got to know a wealthy Fujian merchant, Yan Siqi.  Zhilong was quickly promoted 
to an important position and soon handled Yan’s business with the Portuguese.  
After Yan’s death in 1625, Zhilong took over all of Yan’s commercial fleet and 
turned pirate.  Zheng Zhilong’s pirate-merchant group was run out of his 
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hometown Fujian.  In the chaotic interim period (1640-46) between the collapse of 
the Ming dynasty and the establishment of the Qing dynasty, this pirate group 
controlled nearly all Chinese seaborne trade with Japan and the Nanyang, as well 
as business with the Portuguese, the Spanish and the Dutch.50 
In 1646, Zheng Zhilong was lured to Beijing, where he was killed by 
Manchus officials.  His son, Zheng Chenggong, alias Coxingya, took over the 
powerful fleets.  Zheng Chenggong chased the Dutch out of Taiwan in 1661 and 
made it his new base.  The Dutch continued their trade with Zheng Chenggong 
even after being driven off Taiwan, as they were dependent on Zheng Chenggong 
for access to Chinese merchandise.  One example of such trade was in 1628, when 
Zheng Chenggong signed a contract with the VOC for the purchase of silk, under 
which Zheng Chenggong supplied 3000 dan of sugar, 6000 dan of silk and 5000 
items of silk to the Dutch, for which the Dutch paid 3000 dan of pepper and a 
quantity of cash.51   
Zheng Chenggong’s group acted in a quasi-governmental role in the coastal 
provinces.  They imposed taxes on private seaborne traders by issuing the 
“Coxingya Pass”.  The cost of a “Coxingya Pass” was calculated by the tonnage of 
the ships, usually between 2000-3000 liang of silver bullion.  If traders refused to 
pay, their ships would be robbed and destroyed.52  Nearly 3000 Chinese junks 
sailing to the Nanyang were under the control of Zheng Chenggong, who 
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accumulated a great deal of wealth and was even as wealthy as the Chinese 
Emperor.53 
Since Zheng Chenggong supported the declining Ming dynasty and fought 
against the southward expansion of the Manchu, he was deemed a patriot in the 
eyes of the Han Chinese.54  After the last member of the Ming family died and the 
Manchu’s Qing Dynasty gained control of the mainland, Zheng Chenggong 
retreated to Taiwan and established a kingdom.  The war with the Qing Dynasty 
gradually exhausted all his fortune made through seaborne trade. Zheng 
Chenggong’s kingdom declined, and in 1683, Zheng Chenggong’s grandson 
surrendered Taiwan to the Qing Dynasty.55 
 
Lin Feng (Limahong) 
Lin Feng was a Cantonese pirate chief, known to the Spanish as Limahong. 
He began his career in illicit trade in the Nanyang when he was 19.  In 1574, Lin 
Feng attacked Huilai in Guangdong, but later, his fleet was defeated by the imperial 
coast guard.  Lin Feng was no longer able to find a safe refuge along the Chinese 
coast, so he attempted to move his base to Luzon and set himself up as sovereign of 
the Philippine archipelago.  Lin Feng armed 72 junks, loaded with 2,000 soldiers 
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and experts, together with 1,500 women, in an effort to set up a colony in Manila.56 
In November 1574, Lin Feng’s fleet attacked Luzon, but was hindered by a 
storm that arose in Manila Bay.  They had to land at Paranaque, south of Manila, 
from where they marched on and attacked Manila; they were met by strong 
resistance from the Spanish and indigenous people.  Lin’s Japanese admiral Sioco 
was killed and the remaining pirates retreated to Cavite.  Lin abandoned his plans 
to use Manila as his capital and moved to Lingayen, Pangasinan.  At the end of 
March 1575, the Spanish besieged the Lin Feng pirate fleet.  The Chinese Navy in 
Fujian also sent its forces to attack Lin Feng.  However, in August 1575, after a 
battle lasting a few months, Lin Feng’s group managed to escape in small crafts 
under the cover of darkness.  The Chinese viceroy at Fujian was annoyed with the 
Spanish for allowing Li Feng to escape.  In consequence, the Spanish did not 
receive permission to establish a trading post in Amoy (Xiamen) as this had been 
promised in exchange for the capture of Lin Feng.57 
 
Lin Daoqian 
Lin Daoqian was a pirate chief in Guangdong.  In 1566, Lin’s fleet raided 
Zhao’an, in Fujian province, looted and burned down hundreds of houses and 
killed thousands of people.  Pursued by the imperial navy, Lin and his pirate fleet 
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fled to Penghu, Taiwan.  Lin hid his treasure on nearby Mount Dagu.58  In 1567, 
Lin used his treasure to recruit followers, and traded with Cambodia, Siam 
(Thailand) and Annam (Vietnam).  The Chinese government attempted to catch 
him, but failed.  Lin settled down in Patani, dealing in seaborne trade with China.  
Later, Lin was killed in Patani when one of his home-made cannons exploded.  
One of the cannons he made is said to be displayed to this day in Bangkok, 
Thailand.59 
 
Chinese Pirates as Vietnamese Privateers in the Qing Dynasty 
By the late eighteenth century, China was experiencing a rapid population 
growth, and consequently, there was increased stiff competition for resources and 
means of livelihood.  Two Southern coastal provinces, Guangdong and Fujian, 
were the hardest-hit provinces.  To seek a livelihood, many people from these 
provinces began to emigrate to the Nanyang.60  
Illicit seaborne trade between Vietnam and China was also booming at this 
time.  A surplus of Vietnamese rice, whose export was forbidden by Vietnamese 
law, was illegally imported to feed the Guangdong population.  The rice was 
imported in exchange for Chinese iron, the export of which was also banned by the 
Qing government.  These transactions were operated by fishermen using a well-
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established smuggling network.61 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Tay-son Rebellion (1771-1802), 
led by the Nguyen brothers from Tay-son village in Vietnam, broke out, and lasted 
for several decades.  The Tay-son rebels recruited Chinese pirates as privateers to 
acquire resources for war.  These Chinese pirates were also used as the rebels’ 
naval forces to destroy their opponents.62  In 1792, the Tay-son rebels ordered 40 
Chinese pirate ships to plunder Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang.  In 1794, the 
leader of the Chinese pirates, Chen Tianbu received the accolade of “Great 
governor-general” from his Tay-son sponsors.63  In 1802, the Tay-son Rebellion 
was finally defeated by Vietnamese rivals; thus, the Chinese pirates lost their 
sponsors and bases, and had to return home. 64    
After returning to China, the Chinese pirates divided into different gangs, 
squabbling and killing one another as they competed for the limited resources.  
These gangs finally realised that, in order to survive, it would be advantageous for 
them to collaborate.  In 1805, seven pirate gangs signed an agreement to form a 
confederation.  The pirate confederation numbered 50,000-70,000 pirates, and 
controlled trade and fishing along the coast of Vietnam and Guangdong province.65 
Chinese junks had to pay the pirates protection money when they left ports.  
From the coast, the pirates moved into the waterways of the interior, where they 
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extorted considerable sums in the form of semiannual payments from villages and 
towns, burning without impunity those that refused to pay.66 
The confederation also captured Europeans for ransom, with Portuguese 
traders moving between India and Philippines being the most vulnerable.  
Englishmen, Dutchmen and Americans were also occasionally seized.  For example, 
J.L. Turner, First Mate of the ship TAY, was captured together with six sailors on 7 
December 1806.  After five months of negotiations the pirates received a ransom 
valued at 7,150 Spanish dollars.67   
The Qing government used all possible means to suppress this 
confederation, even cooperating with the British and the Portuguese, and with the 
policy of pardon and pacification, the confederation eventually fell apart and was 
eliminated in 1810.68 
 
Cai Qian –“the King of Pirates” 
While Guangdong waters were controlled by Zheng Yi’s pirate 
confederation, the Fujian coastal area suffered under Cai Qian’s pirate group.  Cai 
Qian came from a poor family in Amoy (Xiamen), Fujian.  When he reached 
maturity, he worked as a hired laborer, and eventfully became a pirate.  By 1804, 
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Cai Qian commanded a formidable force of some fifty ships.69 
The imperial navy took strict measures in coastal provinces to cut off 
supplies for Cai Qian’s fleet.  Being pursued by the imperial navy and with a lack 
of sufficient supplies, Cai Qian decided to seize Taiwan and make it his base.  
Taiwan was a main rice growing province and the capability of the imperial navy 
was weak at this juncture.70 
Cai Qian paid Fujian shipbuilders a large sum of money to construct giant 
junks, which could be converted for military purposes.  When the ships were built, 
the shipbuilders were asked to sail the new giant junks with full cargoes loaded out 
the sea and handed them over to Cai Qian.  The merchants then returned and 
claimed that the vessels and cargoes had been seized by pirates.  These giant junks 
were much bigger and powerful than the imperial Navy ships.71 
In 1804, Cai Qian’s fleet, numbering about one hundred and ten men-of-
war attacked Taiwan.  Cai Qian proclaimed himself King after he settled down, and 
adopted the dynastic title “Guang Ming” [Resplendent Brillance] to signal his 
rejection of the Qing Dynasty and the symbolic restoration of the previous Ming 
Dynasty. 72   However, their anti-Manchu sentiments and Ming restoration were 
useless at that time, when Qing court had begun to secure political allegiance and 
bureaucratic services from the majority of Han Chinese throughout the mainland 
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China.  Furthermore, the administration which Cai Qian set up was dominated by 
maritime interests and the sea nomad life styles, lacked any attraction to the land-
based people of Taiwan.73 
Cai Qian’s pirates forced merchant ships to buy Zhaopiao, or Pass, when 
the ships passed through the waters their controlled.  If they refused, the ships 
would be robbed.  Furthermore, Cai Qian paid Haifeng (literally “Sea Salary”) to 
corrupt officials in the imperial navy, so the officials took no action towards cutting 
off the logistics supply to pirates.74 
The Qing Court employed a wide range of tactics against the pirates, 
including coastal defense, pardons and enticements, and using bandits to attack 
bandits.  By 1810, the imperial navy had succeeded in destroying Cai Qian’s 
fleet.75 
 
Part IV.  Piracy in Colonial Southeast Asia 
 
By the early nineteenth century, European colonisers had seized the main 
strategic ports in Southeast Asia.  The subsequent boom in seaborne trade with 
China also resulted in a fresh impetus for predators of this trade, and piracy became 
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rampant in Southeast Asia.76  
 
The Iranun and the Balangingi  
The Iranun and the Balangingi were the two dominant pirate groups in the 
Sulu Archipelago at the end of the 18th century to the first half of 19th century.  The 
Iranun built up their strongholds on the shores of a lagoon on the island of 
Mindanao and maintained posts on the western coast of Borneo.77  The Iranun had 
the reputation, amongst Europeans, of being the most bloodthirsty and fearsome of 
pirates in the East.78  They were ever eager to plunder European ships and showed 
no mercy to white men.79 
The Iranun cruised in squadrons of thirty or forty vessels; each fleet was 
commanded by its own chief, and each ship had its own captain and warriors.  
These chiefs were proud of their hereditary position: amongst the Iranun, a pirate 
chief had a prestigious and high-ranking place in society.80  Iranun pirate fleets 
cruised all over the Malayan seas, aiming at two objectives: plunder from ships and 
the capture of slaves from coastal villages.81  The slave trade was already well 
established in Southeast Asia before the Europeans set up their colonial domains in  
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Illustration 1 Iranun Pirate in the 19th Century (Source: Tarling, Piracy and Politics). 
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Southeast Asia.82  Captives were sold in the slave markets or forced to work for the 
sea lords in such economic activities as collecting exotic products for regional trade 
with China.83 
The Balangingi pirates got their name from the place of their headquarters 
in Balangingi Island in the Sulu Archipelago.  The Balangingi also had other 
settlements on the islands of Basilan, Binadan and Tawi Tawi, and even at various 
places on the island of Sulu itself.  The Balangingi sometimes joined forces with 
the Iranun on their pirate expeditions.84 
The Iranun and Balangingi relied on the prevailing winds to navigate their 
prahu across Southeast Asia.85  The semi-annual monsoon winds governed both the 
direction and duration of these raiding expeditions.  The monsoon winds blew 
between August and October, and carried pirates towards the Straits of Malacca.  
During these months, the Dutch and English warned their coastal towns and small 
craft to arm themselves against such attacks.86  
The piratical activities of the Iranun in the Straits of Malacca threatened the 
commercial interests of the Dutch and the British.  British officials from Penang 
stressed the necessity for armed cruisers to protect the numerous native prahu that 
frequented its ports.87  The Iranun were active in the south as well; each year, 
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Iranun groups sailed to the southern coast of Java to raid villages and gather birds’ 
nests from coastal rocks.88 
The establishment of a free port of Singapore in 1819 was another lure for 
the Iranun to haunt the Straits Settlements.  Singapore’s early trade with its 
neighbouring Malay states was threatened by these raiders.  By 1830, the situation 
had become so critical that traders from the east coast of the Malay peninsula 
(Patani, Kelantan, Pahang and Trengganu) no longer dared make their usual trips to 
Singapore.89 
Apart from Iranun and Balangingi pirates, there were other groups of 
pirates scattered over the Malay Archipelago, such as those in Sarawak.  The 
Sarawak pirates were composed of two distinct groups, the Malay and the Sea 
Dayaks.  The Sarawak pirates were suppressed in due course by James Brooke, 
later Sarawak’s first white rajah, and the British Navy.90 
 
The Suppression of Malay Pirates 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British East India Company 
backed Iranun and Balangingi privateer raids on its Dutch counterpart in Malay 
regions.91  However, these privateers were too powerful to be controlled, and the 
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various European colonisers, soon realising that piracy was their common threat in 
the Malay world, began to collaborate to rid the region of this menace to their 
business.92   
In 1824, five years after they founded Singapore, the British signed a treaty 
with the Dutch to redefine their respective domains in the Malay world.93  The 
British withdrew from Java and Sumatra, and undertook to make no settlements or 
political connections there; in return, the Dutch acknowledged British supremacy 
in Malacca.  The Straits of Malacca became the boundary of Dutch and British 
colonies.  In the same document, the Dutch and British also agreed to cooperate to 
suppress the Malay pirates.  Article 5 of the Treaty stated:  
Their Britannic and Netherlands Majesties in like manner engage to concur 
effectually in repressing piracy in those seas: they will not grant either asylum or 
protection to vessels engaged in piracy, and they will in no case permit the ships 
or merchandise captured by such vessels to be introduced, deposited, or sold in 
any of their possessions.94 
After the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, the British in particular took firm measures 
to suppress piracy.  
Naval Attacks on Pirate’s Strongholds 
In the early nineteenth century, the sultan of Borneo claimed the whole 
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island of Borneo and the nearby Sulu islands for himself.  However, the sultan had 
frequent trouble with pirates, while also undergoing a rebellion in the southwest 
corner of his realm, Sarawak.  James Brooke called in the British navy to suppress 
the local pirates, who were supported by the Sarawak rebels.  By around 1843, 
Brooke and the British Admiral Henry Keppel destroyed many pirate strongholds, 
including the Saribas stronghold at Padu, Paku, Rembas and the Sekrang 
strongholds of Patusan and Undap.95  Between 1845 and 1848, the British attacked 
Iranun bases in Marudu, north-east Borneo, Tempasuk, Pandasan and Tanku.96 
In 1848, the Spanish, with the aid of steamboats, destroyed the Balangingi 
stronghold at Sipac and deported hundreds of Balangingi people to distant 
mountain valleys.  The Balangingi pirates were finally eradicated during the 
1860s.97   
Another dimension of this anti-piracy campaign was the elimination of 
slavery.  In order to destroy the markets of maritime marauders, the British 
destroyed the slave marts at Galang and Endau in 1836.  With the founding of a 
naval base and commercial port in Labuan in 1846, marauders could no longer sell 
their booty and slaves there.98   
Following the destruction of pirate groups and the markets for their booty, 
European colonialists established strong centralised state powers in Southeast Asia.  
However, small groups of pirates still existed.  These pirates mingled with 
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fishermen and traders in the Straits of Malacca, and launched sudden attacks on 
ships.  Knowing how to distinguish these pirates and ships became a major concern 
for the British and Dutch.  The colonisers implemented a highly effective pass 
system to control vessels, which will be elaborated on in the next chapter.99  
From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, incidents of piracy 
dropped to a very low level.100  However, throughout the colonial period, colonial 
authorities were never able to eradicate piracy completely. 
 
Part V Lessons Learned from the Past  
 
The Rise and Fall of Piracy in Southeast Asian History 
The purpose of studying piracy in Southeast Asian history is to search for 
the underlying causes behind the rise and fall of piracy in history, that can in turn 
help to better understand piracy in modern times.  From this analysis, we can see 
that the rise and fall of piracy can be said to have two principal processes: the 
evolution of piracy itself, and anti-piracy operations carried out by governments.  
The boom of seaborne trade is the prerequisite of the rise of piracy, for it provides 
the prey for pirates.  Piracy becomes rampant when the political and economic 
situation is in turbulence, or local governments lack the capability to suppress 
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piracy.  Pirate activity incidents decline once the political and economic situations 
are stabilised, and the related states have strong capabilities and incentives to crack 
down on piracy.  From the analysis of these two processes, four core variables 
emerge: pirates, prey, places and politics. These four can be seen to vary over the 
different historical periods of Southeast Asia.   
 
The Evolution of Piracy 
Pirates 
In retrospect, piracy in Southeast Asia before the twentieth century can be 
classified into three categories: petty pirates, quasi-governmental pirates and 
legitimised pirates.   
Petty piracy was parasitic on seaborne trade, existing in ports or at 
chokepoints of seaborne trade routes.  Petty pirates usually operated in small gangs; 
most of these pirates were fishermen who combined fishing with casual piracy as a 
side-line to supplement their subsistence incomes.  The victims of petty piracy 
were ships plying coastal waters.  The Cham pirates and other pirates groups in the 
Straits of Malacca belong to this category.   
 
Politics  
Piracy clearly has close links with politics, as quasi-governmental and 
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legitimised pirate groups used piracy for both economical and political gains.  
Apart from plundering commercial ships, raiding coastal villages and towns for 
booty and slaves, these pirates were also political actors.  
Such political pirates were well organised, had land bases and acted as 
semi-governments in the territories they controlled.  The typical feature of quasi-
governmental piracy was that the pirates groups extracted tolls from coastal 
communities and issued passes for ships.  Pirate groups also participated in this 
lucrative illicit trade, or were sponsored by local sea lords.  The Iranun and 
Balangingi pirates in the Sulu Archipelago and the Chinese Zhengyi pirate 
confederation belong to this category. 
When conditions permitted, quasi-governmental pirates could turn into the 
legitimatised pirates, who were sponsored and legitimatised ed by state actors.  The 
Guangdong pirates who were recruited and sponsored by the Tay-son rebels at the 
end of eighteenth century belong to this group.  Some pirate groups legitimatised 
themselves as legal rulers of their controlled areas; examples are the Zheng 
Chenggong and Cai Qian groups. European colonisers offer the most successful 
examples in this category.  When European adventurers first came to Southeast 
Asia, they were brutal pirates.  After they had seized entrepôts and land in 
Southeast Asia, they successfully legitimatised their occupation and violence, and 
labelled those indigenous people who attempted to protect their own interests and 
land by sea-raiding, as pirates. 
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Prey 
The ships and cargoes plying the region’s coastal waters were always the 
prey of pirates.  It should be mentioned that, apart from ships and cargoes, human 
beings were a major point of piratical intent in the Southeast Asian history.  Female 
captives were used for polygamous marriages and male slaves were  put to work in 
agricultural and craft activities.101 
 
Places 
The favoured places for piratical attacks were typically located at the 
chokepoints of seaborne trade, where pirates could easily corner their prey.  Before 
the abolition of slavery in Southeast Asia, pirates also attacked coastal areas and 
villages along inland rivers in search of slaves. For example, Iranun and Balangingi 
pirates, with the help of the “pirate wind”, launched regular piratical attacks on 
coastal villages for human booty. 
 
Anti-piracy Operations 
Incentives and Capability 
The national interests and incentives of foreign sea powers in Southeast 
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Asia are reflected in the perceptions and policies towards piracy and seaborne trade.  
In his famous monograph, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 
A.T. Mahan listed six principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations: 
geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, size of population, 
character of the people, and character of governments”. 102   In terms of 
geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory and number of 
population, the Chinese Empire had advantages over European sea powers.  In 
regard to social character, the Chinese were just as economically motivated as were 
the Western colonisers.  However, the major difference between the two 
civilisations was the character of their governments, which perceived piracy and 
approached seaborne trade in significantly different ways. 
An agrarian dominance policy was well entrenched during most Chinese 
empires.  In consequence, the importance of sea power was ignored, and Chinese 
court policy towards seaborne trade was definitively negative.  The various 
Chinese emperors attempted to monopolise seaborne trade in the Nanyang via the 
tributes system, while private seaborne trade was either banned or severely 
restricted.  In the long run, the succeeding Chinese empires consistently shot 
themselves in the foot economically in their rivalries in the Nanyang through their 
policy to curb or prohibit seaborne trade. 
Due to the prohibition on seaborne trade, many private traders resorted to 
illegal trading.  Thus, they were faced with a two-fronted attack: one from the 
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Chinese government, and the other from their rival traders and colonisers in the 
Nanyang.  Inadvertently, these merchants had to arm themselves and became 
pirate-merchants.  In the eyes of the Chinese mandarins, trade and piracy were 
closely intertwined.  Whenever security was at risk, their first recourse was to 
advocate the prohibition of trade as an expedient means of restoring the status quo.  
Ironically, this prohibition of seaborne trade fuelled the rise in piracy.  The Chinese 
government took pains to suppress these merchant pirates, in order to reduce the 
incentives of such trading activities.  However, this was done at the cost of losing 
its opportunity of enhancing its sea powers relative to its European counterparts, 
causing China’s influence upon Southeast Asia to diminish.  
On the European side, the European colonial sea powers resorted to 
piratical activities to set up their colonial domains, and labelled the indigenous 
people who fought for their own homelands as pirates, to justify their military 
activities. The colonisers accrued wealth and trained their seamen and navy in the 
practices of piracy. This wealth in turn supported their naval enterprises and the 
development of arms amidst the context of a burgeoning seaborne trade.  Their 
incentives to carry on seaborne trade were high, and their will to crack down on 
any piratical activities that hampered seaborne trade were very strong. 
The European colonisers were powerful in terms of their governmental 
capability, and their anti-piracy measures were firm and effective.  They 
successfully controlled passing vessels through a pass system, destroying the 
strongholds and bases of pirates with the help of the steamships and powerful 
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firearms, coupling these activities with other imperialistic aims, European 
colonisers were successful in eventually subduing and almost eliminating 




After examining the rise and fall of piracy in colonial Southeast Asia, as 
discussed in this Chapter, we can draw a conclusion that an in-depth understanding 
of piracy comes from the analysis of two processes: the evolution of piracy itself, 
and anti-piracy operations carried out by governments.  The evolution of piracy 
demonstrates the political and economic transformation of interactions amongst the 
related state actors and non-state actors, while anti-piracy operations reflect the 
incentives and capabilities of states in dealing with piracy issues.  These two 
processes are examined by analysing three sets of interactions in the following 
chapters: pirates and the shipping industry, pirates and states, and interstate 
relations on anti-piracy cooperation.
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CHAPTER 3 





This chapter explores the shipping industry-piracy nexus in Southeast 
Asia.  When steamships, which were not dependent on wind, began to be used 
in the 19th century, the modern shipping industry emerged.  The wide usage of 
steam ships required coal and other bunker services, thus stimulating the 
development of ports.  After the Second World War, rapid economic growth in 
Asia generated a large volume of seaborne trade, and the globalisation of the 
world economy further promoted the shipping industry and port development, 
providing potential prey and crime scenes for pirates.  The loopholes and 
dilemmas in shipping industry further encouraged pirates. 
The chapter is divided into five parts: the first part reviews the shipping 
industry and piracy in colonial Southeast Asia; the second part introduces the 
development of the contemporary shipping industry in Southeast Asia; the third 
part examines the trend of contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia; the fourth 
part discusses the shipping industry’s responses to piracy; and the fifth part 
analyses the dilemmas of the shipping industry in dealing with the piracy issue. 
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Part I.  Shipping Industry and Piracy in Colonial 
Southeast Asia 
The Shipping Industry in the Colonial Era 
The shipping industry propelled the development of Dutch and British 
empires in Southeast Asia.  The Industrial Revolution began in Britain during 
the 1600s, and British merchants became serious competitors with the Dutch in 
seaborne trade and colonising.  In the 1650s and 1660s, the English parliament 
enacted a series of protectionist shipping laws to exclude the Dutch from 
profitable trades.1 
By the late 17th century, British economic and naval strength shifted the 
centre of gravity of seaborne trade from Amsterdam to London.  From the 18th 
century onwards, the industrial and political strength of Britain grew rapidly.  
This resulted in the decline of Dutch maritime supremacy and the rise of the 
British merchant marine in Southeast Asia.2 
Seaborne trade between the British East Indian Company and China 
boomed in the 19th century.  However, in the early 19th century, Britain had a 
huge trade deficit with China in the tea trade.  To solve the problem, the British 
smuggled opium into China with which to purchase tea.  The opium was grown 
in India and the Middle East, but there was a bottomless market for it in China. 
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 Facing the subsequent serious silver bullion outflow and the enormous 
social problems caused by opium, the Chinese Qing Dynasty took firm 
measures to combat opium smuggling.  To trade without opium was almost 
unthinkable for the British at that time, since it constituted the main trade 
income for the British Far East colonies.3  In 1840, the First Opium War broke 
out between Britain and China.  The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of 
Nanking in 1842.  China was forced to cede Hong Kong to Britain, and open 
five “treaty ports” to foreign trade.  Following that, more Chinese ports were 
forced to open by the wars between China and the European powers. 4   
After the First Opium War, the boom in the opium trade gave a fresh 
impetus to the shipping industry in Southeast Asia.  The 19th century witnessed 
great changes in the shipping industry: steam ships took the place of sailing 
ships on trade routes from Europe to the Far East.  The first scheduled 
steamship was launched in 1845 by the Eastern Steam Navigation Company 
and the Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O).  In addition, 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly shortened the time and distance 
between Europe and the Far East.  For instance, a trip through the Suez Canal 
shortened the former 116-day journey from London to Singapore to just 42 
days.5   
British shipping in the Far East was challenged by other European 
shipping services in Southeast Asia, such as the Dutch commercial steam-
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shipping packet service, the Pakketvaart, of the Dutch East Indies. By the end 
of the 19th century, it had developed a well-integrated network of regular 
services over the whole Indonesian archipelago.  It was operated by three 
private steam shipping companies: Cores de Vries (1851-1865), the 
Nederlandsch-Indische Stoomvaart Maatschappij (NISM, 1866-1890) and the 
Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM, 1891-1957). These companies 
made great contributions to the Dutch colonial civil service.  They provided 
“informal surveillance over vast stretches of sea and unguarded coasts”, thus 
helping to provide “greater security at sea, especially to the suppression of 
piracy”.6 
 
The Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) 
Faced with increasingly intense competition in steam shipping in the Far 
East, European shipowners reached a consensus to establish a cartel to protect 
their interests in the booming shipping industry in the Far East.  In 1879, the 
Far Eastern Conference of shipowners was held.  The Conference discussions 
covered trade between the Far East and Europe in broad terms.  The basic 
freight rate was calculated on the “base ports”, which the lines served regularly, 
and shipments to non-base ports would be subject to an additional charge.7  The 
agreement was signed in London on 29 August 1879.  The signatories of the 
first Conference agreement were mainly British shipping companies, such as 
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P&O, the Ocean Steam Ship Company, the Glen Line, Castle Line, the Sire line, 
Norris and Joyner, and Gellatly, Hankey Sewell and Company, but included a 
French company, Messageries Maritimes de France.8   
 
Chinese Junks and Seaborne Trade 
The Qing government lifted the ban on seaborne trade with the Nanyang 
after the suppression of pirate groups in 1727, but only allowed Amoy (Xiamen) 
as the legal export port.  Seaborne trade with the Nanyang boomed for several 
decades.  For example, in 1854, 260 junks arrived at Singapore.9  However, 
after the Second Opium War (1856-1860), China was forced to open more 
“treaty ports” to the Europeans, and customs regulations were made to favour 
Europeans, which greatly affected the interests of Chinese merchants.  The 
number of Chinese junks arriving at Singapore declined to 134 in 1863, and 33 
in 1866.10   
After the Second Opium War, the Qing government still continued its 
agrarian dominance policy, and seaborne trade was discouraged.  The Qing 
government had a strong perception that seaborne trade encourages smuggling 
and piracy activities.  Thus, the Qing government had no intention of protecting 
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Chinese seaborne traders and their junks.11   
Lacking government protection, Chinese junks became easy prey for 
pirates.12  As the main carriers of merchandise, Chinese junks were usually 
fully loaded; their speeds were slow and dependent on the wind, making them 
very vulnerable to pirate attacks.  Even though a junk might be heavily armed, 
when it encountered pirates, and the wind was not favourable, it was hard for 
the vessel to escape from the hundreds of oar-driven pirate prahu.    
Chinese and Arab merchants from Singapore suffered great losses due to 
piracy in the adjacent area of the Straits of Malacca.  In 1833, the losses caused 
by piracy amounted to 20,000 Spanish dollars, nearly 1% of the whole trade 
value of the Straits Settlements.13  Furthermore, many merchants were forced to 
pay protection fees to pirate gangs: 400 Spanish dollars for Nanyang-bound 
ships for example, and 800 Spanish dollars for China-bound ships.14  Because 
of the Chinese government’s unfavourable policies on seaborne trade and their 
technical disadvantages, Chinese junks gradually lost their share of the long 
distance seaborne trade to the European ships. 
 
European Ships  
Compared to the Chinese junks, the European ships had better 
manoeuvrability and speed, and were equipped with more powerful firearms.  
These features made the European ship difficult for pirates to attack.  For 
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example, almost all Dutch East Indies Company ships were armed with 
powerful firearms: 
The biggest vessels, the square-stern ships, carried the heaviest 
armament: 22 iron cannon, 8 to10 swivel-guns15, and about 40 snaphaunces16.  
Shallops 17  were armed on average with 4 cannon, 1 swivel-gun, and 7 
snaphaunces.  It is estimated that the total number of firearms on board vessels 
in the private sector in Java must have amounted to about 5,000 cannon and 
20,000 snaphaunces, which is quite astonishing.18 
Even more importantly than these technical advantages, European ships 
were strongly protected by their colonial governments, unlike the competing 
Chinese junks.  For example, the above-mentioned Dutch shipping companies 
were a part of the Dutch civil service, and were protected by Dutch gunboats.19 
 
The Shipping Industry and Piracy 
In the early 19th century, the booming Far East trade provided easy 
targets for pirates.  As mentioned above, piracy in Southeast Asia was rampant 
and the pirates’ main prey were Chinese junks.  Those most responsible for 
carrying out acts classed as piracy by colonial and Chinese actors were 
indigenous sea raiders, who used vessels known as prahu. 
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The prahu was the most common Southeast Asian vessel.  Its hull was 
built by joining planks to the keel, without using iron nails or a frame.  A big 
prahu carried a crew of 150-200 men with 68 oars in two banks, and was 
steered with two rudders.20  The Iranun and Balangini pirates relied on these 
high speed and manoeuvrable prahu to attack Chinese junks.  
 
Steamships and Anti-piracy Operations 
Between 1836 and the 1860s, in support of efforts to suppress piracy, 
increasing numbers of steamships were dispatched to the Straits Settlements, 
the Dutch East Indies and the Spanish Philippines by their European colonisers, 
which brought about a significant decline in piracy at the end of 1860s.  Apart 
from the steamships, various maritime institutions, such as lighthouses, gaslight 
buoys and beacons were constructed in the Straits Settlements and the Dutch 
Indies.  After these navigation aids were set up, the British and the Dutch could 
identify the ships that sailed through their dominions at night.21 
 
Pass System for Vessels 
Apart from the gunboat policy, one important measure implemented by 
the colonial governments was a pass system for vessels.  The purpose was to 
identify small groups of pirates, who mingled with fishermen and traders in the 
Straits of Malacca and launched sudden attacks on ships.  The Straits 
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Settlements and the Dutch Indies reached an agreement on a pass system for all 
vessels after the Anglo-Dutch agreement in 1824.22 
The pass system required the principal local chiefs on the coast of the 
Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra and neighbouring islands to issue 
passes to vessels from their ports.  The vessels should carry flags and register 
the arms and equipment on board.  If a ship “after a given date to be fixed any 
armed prahu or vessel navigating without papers and without cargo or showing 
a flag to which it is not entitled and refusing to account for its equipment may 
be dealt with as a pirate and an enemy.”23  The pass system proved to be an 
effective way of controlling ships and ports.  Its contemporary parallel is the 
IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) 
implemented after 9/11, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Part II.  The Development of the Contemporary Shipping 
Industry in Southeast Asia 
 
Due to its colonial legacy, the shipping industry in Southeast Asia was 
dominated for years by companies that were headquartered in Europe.  For 
example, the above-mentioned Far Eastern Freight Conference (FEFC) 
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Company and India Board Records, B.C. 69433, 156, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics 
in the Malay World: A Study of British Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century South-East Asia, 
76. 
 73
continued to be dominated by its European founding members.24  During World 
War II, the shipping industry was controlled by colonial governments for war 
purposes.  After World War II, the shipping industry gradually transferred to 
private hands.  For example, in the turbulent 1940s, the region’s ethnic Chinese 
businessmen purchased a large number of landing craft and confiscated 
Japanese vessels from British colonial authorities.  These vessels were engaged 
in sea trade between the Dutch Indies and the Straits Settlements.25  The British 
encouraged this trade, but the Dutch labelled it as smuggling.  By the end of the 
1940s, Singapore had over twenty shipping companies dealing with seaborne 
trade across the Straits, while there were six ethnic Chinese shipping firms in 
Sumatra on the other side of the Straits.26  
In the aftermath of World War II, many independent nation-states 
emerged in Southeast Asia.  Indonesia declared its independence from Holland 
in 1945, the Philippines regained its independence from the United States in 
1946, Malaya gained its independence from Britain in 1957, and Singapore 
became independent state in 1965. 27   These newly-independent states have 
vigorously promoted marine transport through various means, such as setting 
up shipping registries, establishing state-owned shipping lines, and adopting 
policies that favour national shipping companies. 28 
                                                        
24  Mary R. Brooks, Fleet Development and the Control of Shipping in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985). 
25  Twang Peck Yang. The Chinese Business Elite in Indonesia and the Transition to 
Independence 1940–1950 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1998), 211 and 291. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History (South Melbourne, Vic. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 118. 
28 Lin Sien Chia, Mark Goh, and Jose Tongzon, Southeast Asian Regional Port Development: 
A Comparative Analysis, ed. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), 7. 
 74
 
Fleet Development in Southeast Asia  
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia’s fleet has been growing steadily since Indonesia declared its 
independence in 1945.  The Dutch KPM was nationalised and forced to suspend 
operations in December 1957. 29   There are six Indonesian shipping lines 
operating in the international liner trade: P.T. Admiral Lines, P.T. Djakarta 
Lloyd, P.T. Gesuri Lloyd, P.T. Karana Liners, P.T. Samudera Indonesia and P.T. 
Trikora Lloyd.30  
The Indonesian government invested in shipping earlier than other 
Southeast Asian countries.  N.V. Djakarta Lloyd was incorporated in August 
1950, changed into state-run P.N. Djakarta Lloyd in 1961, and converted into a 
limited liability shareholding company in 1974.  Throughout, the company 
remained wholly owned by the government.  In 2004, three state-owned 
enterprises operated shipping services: PT Djakarta Lloyd operated container 
vessels in a number of international liner trades; PT Pelni operated passenger 
and cargo services between the islands of the Indonesian archipelago, while PT 
Bahtera Adhiguna operated a number of bulk carriers.31 
                                                        
29 H. W. Dick, The Indonesian Interisland Shipping Industry: An Analysis of Competition 
and Regulation (Singapore: ASEAN Economic Research Unit Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1987), 1. 
30 Brooks, Fleet Development and the Control of Shipping in Southeast Asia, 61. 
31  PDP Australia Pty Ltd/Meyrick and Associates, Promoting Efficient and Competitive 
Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Indonesia Country Report (Repsf Project No. 04/001) 
(ASEAN, 2005[cited 3 Nov2005]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/AADCP-
REPSF-Project/Indonesia.pdf. 
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Indonesia has implemented a closed ship registration system, which 
dictates that registered vessels must be owned by Indonesian citizens or by a 
company “existing under the Law of Indonesia,” and that the ship must be 
manned by Indonesian nationals. Indonesia does not allow a second register.32  
However, foreign investment requirements for shipping companies in Indonesia 
are loosely worded and their implementation and enforcement is not strictly 
applied. Certain shipping companies can easily by-pass regulations by enlisting 
the help of corrupt officials. 33  Indonesia reserved national flag carriers for 
government cargo: in the 1990s, imported cargoes of state-owned enterprises 
had to be carried by Indonesian-flag vessels.34 
 
Malaysia 
Malaysia has a long-term programme to promote the growth of its 
national fleet.  The Malaysian government places emphasis on its shipping 
services being independent.35  In order to build up its national shipping fleet, 
the Malaysian government established Malaysian International Shipping 
                                                        
32 A second register is a vessel registered in one state is permitted to fly the flag of a second 
state for a specified period.  This situation generally arises as a result of a bareboat charter, 
whereby a vessel registered in State A is chartered for a fixed period to nationals of State B 
who, during the charter period, operate the vessel under the flag of the latter state.  During 
the period of the charter period, the primary registration in State A is cancelled or suspended, 
but it becomes fully effective once again upon termination of the charter.  Richard M. F. 
Coles and Nigel P. Ready, Ship Registration, Lloyd's Shipping Law Library. (London; Hong 
Kong: LLP, 2002), 35. 
33A senior manager in an Indonesian shipping company, in discussion with the author, 5 June 
2004, Jakarta, Indonesia.  
34 PDP, Promoting Efficient and Competitive Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Indonesia 
Country Report (Repsf Project No. 04/001)  (ASEAN, 2005 [cited 3 Nov 2005]); 
available from http://www.aseansec.org/AADCP-REPSF-Project/Indonesia.pdf. 
35 PDP, Promoting Efficient and Competitive Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Malaysia 
Country Report (Repsf Project No. 04/001) (ASEAN, 2005 [cited 3 Nov 2005]); available 
from http://www.aseansec.org/AADCP-REPSF-Project/Malaysia.pdf. 
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Corporation Berhad (MISC) in 1968, as a joint venture between the government 
and private entrepreneurs.  MISC was backed up by a government loan for fleet 
expansion.  In 1970, MISC joined FEFC and engaged in pooling arrangements 
with conference members.36  In 1987, MISC was listed on the main board of the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.  In 1990s, MISC diversified its business into 
ship building, repairing and engineering.  In 1997, Petronas acquired a 29.3% 
stake of MISC and took control of its management.37  In 1998, MISC acquired 
the assets of Konsortium Perkapalan Berhad & PNSL Limited and merged with 
Petronas tankers Sdn. Bhd., increasing Petronas’ stake in MISC to 62.01%.38  
The above mentioned P&O, the former British colonial shipping company, still 
operated in Malaysia after War World II.  In 1996, P&O merged with a Dutch 
logistics service company, Royal Nedlloyd, and changed its name to P&O-
Nedlloyd.39 
According to the Merchant Shipping Ordinance on shipping registration, 
to fly the Malaysian flag, a vessel must be 51% Malaysian owned.  In order to 
increase employment and national tonnages, Malaysia implemented a second 
register, the Malaysian International Shipping Registry, in 1997.40 
Features of the Malaysian second register are as follows:  
                                                        
36 Jennings, Cargoes, a Centenary Story of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, 69. 
37  The abbreviation for Petroliam Nasional Berhad, Malaysia's national petroleum 
corporation established on 17 August 1974. Wholly-owned by the Government, the 
corporation is vested with the entire oil and gas resources in Malaysia and is entrusted with 
the responsibility of developing and adding value to these resources. 
38  MISC, Corporate Milestones (Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Berhad 
(MISC), 2005 [cited 3 Nov 2005]); available from http://www.misc.com.my/. 
39 EEC, Regulation (Eec) No.4064/89 Merger Procedure Article 6 (1) (B) Decision, Case 
No.Iv/M.831-P&O/ Royal Nedlloyd (Commission of the European Communities, 1996 [cited 
18 April 2006]); available from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m831_en.pdf. 
40 PDP, Promoting Efficient and Competitive Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Malaysia 
Country Report, 2. 
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The company owning the vessel must be incorporated in and have an office in 
Malaysia; the ship manager must be a Malaysian citizen or corporation; the 
company must have a paid up share capital of 10% of the value of the ship or 
one million Ringgit, which ever is higher; and tankers or bulk ships must be 
less than 15 years old, and other ships less than 20 years.41 
 
Singapore 
The Singaporean government promoted the development of a national 
flag fleet soon after independence.  Singapore’s government-owned national 
shipping line, Neptune Orient Lines (NOL),was incorporated in 1968. The 
company was listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange in 1981, but was still 
managed by a government-owned investment company, Temasek Holdings 
Limited, which owned 69% of NOL’s stock.42  NOL grew dramatically in 1997, 
when it bought American President Lines (APL), a company nearly twice the 
size of NOL, and America’s oldest shipping firm. Currently, the NOL group has 
a presence in more than 140 countries, and a staff of more than 10,000. 43 
Singapore provides an “open registration” mechanism for its fleet 
development.  According to the 1968 Merchant Shipping (Amendment) Act, 
from 1969 onwards, a shipowner of any nationality could register their vessels 
under the Singaporean flag.  By 1979, the Singapore registry of ships had 
                                                        
41  PDP Australia Pty Ltd/Meyrick and Associates, Promoting Efficient and Competitive 
Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Malaysia Country Report (REPSF Project No. 04/001) 
(ASEAN, 2005 [cited 3 Nov 2005]); available from http://www.aseansec.org/AADCP-
REPSF-Project/Malaysia.pdf. 
42 Brooks, Fleet Development and the Control of Shipping in Southeast Asia, 27. 
43 NOL, History and Milestones: The Proud Heritage of the Nol Group (Neptune Orient 
Lines, 3 Nov 2005 [cited 3 Nov 2005]); available from http://www.nol.com.sg/. 
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grown to nearly 8,000,000 gross registered tonnage (GRT), 450% of the figure 
in 1969.  In 1980, registry requirements were tightened up: foreign-owned ships 
had to be no older than 15 years, and should weigh more than 1600 GRT.44  The 
open registration system will be elaborated below. 
 
Globalisation and the Southeast Asian Shipping Industry 
The shipping industry of Southeast Asian countries has followed global 
trends towards privatisation, alliances and acquisitions.  Amongst those that 
were privatised and transformed from state actors with many functions into 
non-state actors were the state-owned shipping companies, the Malaysian 
International Shipping Corporation (MISC) and Singapore's Neptune Orient 
Lines (NOL).  In 1996, the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) also corporatised 
its terminal operational function to PSA Corporation, in order to take part in this 
highly competitive environment.45 
Facing the challenges of intense competition, shipping lines formed several 
groups of alliances: the first group included the Maersk (Denmark)-Sealand 
(USA) arrangement, Mitsui OSK (Japan), Orient Overseas Container Lines 
(Hong Kong), Nedlloyd (Netherlands) and MISC; the second group included 
Hapag Lloyd (Germany), NOL (Singapore), NYK (Japan) and P&O (UK); and 
the third group included the alliance between Hanjin (Korea), DSR-Senator 
(Germany), Cho Yang (South Korea) and United Arab Shipping Company 
                                                        
44 Brooks, Fleet Development, 27–28. 
45 PSA, Heritage (Port of Singapore Authority, 2005 [cited 18 November 2005]); available 
from http://www.internationalpsa.com/. 
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(Arab multinational).  
 
Port Developments 
The development of the shipping industry has brought about the rapid 
growth of ports.  Since the 1960s, containerisation has been the dominant mode 
of cargo transportation.  Containerisation has had a profound effect on the 
operation of seaports and terminals.46  The high volume and speed of container 
movements spurred the development of terminals. 47   The introduction of 
computerisation and the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) has greatly 
improved communications in the industry, and made savings in terms of 
manpower. 48   Since the 1960s, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have 
developed many ports, as described below.  
 
Indonesia 
Indonesian ports are categorised into two kinds: public ports and special 
ports.  Public ports are for common users, while special ports are developed for 
manufacturing, forestry, fisheries, mining and tourism.  In 1999, it was reported 
that Indonesia had 656 public ports and 1,233 special ports.49  Of the public 
ports, 110 are managed by four port corporations, Pelabuhan Indonesia or 
                                                        
46  Chee Tack Chan and Hee Huat Lee, Containers, Containerships & Quay Cranes: A 
Practical Guide (Singapore: Genesis Typesetting & Publication Services, 2000), 16. 
47 Chia, Goh, and Tongzon, Southeast Asian Regional Port Development: A Comparative 
Analysis, 13. 
48 Ibid., 18. 
49 PDP, Promoting Efficient and Competitive Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Indonesia 
Country Report (REPSF Project No. 04/001). 
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Pelindos I to IV.50  The remaining 546 public ports are managed by the national 
government on a non-commercial basis. 51 
 
Malaysia 
Malaysian ports are classified as major or minor.  The six major ports 
are Port Klang, Bintulu, Johor and Port of Tanjung Pelepas (PTP), Kemaman, 
Kuantan and Penang.  These major ports are controlled by the Federal Port 
Authorities (FPAs). 52   Port Klang and Penang are major centres for cross- 
Straits of Malacca bulk trade.  In 2000, PTP became operational as a 
transshipment centre.  Kuantan was developed as a port specialised in the 
import and export of petrochemical products. 
In 1995, the Malaysian government introduced measures to encourage 
Malaysian shippers to use Malaysian ports rather than Singapore’s.  For 
example, the government doubled duties on full-loaded trucks leaving Malaysia.  
These measures greatly reduced the volume of Malaysian cargo handled by 
Singapore.  The percentage of Malaysian cargo handled by Singapore went 
down from 90% in 1995 to 20-30% 2005.53  
                                                        
50 Pelindo I administers the ports in Aceh, North Sumatra and Riau; Pelindo II, covers West 
Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Lampung and Jakarta; Pelindo III covers Central 
Kalimantan, South Kalimanatan, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara; Perlindo IV 
covers Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya.  
51 PDP, Promoting Efficient and Competitive Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Indonesia 
Country Report (REPSF Project No. 04/001).  
52 MIMA, Port Competitiveness: SWOT Analysis under Malaysian Federal Port Authorities 
(Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2004 [cited 24 April 2005]); available from 
http://www.mima.gov.my/mima/htmls/papers/pdf/nazery/PortComp_SWOT.pdf. 
53 PDP, Promoting Efficient and Competitive Intra-ASEAN Shipping Services – Malaysia 




Singapore is the world’s busiest container port.  In 1996, the Maritime 
and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) was set up to take over the Port of 
Singapore Authority (PSA) regulatory functions.54  In 1997, PSA Corporation 
Limited took over the terminal operation function previously carried out by the 
PSA.  The PSA Corporation has become the world’s single largest container 
terminal owner-operator, handling about one tenth of the world’s containers.  
For example, in 2005, the PSA Corporation handled more than 23,192 million 
Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) containers.55  However, Singapore is facing 
cutthroat competition from other Southeast Asian ports, such as Tanjung Priok 
(Indonesia), Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia), Manila (Philippines) 
and Laem Chabang (Thailand).56 
 
Seaborne Trade Routes and Chokepoints 
Cargo flowing into Asia typically includes containerised goods, dry bulk 
goods such as grain, coal, and iron ore from North America and Australia, as 
well as oil from the Middle East.  Crude oil is the biggest single cargo in terms 
of volume through Southeast Asia to East Asia, while finished consumer goods 
are the principal cargo being transported back via Southeast Asia to India, the 
                                                        
54 MPA, “MPA’s Role”, http://www.mpa.gov.sg/aboutmpa/mparoles/roles.htm. 
55  PSA, Powering Global Gateways (PSA International PTE Ltd., 2005 [cited April 26 
2006]). 
56 Chia, Goh, and Tongzon, Southeast Asian Regional Port Development: A Comparative 
Analysis, 24–51. 
 82
Middle East and Europe (see Map 2).  
The major sea lines of communication (SLOCs) via Southeast Asia are 
constricted at several key straits, the most important of which are located in the 
Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar.  These SLOCs cross the 
waters of several countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, with 
Singapore’s port facilities serving as a major node for refuelling and 
transhipment.  More than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage 
passes through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok.57  
 
Managing Shipping Flows 
The earliest regulatory measures were primarily concerned with 
controlling shipping flows, thereby minimising the risk of collisions and 
resultant marine and coastal pollution.  In 1977, a safety agreement was signed 
in Manila during an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting, 
which included “a traffic separation scheme incorporating two deep water 
channels”.58  The same year, at another ASEAN meeting, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore reached an agreement on the Traffic Separation Schemes (TSSs).  
The maximum tonnage of ships permitted to pass through the Straits of Malacca 
was limited to 230,000 dwt with an Under Keel Clearance (UKC) of at least 3.5 
metres at all times; any ships larger than 230,000 dwt must use the Lombok and 
                                                        
57 Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in an 
Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 
38. 
58 Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore, and Indonesia 
(Alphen aan den Rijh: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 71–75. 
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Makassar Straits.59  In 1981, this routing system was adopted by the IMO.60 
These TSSs were agreed jointly by the three littoral states of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore.  To enhance safety, further measures were 
recommended by the three parties, including the extension of the TSS from One 
Fathom Bank to Pulau Pisang, and a joint resurvey of critical areas, wrecks and 
shoals in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.  The TTS extension, as well as 
changes to the existing routing system, came into force in December 1998.  As 
far as the Straits of Singapore is concerned, the modified system included: 
• Classing a new deepwater route (DWR) off Tanjung Medang as a 
precautionary area where ‘ships must navigate with particular caution, and 
within which the direction of traffic flow may be recommended.’ 
• A reduced speed limit of 12 knots for VLCCs in specified areas. 
• The implementation of a compulsory reporting system, known as 
STTAITREP, to facilitate traffic control.  This is now obligatory for all 
ships exceeding either 300 Gross Tonnage (GT) or 50 m in length 
entering the operational area.61 
 
The Straits of Malacca 
The Straits of Malacca have been the main seaborne trade gateway since 
the early history of Southeast Asia.  The Straits of Malacca remains the shortest 
sea route from the ports of India and the Persian Gulf to ports on mainland East 
Asia (see Map 3).  
                                                        
59 Ibid. 
60 Jon M. Van Dyke, "Legal and Practical Problems Governing International Straits," in The 
Straits of Malacca, ed. Hamzah Ahmad (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications Sdn. Bhd., 
1997), 23. 
61 Mark Cleary and Goh Kim Chuan, "Trade and Environmental Management in the Straits 
of Malacca," in Shipping and Ports in the Twenty-First Century: Globalisation, 
Technological Change and the Environment. ed. David Pinder and Brian Slack (London: 




Map 2Commodity Flow and the main Straits 





Nowadays, tanker traffic through the Straits of Malacca is more than 
three times that of Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times that of the 
Panama Canal.  Each year, more than 1,100 fully laden super tankers pass 
eastbound through the Straits, many with only a meter or two of clearance 
between keel and sea bottom.  About 9.5 million barrels of oil transit the Straits 
every day.62 
       The geographical boundary of the Straits of Malacca area is defined as 
follows:  
The northwest boundary is a line from Ujong Baka (540’ N, 95 26’E), the 
north westernmost point of Sumatra, to Laem Phra Chao (7  45’N, 98 18’E), 
the southernmost point of Ko Phukit, Thailand.  The southeast boundary is a 
line from Tanjung Piai (1 11’N, 103 31’E), the southernmost part of Peninsular 
Malaysia, to Pulau Iyu Kecil (1 11’N, 103 21’E), thence to Pulau Karimun 
Kecil (1 10’N, 103 23’E) and onward to Tanjung Kedabu, Sumatra (106’N, 
102  59’E).63  
The maximum tonnage of ships allowed to pass through the Straits of 
Malacca was limited to 230,000 dwt with an Under Keel Clearance (UKC) of at 
least 3.5 metres at all times, according to the Traffic Separation Schemes, which 
will be discussed later.  Ships larger than 230,000 dwt must use the Lombok 
and Makassar Straits. 
 
                                                        
62 Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, 36–41. 
 
63 Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet? (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2003), 6. 
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Map 3The Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
Source: Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca:Gateway or Gauntlet? (London:McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2003) 
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The Lombok and Makassar Straits  
The Sunda and Lombok-Makassar routes are superior in terms of depth 
and width to the Straits of Malacca, but lack good navigational aids and 
infrastructure.  Furthermore, ships using these straits have to navigate a longer 
distance (1000 nautical miles) and more time (2-3 days) than passing through 
the Straits of Malacca, and the freight rate would also increase nearly 20-30%.64  
In terms of freight costs, these straits are not the ideal choice for shipping 
companies.  
 
National Maritime Interests of Littoral Countries   
 
Singapore 
Singapore is the world’s busiest international container port, attracting 
on average 140,000 vessel calls annually.65 Singapore initially built itself up as 
an entrepot port, and has since been highly dependent on foreign trade, as the 
country has few natural resources of its own. Its port and related maritime 
services contribute around 6% of Singapore’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).66 
                                                        
64 Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade” 41. 
65 MPA, Introduction (Maritime Port Authority, 2006 [cited 18 April 2006]); available from 
http://www.mpa.gov.sg/portdevelopment/intro/intro.htm. 
66 SMF, Singapore: International Maritime Centre (Singapore Maritime Foundation, 2006 




Malaysia is heavily dependent on the ocean, and the maritime sphere has 
become increasingly important in economic and security terms.  Maritime 
resources contribute substantially to Malaysia's economic prosperity, with 
petroleum and gas constituting Malaysia's single largest export commodity.  
Significantly, all its natural gas and crude oil are found offshore.67  More than 
90% of Malaysia's export trade is seaborne, while the fishing industry provides 
jobs for 2% of the labour force.68  
Being a littoral state, the economic activity of the country is dependent 
to a large extent on its marine resources, supporting industries such as fishing, 
coastal transportation, seafood processing and marine leisure.  Its port and 
shipping sectors provide a backbone to its trade and economic affluence.69 
Malaysia’s ports have grown rapidly in the past decade, Port Klang becomes the 
world’s 12th largest container handling port, and the Port of Tanjung Pelepas is 
the fastest growing transshipment port in the world.70  
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is the largest archipelago state in the world, with 
                                                        
67 Abdul Rahman, Janib & Wong (1997). The Maritime Sector and the Malaysian Economy 
(MIMA Monograph), 16. 
68 Ibid., 14. 
69 Ibid., 10. 
70 From the Keynote Address by YAB Deputy Prime Minister at the 2nd Asia Maritime and 
Logistics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 6 October 2003. 
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approximately 17,508 islands and islets and an 81-thousand kilometre coastline.  
Indonesia is rich in maritime natural resources, and has a great deal of 
economic potential yet to be explored.71  
Unlike Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia has a huge proportion of its 
population under the poverty line.  In terms of national maritime interest, the 
development of maritime sectors and fisheries to feed the people is a priority 
for the country.  To achieve this goal, the Indonesian government maritime 
policy is designed to improve the welfare of fishermen and fishpond farmers, 
and improve the role of maritime and fishery as a source of economic growth.72  
However, since the 1980s, the degradation of fish habitats and excessive 
commercial fishing in Indonesian waters, especially by illegal Thai trawlers, 
have been causing great economic losses for Indonesia, and a slump in profits 
for fishermen.  Many Indonesian fishermen have had no choice other than to 
turn pirate, and this will be elaborated on in Chapter 4. 73  
 
Part III. Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia 
 
The IMB Piracy Reports 
During the Cold War, from the late 1970s to 1980s, piratical attacks 
against Vietnamese boatpeople fleeing the Communist regime in Vietnam were 
                                                        
71 NIA, An Official Handbook: Maritime and Fishery (National Information Agency, 2006). 
72 Arif Havas Oegroseno, "The Straits of Malacca and Challenges Ahead: Indonesian Point 
of View," in "Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security Environment"  (Kuala 
Lumpur: MIMA, 2004). 
73 NIA, An Official Handbook: Maritime and Fishery (National Information Agency, 2006).  
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much reported in the media and in government reports.74  In 1989, the IMB 
published the first worldwide statistics of contemporary maritime piracy against 
merchant ships, “The IMB Chronology of Pirate Attacks on Merchant 
Vessels”.75  The chronology data started in 1981 and ended in 1987, and report 
773 piratical attacks worldwide.  The Chronology was the prototype of the later 
IMB piracy reports.76  However, the information in the Chronology is limited.  
The data only show date, vessel, flag and location of the piratical attacks.77 
In 1992, in response to the escalating number of incidents of piracy, the 
IMB Regional Piracy Centre (ICC-RPC), a non-government agency of 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), was established in Kuala Lumpur.  
IMB-RPC has been financed by voluntary contributors from ship-owners’ 
associations and insurance companies.  In 1998, the IMB Regional Piracy 
Centre was renamed the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB-PRC).  The IMB-
PRC provides weekly updates on pirate activities via the Internet and publishes 
comprehensive quarterly and annual reports detailing piracy statistics.78 
The first IMB-RPC Piracy report (1992) came out in 1993, and had only 
seven pages.79  The IMB Piracy Report (1992) only contains the number, time 
and place of attacks.  The report lacks details as to the exact location of attacks, 
                                                        
74 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). Piracy against the boat people was a refugee problem, different 
from piracy against merchant ships being discussed in this dissertation; thus, details of these 
attacks will not be incorporated here.  
75 Eric Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea, International Maritime Bureau of the ICC, (Paris: ICC 
Publishing SA, 1989), 241–72. 
76 Ibid. 
77 IMB, "The IMB Chronology of Pirate Attacks on Merchant Vessels 1981-1987," in Piracy 
at Sea, ed. Eric Ellen (Paris: ICC Publishing SA, 1989). 
78  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships" (United Kingdom: ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, 2004). 
79 The information of piracy was compiled from: victim vessels, shipowners, associations of 
shipowners, reports in the international press and local media, and the Department of Energy, 
United States of America. 
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time of attack, description of pirates, number of pirates, number of pirate crafts, 
ship call signs and ship communication numbers. 
From 1994, the IMB Piracy Annual Report (1993) began to attach the 
details of piratical attacks, with the date, vessel name, flag, vessel type, time of 
attack, position (latitude-longitude), waters and the map of known pirate 
locations.80   
From 1996, the IMB Piracy Annual Report (1995) began to analyse the 
trends of piracy and add a brief narration of each piratical attack.81  The IMB 
piracy annual Report (1996), released in 1997, began to classify piratical 
incidents into different categories, such as “ types of attacks”, “types of 
weapons used by the pirates” and “ types of violence to crew”.  
In 1998, the IMB Regional Piracy Centre was renamed as the IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre (PRC), and the piracy report changed its name to “Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships”.82 
Since it published its first piracy report in 1993, the IMB has been 
criticised by some shipping associations for its definition of piracy.  The IMB 
Regional Piracy Centre defines piracy as: “an act of boarding any vessel with 
the intent to commit theft or other crime and with the capability to use force in 
the furtherance of the act”.83  The shipowners complained that IMB defined all 
attacks, on ships at sea or at anchor, as piracy, which “artificially inflated the 
                                                        
80 ICC-IMB, "IMB Piracy Report (1 January–31st December 1993)," (Kuala Lumpur: ICC. 
International Maritime Bureau-Regional Piracy Centre, 1994). 
81  ICC-IMB, " Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 1995)," (Essex: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1998, 1996). 
82  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 1997)." 
83 ICC-IMB, Piracy Report 1992, 2. 
 92
numbers and gave shipping a bad name”.84  Furthermore, some piratical attacks 
were only attempts, and did not cause any loss or damage.  The IMB responded 
to the complaints from the shipping industry, and separated actual and 
attempted attacks in “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (1998)”, 
released in 1999.  The report added a new section on “observations,” to 
highlight the number of serious attacks, and reported some piracy news at the 
end of report.  In the annual report of “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
(1999)”, “Warnings” (for piracy prone areas) was added, to warn mariners to 
take necessary precautionary measures when passing through these areas. 85  
The voluntary financial contributors to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre were 
revealed for the first time in “IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
(2000)”.86  Since 2000, the IMB piracy reports have retained the same format. 
 
Piracy Trends (1990–2005) 
 
According to the IMB Piracy reports, the number of incidents of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships worldwide kept increasing in the 1990s, 
                                                        
84 ICC-IMB, " Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report” (1 January–31 
December 1996)," 4. 
85  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 1999), " 11. 
86 These contributors are: Britannia Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, UK; GARD 
P&I, Norway; International Operations S.A., Athens Branch, Greece; Japan P&I Club, Japan; 
Oman Insurance Company (P.S.C), Dubai-UAE; Petroships Pte Ltd, Singapore; Seaarland 
Shipping Management Geselleschaft mbH, Austria; SKULD; Standard Steamship Owner’s 
Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Limited; Target Marine S.A, Greece; The 
North of England P&I Association Ltd., U.K. The Swedish Club, Sweden; United Arab 
Shipping Company (SAG), Kuwait; Vietnam Insurance Corporation-BAOVIET, Vietnam; 
West of England Ship Owners Insurance Services Limited.  See ICC-IMB, "Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1 January–31 December 2000)," (Essex: ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, 2001), 2.  Since the funding is on voluntary base, the list 
contributors have some minor changes from year to year.  
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culminated in 2000, and declined after 2004.  The number of piracy incidents in 
2000 reached 469, more than five times that of 1991.  From 2004 to 2005, 
piratical incidents worldwide declined; the reasons for this decline will be 
explained in later chapters. 87   The most piracy-prone areas are still in 
Indonesian waters, the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. 
According to Captain Noel Choong, director of the IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, at least fifty% of piratical attacks are not 
reported.88  Considering the huge extra cost that may occur when a ship is being 
investigated after a piratical incident, and the possibility of an increase in 
insurance premium on future voyages, shipowners would rather leave the 
piratical incident unreported.  This will be discussed in a later section. 
Table 1 Actual and Attempted Piracy Attacks in Southeast Asia 
(1992-2006) 










































Source: IMB Piracy Reporting Centre. 
 
                                                        
87  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 2004)." 
88 Noel Choong, (Regional Director of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre), in discussion with 
the author, Kuala Lumpur, 13 March 2004. 
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The Victim Ships 
Bulk carriers are the favourite targets of pirates in Southeast Asia.  
Nearly a third of all vessels attacks in Southeast Asia belong in this category.  
The reason is simple: bulk carriers travel at a limited speed and their 
freeboards are low, which makes it easier for pirates to board them when they 
are underway.89  
The other types of popularly targeted vessels are general cargo ships, 
container ships and oil tankers.  In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, these 
vessels are most likely to be attacked, because they have to slow down when 
passing through the Straits.  Furthermore, there are numerous ships that 
frequently ply closer to the coast, thereby making them easy targets for 
pirates.90 
                                                        
89 Freeboard: the distance between the water line and the uppermost full deck of a ship. 
90  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report" (London: ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, 2004). 
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Table 2 Types of Ships Attacked, January–December 1994–2005 
 
 
Source: ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships—Annual Report 2005. 
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Part IV. Shipping Industry Response 
 
The Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ Associations (FASA) 
ASEAN shipowners respond quickly to piracy in Southeast Asian waters 
through the Federation of ASEAN Shipowner’s Associations (FASA).  The 
FASA is an ASEAN non-governmental organisation, which was approved at 
the fifth meeting of the 14th ASEAN Standing Committee in Manila on 21 May 
1981.  The current members of FASA are: Filipino Shipowners’ Association 
(FSA), Indonesian National Shipowners’ Association (INSA), Malaysian 
Shipowners’ Association (MASA), Myanmar Five Star Line (MFSL), 
Singapore Shipping Association (SSA), Thai Shipowners’ Association (TSA) 
and Vietnam Shipowners’ Association (VSA).91 
Regarding piracy in Southeast Asia, these shipping associations have given 
advice to shipowners and masters of vessels plying through piracy-prone areas, 
brought piracy to public attention, and lobbied governments to take effective 
measures to combat piracy.  For example, the Singapore Shipping Association 
(SSA) has advised its ships to take the following measures:  
• Increase surveillance and vigilance during the hours of darkness; 
• Maintain constant visual and radar watch; 
                                                        
91 FASA, History and Membership (Federation of ASEAN Shipowners' Association, 2006 
[cited 4 April 2005]), available from http://www.fasa.org.sg/index.cfm?GPID=8. 
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• Establish radio contact (VHF) and agree on attack emergency signals 
with crew, ships in the vicinity and shore-based authorities; 
• Install special security equipment which activates an alarm system;  
• Install properly concealed video cameras to record on film any 
incidence of attack or robbery; 
• Seal off all means of access to accommodation areas of the vessel; 
• Install searchlights on the bridge wings, bow and stern, so that their 
beam could be directed overboard in the direction of attack; 
• Have on standby water hoses or other equipment which could be used 
to repel potential boarders; 
• Secure all personal belongings in locked containers; 
• Nominate a secure area for crew members to retreat to, in the event 
that a large number of armed robbers should succeed in boarding the 
vessel; 
• Keep crew well informed of security and action plans.92 
 
The Asian Shipowners Forum 
In the face of increasing piracy attacks, the Asian Shipowners Forum 
(ASF), which consists of the Shipowner Associations of Australia, China, 
Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea and the FASA, accepted the 
proposal by the Japanese Shipping Association (JSA) to exchange views on 
piracy issues at its annual meetings.  
Anti-piracy measures were reaffirmed in the document entitled, “Asia 
                                                        
92 Robert C. Beckman, Carl Grundy-Warr and Vivian L. Forbes, Maritime Briefing: Acts of 
Piracy in the Malacca and Singapore Straits (UK: International Boundaries Research Unit, 
1994), 17. 
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Anti-Piracy Challenge 2000,” that was adopted at the Regional Conference on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships held in 2000.  ASF 
activities on piracy problems can be summarised in chronological order: 
• 1992—A resolution was adopted for ASF to appeal to various 
governments against the sharp increase of ship robbery incidents in the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore; 
• 1993—The ASF sent a letter to governments concerned, as well as the 
IMO, requesting their cooperation in further efforts to eradicate these 
acts; 
• 1994—The ASF reaffirmed the understanding declared at the Second 
Meeting that piracy is the common enemy of mankind, and requested 
governments concerned as well as the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) to enhance the safety of maritime navigation.  
• 1995—The ASF reached a consensus that the voluntary ship reporting 
regime for ships passing through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 
should be made mandatory;  
• 1996—The ASF requested regional governments to be more vigilant 
against piracy and ship robbery in the South China Sea, especially in 
the triangular area within straight lines connecting Hong Kong, 
Vietnam and Luzon Island.  The ASF noted with satisfaction the 
effective role of the governments of Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia in combating ship robbery crimes in the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore. 
• 1997—While piracy acts in the South China Sea have reportedly 
declined, the number of thefts against ships at anchor or in 
loading/discharging mode has increased.  In this connection, the ASF 
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requested all governments and their law enforcement agencies 
concerned to increase vigilance through patrols, and to ensure that 
ships in ports are always safe. 
• 1998—The ASF praised the joint efforts of the governments of the 
Philippines and Malaysia in cracking down on piracy in the Sulu Sea.  
The ASF requested all governments to increase patrols by police or 
naval vessels to eradicate acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships in their own territorial waters and neighbouring areas. 
• 1999—The ASF expressed serious concern over the frequent 
occurrence of piracy and armed robberies, and also took note of a 
number of hijacking incidents in Asian waters. The ASF requested law 
enforcement agencies in the coastal states to make thorough 
investigations into these incidents, and make public their results. The 
Forum also requested the coastal states to increase patrols and 
strengthen their cooperative measures. 
• 2000—The ASF expressed its gratitude to the Japanese government 
for convening the “Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships” in which police agencies, maritime 
policy agencies, and private organisations from Asian countries were 
present.  It also stressed the necessity for respective Asian countries to 
enact appropriate legislation to deal with the crime of piracy.  In 
addition, the ASF recommended that Asian governments ratify the 
1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
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the Safety of Maritime Navigation, or Convention on Hijack 
Prevention.93 
For the past few decades, the ASF has been making persistent demands 
on governments in the region and the IMO to take positive and effective steps 
to eliminate acts of piracy, and to enhance the safety of maritime navigation.  At 
the same time, the Forum urged individual shipping companies to take whatever 
preventive measures they could to protect themselves.  Furthermore, the Forum 
appealed to all other stakeholders, including littoral states, flag states and 
international organisations to fulfil the obligations mentioned by UNCLOS and 
other international legal instruments; this will be dealt with in Chapter 5.94  
Given that so many organisations have been involved in protecting ships 
and that so many anti-piracy measures have been taken, why is it that pirate 
attacks are still on the increase?  There are yet inherent dilemmas in the 
shipping industry which cause ships to be vulnerable to pirates.  
 
Part V The Dilemma of the Shipping Industry 
 
The shipping industry faces a cost and effect dilemma.  In order to 
reduce operation costs, many shipping companies register their ships under 
Flags of Convenience (FOC).  However, the lax administration of the FOC 
provides an opportunity for pirates to re-register stolen ships. 
                                                        
93 Norihide Tanaka and Hitoshi Takase, "Piracy and Ship's Safety: A View from the Shipping 
Industry," in Combating Piracy and Ship Robbery: Charting the Future in Asia Pacific 
Waters, ed. Hamzah Ahmad and Akira Ogawa (Kuala Lumpur: Syarikat MAJ, 2001), 164–5. 
94 Ibid., 166. 
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Flags of Convenience 
A Flag of Convenience (FOC), or “open registry” is: “the flag of any 
country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled 
vessels under conditions which, for whatever the reasons, are convenient and 
opportune for the persons who are registering the vessels.”95   
The use of flags of convenience can be traced back to the use of the 
Spanish flag by English merchants in order to avoid Spanish monopoly 
restrictions on trade with the West Indies in the 17th century.  However, the 
widespread use of flags of convenience began in the 1920s.  In 1922, two cruise 
liners, the RELIANCE and the RESOLUTE, had their flags changed from 
United States flags to Panamanian ones, in order to avoid prohibition 
regulations which prevented the sale of liquor on board American vessels.96  
Since World War II, the number of flags of convenience has increased 
tremendously.  The leading open registry countries are Panama, Liberia, the 
Bahamas, Malta and Cyprus.97  For example, at the end of 2000, the number of 
ships flying Panamanian and Liberian flags reached 7,741, totalling 
                                                        
95 Richard M. F. Coles and Nigel P. Ready, Ship Registration (London: Lloyd’s Shipping 
Law Library, 2002), 15. 
96 Ibid. 
97 The following countries and territories were considered to be FOC states by the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), which spearheads opposition to the open registry system, 
in June 2001: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, 
Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gibraltar, Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, 
the Netherlands, Antilles, Panama, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu. Jamaica, Sao Tome and Vietnam are under consideration for a similar designation. In 
addition, the ITF designates as FOC vessels an individual basis, those ships that are registered 
in Hong Kong, the Philippines or Singapore. Furthermore, ships flying the flag of countries not 
mentioned above will be treated as FOC ships, if the ITF receives information that they are 
beneficially owned in another country. 
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165,833,187 GT, more than a quarter of global tonnage.98  Japan has the second 
largest tonnage of vessels in the world, but over 86% of its ships were 
registered under a foreign flag of convenience in 2002.99 
 
Reasons for Flagging Out 
The reasons why shipowners register their ships under FOC flags, or 
“flag out”, is based principally on economic considerations.  FOCs are easy to 
register; for example, a ship may be registered at a consul’s office abroad, and a 
transfer from one registry to another is not restricted.  Taxes on a ship’s income 
are low or may not even be levied.  A registry fee and an annual fee, based on 
tonnage, are normally the only charges made.  For example, under Panama 
registration, a ship of 15,000 dwt, need only pay US$3,000 for initial 
registration, and subsequently pays only US$1500.00 annually in tonnage tax 
(10 cents per ton) and an annual survey tax fee of US$1,000.100  In comparison 
to a ship, which costs at least several million U.S. dollars, this amount is very 
small indeed.  
From the shipowners’ point of view, their ultimate aims are to maximise 
profit and minimise operation costs.  Flags of Convenience (FOC) meet this 
demand.  Under the registration of FOC, shipowners can avoid taxes and 
benefit from lower crewing costs.  For example, annual crewing costs for a 
United Kingdom-registered tanker with a British crew are estimated at 
                                                        
98 Ibid., 18. 
99 Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 109. 
100 Richard M.F. Coles, and Nigel P. Ready, Ship Registration (London: LLP, 2002), 245-47. 
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US$908,000.  In the case of a Hong Kong-registered ship (FOC) with a Hong 
Kong crew, that figure could be reduced to US$396,000.101   
Furthermore, under FOC, shipowners enjoy anonymity.102  Owners can 
change their identities to avoid being identified, especially when their ships 
have been blacklisted by an insurance company.  There are always conflicts of 
interest between shipowners and insurance companies, which will be discussed 
in a subsequent section entitled, “piracy and insurance”.  
However, the FOC system lacks a union structure, which is arguably 
essential for the application of safety and social standards in countries of 
normal registry; specifically, it lacks a national trade union of the flag state that 
represents the interests of national seamen on board vessels owned by owners 
who have economic links with the flag state.  FOC owners are in a better 
position to put pressure on masters and officers to take risks, since there is no 
appropriate government to which shipboard personnel can complain. FOC 
countries are typically small states that have neither the power nor the 
administrative machinery to impose effective governmental or international 
regulations on ships under their registration.  Furthermore, FOC countries’ 
principal aim is to earn money from registration, and they have no intention or 
power to protect ships under their registration.103  Thus, those ships under a 
FOC have questionable security measures, and are vulnerable to piratical 
attacks.   
The loophole of FOC has long been used by pirates for re-registering 
                                                        
101 Coles and Ready, Ship Registration, 46. 
102 Ibid., 20. 
103 B. N. Metaxas, Flags of Convenience: A Study of Internationalisation (Aldershot, Hants 
Hampshire: Gower Pub. Co., 1985), 14–15. 
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stolen ships.  The modus operandi is quite simple.  The criminal groups use 
their network to find a suitable ship to be hijacked at sea.  The cargo on board is 
downloaded, and disposed of through their smuggling network on the black 
market.  The crew are either killed or abandoned.  A typical illustration of this 
kind of attack is the “Cheung Son Case”, which will be elaborated on in 
Chapter 4.104  
The ship becomes a “phantom ship."  It can then be registered under 
several names with different particulars, making the task of tracing the ship 
very difficult.  Its shipping documents can even be obtained prior to a 
“phantom” shipowner physically taking control of a ship, as will be discussed 
in the “Cheung Son Case”.105 
The phantom identity enables the owners of phantom ships to commit 
maritime fraud.  Firstly, the phantom shipowner offers competitive freight rates 
to shippers who are not aware of the conspiracy.  After the cargo has been 
loaded, the ship is diverted to another destination, and the cargo is off-loaded 
and sold to pre-arranged buyers.  The ship is then re-registered with yet another 
phantom identity, and the crime is committed all over again.  It is difficult to 
trace these ships because none of their registration details are accurate.106 
According to IMB reports, 136 ships have been hijacked and have then 
disappeared.  Many of these ships were probably turned into phantom ships.107  
The phantom ship phenomenon will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
                                                        
104 ICC-IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: A Special Report (Kuala Lumpur: 
ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1998), 32. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 33. 
107  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 2005)," (Essex: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2006). 
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Piracy and Insurance 
To avoid losses from piratical attacks, one solution for shipowners is to 
buy an insurance policy with piracy coverage.  In global insurance markets, 
piracy is usually covered under hull and machinery risks.108 
If piracy risk is included under hull and machinery risk, in the case of hulls, 
the Institute Hull Clause treats piracy as an ordinary marine peril under clause 
No. 6.1.5.  However, an insurance policy always has a “deductible amount” 
term.  The insured has no right to claim for any reimbursement when the loss 
incurred is less than the deductible amount.109   
 
Conflicts of Interest  
Most pirate attacks in Southeast Asian waters are made with the intent 
of robbing the crew of cash and property.  The economic losses made in these 
attacks are usually insufficient to exhaust the deductibles on most marine 
insurance policies.  This means that shipowners have to cover the entire loss 
without getting any reimbursement from their insurance company, or get a fixed 
maximum reimbursement, for example, US$20,000, as in the Hellenic Club's 
1988 rules.110  This is the main reason why up to half of piracy incidents are 
under-reported.  If shipowners report that their ships being attacked by pirates, 
                                                        
108 Jonathan Ignarski, "Piracy, Law and Marine Insurance " in Piracy at Sea, ed. Eric Ellen 
(Paris: ICC Publishing SA, 1989), 182. 
109 Robert Henry Brown, Marine Insurance, 6th ed. (London: Witherby & Co., 1998). 
110 Jonathan Ignarski, "Piracy, Law and Marine Insurance " in Piracy at Sea, ed. Eric Ellen 
(Paris: ICC Publishing SA, 1989), 182 
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they might lose time and money in waiting for the insurance company to 
investigate the case, and even after all that, they might not succeed in obtaining 
sufficient reimbursement.  Furthermore, the shipowner might acquire a bad 
reputation of being vulnerable, and their insurance company might require a 
possible increase in premium.   
Insurance coverage is only helpful when a ship is hijacked or damaged 
by pirates.  In this case, the shipowner will definitely report the piratical case, 
but shipowners have to cover the loss of the deductible amount under their own 
expense, and will not be reimbursed the full value of the ship. 
The brutal nature of contemporary maritime piracy creates an 
atmosphere of terror in which it is much more difficult for shipowners to crew 
their vessels, particularly those ships plying Southeast Asia waters.  As a 
consequence, shipowners are forced to offer better pay and increased benefits to 
their sailors in compensation for the greater physical risk, and this of course 
results in an increase in shipowners’ operating costs.  To remain in business, 
such shipowners will need to cut prices and reduce margins to compensate 
merchants for their own added risk of delay or loss.  In order to avoid having to 
reduce profit margins and to stay in business, shipowners are compelled to 
employ anti-piracy measures.  Implementing more effective measures often 
costs more than shipowners are currently willing to spend.111 
One example involves the problems and costs of hiring a group of 
private armed escorts.  There is a private security company, “Malacca Straits 
Maritime Security”, which provides security escorts through the Straits of 
                                                        
111 The author’s interview with a captain of a Singaporean shipping company, 18 May 2004, 
Singapore. 
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Malacca.  The service costs between US$10,000 and US$100,000 a day.  The 
US$10,000 service consists of a group of four to six armed Gurkhas on a small 
escort vessel.  The full service includes an armed Gurkha squad on board, fast 
craft and helicopter scouts, and an additional patrol craft escort.  
However, the necessary maritime legislation and multilateral 
coordination have not yet been worked out to facilitate the operations of such 
private armed escorts.  Furthermore, a regional licensing regime must be 
established in order to distinguish between reputable private security companies 
and those with a more mercenary inclination.112 
As previously mentioned, insurers are responsible only for losses 
sustained that exceed the amount of the deductible.  A lower deductible amount 
means a higher premium, to compensate for the insurer’s added liability.  In 
most piratical attacks in Southeast Asian waters, the losses from piracy are less 
than the policy deductible, so insurers indemnify such losses only on rare 
occasions.   
Insurers are keen to collect data on losses caused by pirate attacks.  
Based on this data, insurers have begun to charge increased premiums because 
of the piracy risk in some regions; for example, it is more difficult to obtain hull 
insurance in Indonesia than anywhere else in the region.113  
Although piracy incidents have declined significantly since 2004, on 20 
June 2005, the Straits of Malacca and adjacent ports, including other Indonesian 
ports (Ambon, Balikpapan, Jakarta and Poso), were listed as war-risk areas by 
                                                        
112 Tracy Sua, "For Hire: Guardians of the Sea—Several Firms Now Offer Armed Escort 
Vessels and Mercenaries," The Straits Times, 15 April 2005. 
113 Gottschalk and Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 100-104. 
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the Joint War Committee of the London Insurance Market, without any 
announcement to the shipping industry beforehand. 114   According to 
international practice, when a vessel sails into a so-called war-risk area, its 
insurance coverage can be cancelled by the insurers.  If a vessel intends to 
travel into this war-risk area, the shipowner will have to pay an extra premium 
to reinstate the ship’s insurance cover.   
War risk premiums are calculated as a percentage of the total value of an 
individual ship’s hull and machinery.  For example, after the Tamil Tiger 
terrorist attack on Colombo’s airport, war risk premiums for ships calling at 
Colombo’s port climbed as high as 0.7% of a ship’s value, i.e. US$500,000 per 
single port call for the largest containerships.115  This means that shipowners 
whose vessels transit the Straits of Malacca or call at Indonesian ports may 
have to pay for additional insurance coverage.  This will greatly increase costs 
for the shipping industry. 
 
Conclusion 
The shipping industry is the direct victim of pirates; the analysis of the 
nexus between shipping industry and piracy provides first-hand knowledge on 
contemporary piracy.  The booming international sea trade following the Cold 
                                                        
114 The Joint War Committee (JWC) represents the interests of the London marine insurance 
community and comprises members of the Lloyd’s Market Association (LMA) and the 
International Underwriting Association (IUA). Chairman of JWC is Rupert Atkin, Director 
of Underwriting at Talbot Underwriting. See SSA, Joint War Committee War Risk Listed 
Area (Singapore Shipping Association 2005 [cited 1 Nov 2005]); available from 
www.ssa.org.sg. 
115 Donald Urquhart, "Malacca Strait Risk Premiums Set to Skyrocket," The Business Times 
5 July 2005. 
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War brought about the rapid development of the shipping industry, and the 
shipping industry stimulated the development of ports.  In the Southeast Asian 
context, the increased number of ships and ports provides the prey and the 
places for pirate activities.  
The shipping industry has met with a cost and effect dilemma.  In order 
to maximise their profits, shipowners try their best to minimise operation costs.  
Many shipowners register their ships under Flags of Convenience (FOC).  The 
FOC countries have no “genuine link” with the ships carrying their flags; most 
importantly, they have no capability and intention to protect these ships.  Ships 
without strong flag states’ protection are vulnerable to pirates.  Modern 
technology installed on ships greatly reduces the number of crew needed on 
board; this also makes the ships easier for pirates to seize.116 
Poor security administration in some ports provides an opportunity for 
pirates to commit crimes against ships.  Furthermore, lax ship registration, such 
as the practice of the flag of convenience, facilitates the re-registering of 
hijacked ships by international criminal syndicates.117  
No panacea for the complicated dilemmas in the shipping industry has 
yet been found.  In the meantime, shipowners have been taking steps to prevent 
their ships from being attacked by the pirates, and have taken collective action 
to urge their respective governments to take firm action to combat piracy.  
Who are these pirates? How do they operate? How do they interact with 
                                                        
116  IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Guidance to Shipowners and Ship 
Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships (29 May 2002 [cited 1 Nov 2005]), available from 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D5378/623r3.pdf. 
117 Coles and Ready, Ship Registration, 15–31. 
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the region’s states, and how do the states respond to them?  These questions 








This chapter examines the interaction between pirates and states.  After 
the Cold War, the tension in Southeast Asia was eased.  Seaborne trade and the 
development of the shipping industry are external prerequisites for piracy.  
However, we might ask, what were the developments that precipitated the 
upsurge in piracy in Southeast Asia during the 1990s?  The answers to this 
question lie in the internal political and economic factors of the littoral states.  
This chapter elucidates these internal factors, which include poverty, corruption, 
and the capability of law enforcement agencies, which foster piracy. 
The analysis covers three littoral states and China, with a focus on 
Indonesia and China, for Indonesia is the most pirate-prone zone, and China 
was the main destination for pirate booty in the 1990s.  Furthermore, the armed 
forces and law enforcement agencies in these two countries have many striking 
similarities, such as involvement by the armed forces in commercial activities, 
and allegations brought against them that they were both in collusion with 
pirates.  
This chapter is divided into three parts: the first part reveals the different 
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aspects, such as the origin, organisation, and modus operandi of pirates; the 
second part introduces the anti-piracy law enforcement agencies and domestic 
laws against piracy in the littoral states; and the third part analyses pirate-state 
relations, focusing on the collusion between pirates and corrupt law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
Part I.  The Pirates 
 
Small Pirate Gangs 
The majority of piratical attacks in Southeast Asia are perpetrated by 
small-scale criminal gangs.  Their targets are mostly vessels in ports or at 
anchorage, especially those in Indonesia.  Most small pirate gangs carry knives 
or machetes, although occasionally guns may also be used, and their attacks are 
less organised and more opportunistic.1   
Those suspected of being involved in small-scale pirate attacks in and 
around the Straits of Malacca are mainly Indonesian fishermen, living in coastal 
villages, who use piracy as a way of supplementing their inadequate livelihoods.  
The main reason that drives them to piracy is the drastic decline in fish stocks 
and a slump in their income from fishing. 
Since the end of the 1980s, fish stocks in Indonesian waters have been 
sharply declining.  The blame lies in a combination of the degradation of fish 
                                                        
1  P. Mukundan, "The Scourge of Piracy in Southeast Asia: Can Any Improvements Be 
Expected in the near Future?" in Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, ed. 
Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005), 34-44. 
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habitats and excessive commercial fishing.  It is estimated that 80% of 
Indonesia’s coral reefs are damaged, with greatly reduced fish stocks. 2  In 
addition to the destruction of the coral reefs, pollutants such as petrochemicals, 
human sewage, silt from forest clearance and agriculture, especially sawdust 
from east Sumatra, have caused the degradation of fish habitats, and a slump in 
the profitability of fishing.  
Several decades ago, for example, a traditional Belawan fisherman caught 
about 200kg of fish per week, earning about 3,300,000 rupiah (US$ 330), 
excluding operational costs, which were about 700,000 rupiah (US$ 70) per 
week.  Nowadays, the size of catches has dropped considerably to 70kg per 
week, equivalent to earnings of 500,000 rupiah (US$ 50) per week.  To make 
matters worse, operational costs have soared to 1,200,000 rupiah (US$120) per 
week. This means that even though they can sell their fish, they still make a 
loss.3   
To make matters worse, Indonesia is afflicted by illegal trawling.  Although 
the Indonesian government issued a decree banning trawlers in July 1980, 
illegal trawlers still go unchecked in Indonesian waters.4  Each year, more than 
3,000 Thai trawlers fish illegally in Indonesian seas.  Indonesian law 
enforcement officials were alleged to “allow the Thai fleets to avoid hefty 
                                                        
2 Tom McCawley, "Sea of Trouble," Far Eastern Economic Review 167, no. 21 (2004):50-53. 
3 Anucha Charoenpo, Illegal Thai Fishing Robbed Indonesia Off Billions of Catches and 
Cash (Southeast Asian Press alliance, 2006 [cited 18 May 2006]), available from 
http://www.seapabkk.org/fellowships/2002/anucha.html. 
4  John G. Butcher, The Closing of The Frontier: A History of the Marine Fisheries of 
Southeast Asia c. 1850–2000 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 235. 
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license fees and taxes in return for bribes”.5  It is estimated that illegal fishing 
has robbed Indonesia of US$ 1.2 billion to US$2.4 billion worth of potential 
catch. 6 
Some extremely desperate fishermen have turned to piracy for quick money, 
attacking ships in port or at anchorage.  They know that crew on board these 
ships do not carry guns, and are told not to resist when attacked, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3.  For these reasons, Belawan remains one of the most 
piracy-prone ports in Indonesia.  From 1992–2005, in Belawan alone, there 
were 82 incidents of armed robbery against ships.7  In June 2005, Belawan was 
blacklisted by the Joint War Committee (JWC) of London Insurance Market, 
which meant that ship owners had to pay an additional insurance premium for 
calling at Belawan.8 
In Indonesia, many coastal communities suffer the same problem, forcing 
fishermen or unemployed sailors into crime.  These people, who have nautical 
skills, are suffering economic hardship, and are likely to be hired by pirate 
gangs to launch opportunistic attacks on ships for quick money.  For example, 
Anderson, a 39-year-old unemployed Indonesian sailor, and his companions 
were promised 25 million rupiah (US$2,755) each to hijack the barge Kapuas 
68, laden with 3,000 tonnes of palm oil.  These pirates were arrested in Bintan 
by the Indonesian navy when their engine died and their boat ran aground on a 
coral reef.  When Anderson was jailed, he still claimed that he “never meant to 
                                                        
5 Anucha Charoenpo, Illegal Thai Fishing Robbed Indonesia Off Billions of Catches and 
Cash. 
6 Ibid. 
7 IMB Annual Report (1992–2005). 
8JWC, "Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas, Jw 2005/001"(London 
Joint War Committee, 2005). 
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be a pirate”.9   
There are several pirate gangs that operated in Indonesian territorial 
waters along the Straits of Malacca, where more than 500 vessels pass by every 
day.  They attacked foreign ships heading towards Singapore.  In 2002, for 
example, the Indonesian Marine Police from Riau Regional Command arrested 
a six-member gang.  The gangs operated around Batam Island, were only armed 
with knives and swords, and just took valuables and ships’ safes from captains’ 
cabins.10 
There was a pirate gang operating around Palembang and the Bangka 
Straits of South Sumatra.  This gang was said to be the most ruthless, as the 
pirates did not hesitate to injure their hostages.  In 2003, they made eight 
attacks in this area.11 
 
International Criminal Syndicates 
Starting in the mid-1990s, a serious type of hijacking of ships, which 
was perpetrated by international criminal syndicates, became quite common in 
the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.  These syndicates hijacked 
ships on the high seas, sold the stolen cargoes, repainted the ships, re-registered 
them with fake registration papers, and turned these ships into phantom ships, 
as described in Chapter 3.  The phantom ships were used for all kinds of illegal 
activities, such as smuggling, drug or human trafficking, and marine fraud.  In 
                                                        
9 McCawley, "Sea of Trouble", 50–53. 
10 Edy Budiyarso, Arif Ardinansyah, and Rumbadi Dalle, "Hikayat Kapten Hook Di Selat 




terms of marine fraud, for example, the syndicates offered unsuspecting 
shippers attractive freight rates to carry rice, rubber, aluminium ingots or palm 
oil.  Such shippers would then find that their cargo had gone missing.  Phantom 
ships changed their name each time they left port.  It was reported that one 
phantom ship could earn US$40-50 million per year.12  Thus, the economic 
losses of shipowners and shippers were enormous, and these syndicates were a 
real threat to the shipping industry.  
These criminal syndicates featured well-trained personnel, using fast 
boats, modern weapons and sophisticated communications.  These groups had 
established links in the black market, where they would be sure to dispose of 
their stolen goods.  To support their operation, the criminal syndicates were 
often in collusion with local law enforcement officers.13  This will be elaborated 
on in the third part of this chapter.  
In recent years, according to the IMB, five criminal syndicates were 
responsible for most of the larger-scale hijackings in the Straits of Malacca.  
These syndicates, with mafia-style dons in Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong 
Kong SAR and China, made money from piracy on a regular basis.14  
On 20 November 1998, an Indonesian intelligence body (Guskamar 
Armabar) arrested the mastermind of an international ship hijack syndicate, Mr. 
Chew Cheng Kiat, alias Mr. Wong, a Singaporean citizen, at Batam Island in 
                                                        
12 Economist, "South Sea Piracy: Dead Men Tell no Tales,” Economist 353, no.8150 (1999): 
87–89. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Simon Elegant, "Dire Straits," Time Asia, no. 6 December (2004): 2. 
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Indonesia, 45 minutes by ferry from Singapore.  Mr. Wong was charged with 
hijacking tankers in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Straits.15 
According to Mr Wong’s confession, when a vessel was hijacked, he 
and his men would change her appearance and shipping documents.  They used 
a small tanker, MT PULAU MAS, as their operations centre, to change the 
appearance of hijacked ships.  Mr. Wong confessed that, between 1996 and 
1998, his syndicate had been involved in the hijacking of MT ATLANTA, MT 
SUCI, MT PETRO RANGER, MT PENDOPO and MT PLAJU.16 
According to the Indonesian police, Mr. Wong’s international network 
was located in China, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Malaysia.  Based on 
evidence gathered from police investigations, all hijacked vessels and their 
cargoes were sent to China.  Mr. Wong’s boss was a Hong Kong businessman, 
based in China, named Ling Sau Pen, whose key men included Tan Chan San in 
Johor Bahru, Chang Kee Ming in Hong Kong and Wang Yi Lung in Taipei.  
This syndicate usually not only robbed crew members, but also took over their 
ships.17  Mr. Wong sometimes had paid informants on the target vessel.  His 
informants on board informed him of all the ship’s details before they launched 
an attack.18 
Ironically, before Mr. Wong was arrested, Indonesian naval officers had 
reportedly initially tried to blackmail him.  After one week of bargaining, Mr. 
                                                        
15 ICC-IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report” (1 January–31 
December 1999), 20. 
16  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 1998)," (Essex: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 1999), 19. 
17 Harsono, "Dark Alliance Rules the High Seas", Nation, 13 April 1999. 
18  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report, (1 January–31 
December 1998)," 19–20. 
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Wong finally ended up in a naval detention centre in Batam.  The Indonesian 
navy denied the allegation of blackmailing, but also declined to reveal the real 
story behind the Wong arrest.19 
The Modus Operandi of Pirates  
The modus operandi of pirates in Southeast Asia can be classified into: 
attacks against ships in harbour or anchorage; attacks against vessels under way; 
hijack-turned-phantom ship and kidnap-for-ransom.20 
 
Attacks against Ships in Harbour or at Anchorage 
Pirates attack ships in harbour or at anchorage in search of cash and 
valuables.  In the early hours of the morning, pirates climb aboard ships by 
using grappling lines and then ransack cabins and ships' safes.  If the pirates are 
few in number, they steal whatever they can get, and escape without the 
knowledge of the crew.  These criminals are called copet laut in Indonesian, 
(literally “sea pickpockets”).21  If pirates operate in a larger gang, they use 
weapons to extort more money from the captain and crew.22  
Pirates are generally armed with rudimentary weapons, such as knives, 
pistols and machetes, known as parang in the region, and operate from small, 
manoeuvrable dinghies or other similar light craft.  This type of piracy reflects 
                                                        
19 Harsono, "Dark Alliance Rules the High Seas." 
20 Catherine Zara Raymond, "Piracy in Southeast Asia: New Trends, Issues and Responses”. 
(Working Paper No. 89, Insititute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2005). 
21 Philips J. Vermonte, (Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
Jakarta), in discussion with the author, 12 May 2004. 
22 Michael Westlake, "But Is It Safe?" Far Eastern Economic Review 155, no. 46 (1992): 45–
46. 
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the relatively lax security measures in Southeast Asian ports.  Indonesian ports 
are notorious for this kind of attack.  The average loss in this type of incident 
ranges from US$5,000 to US$10,000.23  The following is a typical account of 
this attack reported by IMB-PRC:  
Date: 19.05.2004. Time: 0020LT. 
AGATE, a Singapore tanker, 5003 DWT, IMO No. 8413461, was attacked by 
pirates at anchorage in Balongan, Indonesia.  While at anchor, three armed 
robbers boarded the tanker.  One of the robbers held an oiler at knifepoint; the 
other two ransacked the engine room store and escaped with ship’s stores and 
property at around 0200 LT.  The oiler received no physical injury, but was in 
as state of shock.  [The] Master contacted the Indonesian Navy Western 
territory, via telephone, but the operator was unable to speak [or understand] 
English.  At 0520, Port security officials boarded for investigation.24  
In terms of direct economic losses, these piratical attacks do not appear 
pose a very great threat to the shipping industry; however, the human casualties 
and the traumatic impact on surviving seafarers raises serious.25 
 
Attacks against Vessels Underway at Sea 
The targets of pirates are the ships underway at sea.  This kind of piracy 
is principally interested in cash and valuables on board; known as “hit and run” 
                                                        
23 Young and Valencia, "Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and 
Utility," Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 269–83. 
24 ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January –31 
December 2004)." 
25Noel Choong (Regional Director of IMB Piracy Reporting Centre), in discussion with the 
author, Kuala Lumpur, 8 May 2004. 
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attacks, or “Asian piracy”.26  This kind of operation requires more advanced 
weapons and boats.  The pirates prefer using wooden high-speed boats which 
do not show up on the merchant ship’s radar.  These boats usually have 3–4 
outboard motors installed, giving them a speed of 40-60 knots, faster than a 
naval patrols boat.27  When pirates draw alongside a ship underway, they board 
it using grappling hooks, and then demand cash and valuables from the ship’s 
safe and the crew. 28  In some incidents, pirates may use several vessels to 
intercept a target, and open fire on the ship, forcing it to stop.29 
Nowadays, most shipmasters do not keep much money in the ship’s safe, 
since shipping companies usually pay their crews by depositing salaries into 
home bank accounts.  However, if pirates find no money in a ship’s safe, the 
frustration of going away empty-handed can make them physically aggressive 
towards the captain and crew, who are at risk of being tortured and harmed.  
Many masters keep some money, usually US$4,000-5,000, as a pirate pot in 
case of piratical attacks.30  In this style of attack, the value of the stolen goods 
can be between US$10,000 and US$20,000.31  
 
Hijack-turned-phantom Ship 
Pirates of this type are after the cargo and the ships themselves.  These 
                                                        
26  Jayant Abhyankar, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: An Overview" (paper 
presented at the SEAPOL Inter-regional Conference Bangkok, March 21-23, 2002). 
27 Kompas, "Kapal Perompak Lebih Cepat," Kompas, 27 January 2001. 
28 Economist, "South Sea Piracy: Dead Men Tell No Tales," 87–89. 
29The author’s interview with a Singapore coast guard, on 15 April 2005, Singapore. 
30Captain Li Wenqing (IMC Shipping Co. Pte Ltd.), in discussion with the author, 16 May 
2005, Singapore.  There is a similar reference in John S. Burnett, Dangerous Waters: 
Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas (New York: Plume, 2003), 94. 
31Anthony Davis, "Piracy in Southeast Asia Shows Signs of Increased Organization," Jane's 
Intelligence Review, no. June 1 (2004): 26–29. 
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pirates hijack the vessel, and turn it into phantom ship, as described above.  
This kind of operation is usually carried out by criminal syndicates.  Pirates 
need secure ports to download the stolen cargo, and transfer cargo to other ships.  
These operations are usually done in hidden locations—unofficial anchorages, 
known as “rat harbours”, in Indonesian waters.32 
Apart from the above-mentioned marine fraud, phantom ships are 
usually put to use for smuggling purposes.  The syndicates have a ready 
business network through which to sell their booty.  In Southeast Asia, 
particularly in the late 1990s, the favourite prey was oil, which was easily 
smuggled into a booming black market in China.33 
The following MV CHEUNG SON case is a famous hijack-turned-
phantom ship case.  The following account is written based on the Chinese 
court records and author’s interviews.  
 
MV CHEUNG SON CASE – (Chinese Serious Crime Case No.9901)34 
One of China’s most brutal cases of piracy in the South China Sea, involving 
the murder of 23 Chinese seamen on board the MV CHEUNG SON, whose 
bodies were dumped overboard, ended with 13 pirates (one Indonesian and 12 
Chinese nationals) being sentenced to death.  The MV CHEUNG SON trial 
had a significant deterrent effect on pirates, and their choice of China as a 
destination for stolen cargo. 
                                                        
32 McCawley, "Sea of Trouble," 87-89. 
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In August 1998, Soni Wee, an Indonesian pirate from Batam, went to 
Shenzhen, China to meet his Chinese accomplice, Zhu Yousheng. Soni Wee, 
whose boss was a member of a Chinese criminal syndicate based in Indonesia, 
had got information that an oil tanker would set sail for China.  They searched 
for a suitable ship to rob in the South China Sea, and soon located Weng 
Siliang’s steel-hulled ship. 
Weng Siliang was a Chinese millionaire in Shanwei, Guangdong.  He 
had made his fortune from a contract with the Chinese marine coast guard over 
anti-smuggling activities.  In the early 1990s, smuggling was rampant in the 
Southern China’s coastal provinces (as will be discussed further in the third 
section of this chapter).  The local law enforcement agency, Chinese marine 
coast guards, did not have the capability to combat smuggling.  They issued 
permits to private shipowners, who provided ships and crew at their own 
expense to catch the smugglers.  The private shipowners were entitled to a 
certain percentage of the total value of the contraband confiscated as a reward.  
If these private shipowners seized a smuggling ship with a high value of 
contraband, or “elephant”, as they call it, the small percentage reward in fact 
turned out to be a huge sum of money. Their ships had legal law enforcement 
licenses for anti-smuggling operations.   
However, in 1998, Chinese President Jiang Zemin announced the 
creation of a crack anti-smuggling police force, in a bid to stamp out smuggling 
operations that were destabilising a number of state industries, particularly the 
 123
oil industry.  Licences for private anti-smuggling ships were withdrawn. 
Weng Siliang’s ship, named “Marine Coast Guard-D4220” which had 
had a legal anti-smuggling license, soon became a “Three No’s” ship—“No 
Permit, No Certificate and No Registration Number”.  Weng’s cash flow was 
cut off.  To make the matters worse, he had to pay a large amount of money for 
the maintenance of his ship.  Weng soon found himself trapped in financial 
difficulties.  It was at that time that Soni Wee and Yousheng approached him. 
They soon reached an agreement to use Weng’s ship, disguise themselves as an 
anti-smuggling task force to catch an “elephant” at sea, and then to share the 
booty equally amongst them.  
Various tasks were assigned to each of them: Soni Wee was in charge of 
operations, including gathering intelligence, buying weapons and tools, 
navigating the ship, contacting foreign buyers, and commanding piratical 
activities at sea; Zhu Yousheng provided the funding, RMB10, 000, to buy 
weapons, tools and other logistics support; Weng Shiliang provided the ship and 
crew. 
Apart from Chinese pirates, Soni Wee recruited 12 Indonesian crew in 
August 1998.  These were assigned to take over the ship that was to be hijacked.  
One hardened Chinese pirate, Jia Hongwei, who will be discussed in more 
detail later, was in charge of weapons and tools; he spent RMB 20,000 given to 
him by Zhu Yongsheng on a hunting rifle, a pistol, handcuffs, knives, sticks, 
police uniforms and other equipment. 
On 5 September 1998, Soni Wee and the other pirates set sail from the 
wharf of the Port Authority Shanwei, Guangdong.  Weng Siliang stayed at 
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home, using a radio telephone station, to give orders to the pirates at sea. 
On 7 September 1998, at 2:00 a.m., in the open sea, Soni Wei and other 
pirates put on Chinese marine coast guard uniforms or camouflage uniforms, 
pretending to be members of an anti-smuggling task force.  According to 
information they had received from their overseas boss, there would be an oil 
tanker passing by their area soon, and so they kept a continual radar watch for 
their target. 
On 9 September 1998, at 7:00am, at the position 22:04N, 118.49.8E, the 
pirates spotted a Singaporean oil tanker, MV LOUISA.  When the two ships 
drew close, Soni Wee ordered the MV LOUISA to stop for inspection. The 
pirates boarded the ship, and ransacked the safe and valuables.  All the crew 
were handcuffed and locked in a cabin. 35  Soni ordered the 12 Indonesian 
pirates to sail the MV LOUISA, and he and the other Chinese pirates sailed their 
own ship back to Shanwei in China.  
The MV LOUISA was laden with 5564 tonnes of refined palm oil, with 
an international market price of US$700.00 per tonne. Soni Wee contacted his 
overseas boss to sell the goods, but the boss only offered one-third of the 
market price, which was far lower than they had expected.  The pirates delayed 
their decision for a few days. 
However, a few days later, Soni Wee was informed that the owners of 
the MV LOUISA, who also had a wide network amongst law enforcement 
agencies and criminal syndicates, had sent their men to negotiate with the 
                                                        
35  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 1998)," 28. 
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Indonesian pirates on board MV LOUISA.36  Furthermore, thanks to the captain 
of the MV LOUISA, who had sent off an SOS signal to the IMB before the 
pirates took over the ship, the IMB had forwarded an alert to all port authorities 
to search for the stolen ship.  The pirates had to abandon the ship on 15 
September 1998, north of Sulawesi in Indonesia.  When the MV LOUISA was 
recovered, her name had been changed to the MV HOLLY and she was flying 
the Panama flag. 37 
Soni Wee and the other Chinese pirates did not earn any money from 
hijacking the MV LOUISA, and were thus frustrated and desperate.  A month 
later, the pirates used the same modus operandi to plunder a Korean ship, 
carrying sugarcane juice.  The pirates gained little—just some cash and cheap 
equipment.  Therefore, the victim ship did not report the piratical attack to the 
IMB; the details of this attack were only acquired from the testimonies of the 
pirates in the later MV CHEUNG SON trial. 
 
Hijack of MV CHEUNG SON 
After several months of bad luck and with no money in their pockets, 
the desperate pirates could not wait for instructions from their overseas boss.  
On 15 November 1998, Soni Wee and the other pirates sailed out again in 
search of prey. The next day, at position 22:20 N; 118:49E in the South China 
Sea, the pirates found a bulk carrier, flying the Panama flag, the MV CHEUNG 
SON.  The ship had left Shanghai port several days earlier, and was bound for 
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37  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1st January–31st 
December 1998)," 28 
 126
Port Klang, Malaysia, carrying a cargo of furnace slag.38  Soni Wee and the 
other pirates, in marine coast guard uniforms, pursued the MV CHEUNG SON 
at high speed, and fired guns to stop the vessel. As the launch drew alongside, 
Soni shouted, “This is the Chinese Marine Coast Guard. You are ordered to stop 
for inspection for contraband …” In their hurry, the pirate’s ship crashed into 
MV CHEUNG SON and the pirate ship’s stem was seriously damaged.    
Once on board, the pirates shut down all communications equipment and took 
control of the ship.  The pirates handcuffed 23 of the crew in a cabin, and 
ordered the four engineers in the engine room and two cooks to continue to 
work in their positions.  Soni was disappointed about the goods on board, and 
ordered seven other pirates to sail the damaged pirate ship back to Shanwei 
with a sample of the furnace slag.  
Weng Siliang received the sample and passed it on to a foreign buyer, 
alias “Roger”, a Chinese Indonesian based in Singapore, for chemical tests and 
evaluation.  “Roger” informed Weng later by phone that the furnace slag had no 
market value, but he offered to buy the ship, MV CHEUNG SON, for a price of 
US$300,000.  The MV CHEUNG SON was 146m in length, 10,373 dwt; 
together with cargo, her market value was over three million $U.S. dollars.  The 
pirates had no choice but to sell the ship at this cheap price. On 23 November 
1998, “Roger” sent 16 of his men from Indonesia to take over the ship. 
The next step for the pirates was to empty the ship. Since the MV 
CHEUNG SON was owned by a Hong Kong shipping company, all the crew 
members on board had been hired from Guangdong by the Chinese Overseas 
                                                        
38  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 1998)," 29. 
 127
Shipping Company (COSCO).  For fear of being identified by the Chinese crew, 
Soni Wee decided to kill all the crew members.  
 
Dead Men Tell No Tales 
On 25 November 1998, Soni Wee and some other pirates sailed the MV 
CHEUNG SON to a position of 22 N; 116 E, and told the other pirates that the 
crew of the MV CHEUNG SON had to be eliminated; everybody had to kill at 
least one man.  That night, Soni Wee taped the mouth of the Captain, dragged 
him out on deck and hit him on the head with an iron bar.  He tied a weight to 
the corpse, and threw it into the sea.  The other pirates followed suit, killing the 
other 22 crew members one by one before dawn.  
Having killed 23 crew members, the pirates sailed MV CHEUNG SON 
into Guangdong waters to pick up the Indonesian crew, who had been waiting 
to take over the ship.  The Indonesian crew boarded the ship with a complete set 
of fake shipping documents, and the MV CHEUNG SON vanished into the blue. 
The MV CHEUNG SON has never been recovered: the ship must be 
somewhere in the world, but no one knows her current name or where she is. 
Later, Weng Siliang received the first payment from “Roger”, RMB 970,000, 
and shared the money with the other pirates. 
In December 1998, 12 corpses were found in Guangdong waters.  All 
were identified as crew members of the MV CHEUNG SON.  The Chinese 
Ministry of Public Security took the case very seriously, and assigned a team to 
investigate the case immediately.  The case was later labelled Serious Crime 
Case No. 9901.   
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Even before the corpses had appeared, the police had received 
intelligence that a gang of pirates using a former anti-smuggling private ship 
had robbed a ship on the high seas, and earned a lot of money by selling the 
ship.  The police began to investigate former private anti-smuggling ships. 
Subsequently, they found a ship with a damaged stem, and eventually tracked 
down and arrested the pirates. 
 
 







Illustration 3 Soni Wee dispatched to court from jail. (Photo: Wang Wei) 
 
Epilogue 
The MV CHEUNG SON case attracted international attention. Thirty-
eight defendants were convicted of hijacking and killing the crew of the MV 
CHEUNG SON.  Among the defendants, 13 pirates, Soni Wee, Weng Siliang, 
Jia Hongwei and others were sentenced to death, but the head of the syndicate 
and the foreign buyer, “Roger” are still at large.  On 28 January 2000, 
thousands of people gathered outside the Sanwei courthouse to see the 
“Doomsday of the evil monster of the sea”, as the pirates were led away to the 
execution grounds. 
This case illustrates many of the issues discussed earlier in this chapter: 
the role of the pirates, the syndicates, and how they operate.  The MV CHEONG 
SON case gives an unparalleled glimpse into the lives and contexts of the 
pirates and their prey.  However, if the pirates had had accurate intelligence 
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about the ship from a syndicate, they would not have been caught so easily.  
There are several key elements in this kind of attack: 
 
1. Information  
The information on a ship and its cargo are crucial for pirate operations.  
Pirate syndicates gain this information from their informants within shipping 
companies, port authorities and corrupt law enforcement officials.  In the attack 
on MV LOUISA, the pirates had information about her in advance, and so easily 
succeeded.  In contrast, in the CHEONG SON case, the pirates did not have any 
information about her: if they had known that the ship was only carrying cheap 
furnace slag, they would not have attacked her, or killed so many of her crew 
members.  If pirates had not been so desperate for money, and if they had had 
accurate intelligence about the ship from a syndicate, it would have been 
difficult for the Chinese police to have ever caught them. 
 
2. Smuggling Network  
Syndicates rely on a ready smuggling network to dispose of stolen 
goods.  Usually, they choose a lucrative product as their prey, and one which 
will be easy to sell through their smuggling network or on the black market.  
For example, refined palm oil, as in the MV LOUISA case, kerosene and diesel 
fuel, rubber, steel, copper and aluminium.  In the 1990s, a great number of these 
stolen products flooded the black market or were smuggled into booming 
Chinese markets.  
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3. Shipping Documents and Crew 
Syndicates supply a ready set of shipping documents and crew for the 
hijacked ships.  The lax administration of FOC allows pirates to get their hands 
on shipping documents easily, as was discussed in Chapter 2.  Different pirates 
are assigned to do different kinds of jobs; some are  responsible for, hijacking 
ships, while others are in charge of false documentation for the phantom ship. 
  
4. Logistics Support and Collusion with Corrupt Officials 
Pirates have a strong logistics support from land, and are also frequently 
in collusion with corrupt officials, as will be elaborated on in a later section.  
 
5. A Pirate’s Confession 
Pirates involved in hijack-turned-phantom ship operations are usually 
more professional than the small pirate gangs.  Jia Hongwei, the hardened pirate 
in the MV CHEONG SON case, was a retired army officer and an amateur 
writer.  While in jail, he wrote a letter to his parents, confessing the crime he 
had committed. From this letter, we can really get some insight into a pirate’s 
mind and hear his own voice:  
 
I deeply regret that I did not listen to your advice; I regret that I mingled with 
bad guys and walked on the road that led to crime.  But it is too late. I, your 
son, owe you too much; if I were set free, I would repay your compassion, 
which is deep and broad like the sea. 
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Mom, please do not overwork.  Your son deserves this punishment; you do not 
need to make any effort to rescue me.  There are too many temptations and too 
much cheating in society.  Do not let my younger brother and sister try to find 
a fortune in the outside world.  If they aren’t careful, they could fall into the 
same trap as I did. 
You used to tell us, “Gold and silver nests are no better than our own grass 
nests.” Over the past few years, I have enjoyed these gold and silver nests, but 






 Illustration 4 Jia Hongwei (left), Soni Wee (middle) and Weng Shiliang (right) in court, 
Shanwei, 1999 (Photo: Wang Wei) 
It was Shenzhen where your son first faltered. [After he retired from the army, 
Jia Hongwei went to Shenzhen, a Special Economic Zone in Guangdong 
province, near Hong Kong.] What kind of a place is Shenzhen?  A window for 
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reform and opening up to the outside world?  A paradise for adventurers?  A 
dye vat? Outsiders do not read its real face: they only look at its luxurious 
surface, and cannot see the murderous motives behind the glossy facade, the 
corrupt and dirty money at its core.  At that time, I rushed into her with a crazy, 
cavalier attitude: she was so charming.  But in just a few years, I was defeated 
and had lost my armour in this arena, because I could not resist temptation. 
 
When I first came to Shenzhen, do you know how difficult it was to establish a 
business?  I asked my friends and relatives to help me, hoping that they would 
give me a hand when I was in trouble.  However, all I could see were their 
cruel and greedy faces.  I was disappointed.  I began to learn the rules of the 
real world, struggling in a bitter-sea-like real world.  I could not feel the sense 
of crying, even though I cried very sadly at that time. 
 
I was determined to climb the social ladder: I did not want to beg from 
anybody. I worked hard and struggled desperately. In order to fulfil my 
ambition, I had to break up with Jing [his girlfriend]. I was not a betrayer.  I 
only wanted to prove that I was a real hero. I chose a road of no return; I did 
not want to get her into trouble. I wanted to prove that I was not a loser, but a 
tough guy. 
 
Because of my job [selling wine], I went in and out of all kinds of luxurious 
places of entertainment. My perception of values had completely changed.  I 
was a hard-working guy and had a good reputation for loyalty.  I was soon 
established in Shenzhen’s entertainment circles.  I got to know a lot of 
domestic and foreign friends.  Some of them were businessmen, some were 
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from secret societies.  I was seduced by some foreign friends and became 
addicted to drugs.  From then on, I could not control myself. 
 
However, I was under pressure, as the easy money I got changed me from 
being a slave of money into a master of money.  After I got rich, I was afraid to 
contact our family, and dared not send you any money.  I knew you would not 
allow any child to get rich by bad deeds, for we come from common, diligent 
and thrifty peasant stock without any ambition.  My distorted mind drove me 
crazy in spending money.  I spent one million RMB in one month, one million 
RMB—such a crazy amount! This made me bankrupt and I had no choice but 
to go the doomed way to death. When I finally woke up, it was too late; I could 
not control my destiny.  
 
I feel guilty for the damage I have done to our family.  I do not know what to 
say.  Perhaps the media will describe me as a demon with a green face and 
flanks.  Let it be, it is propaganda. In fact, your son is a guy with responsibility 
and a kind human nature.  Please take care of your health and withstand 
pressure from all directions. 
 
Your son now has no hope.  I am a criminal who deserves the punishment of 
the law.  I do not blame anyone. It is my destiny to suffer this punishment.  If I 
am pardoned by the government and do not have to die, I will be a nice and 
respectful man.  If not, do not feel sorry for me.  If our neighbours ask where I 
am, just reply that your unfilial son has gone abroad, had a car accident and 
has died. He will never come back. 
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Your son has made up his mind, so please do not worry about me. Let it be. Let 
this go with the wind, and do not keep it in mind. Eat well, sleep well, and take 
care. There will be sunshine after a rainy day.39 
 
Later, Jia Hongwei was given the death sentence by the Intermediate 
People’s Court in the Southern port of Shanwei in Guangdong province.  In jail, 
Jia Hongwei tried to finish a memoir of his pirate life, “Tears of a Pirate: The 
Confessions of a Pirate awaiting Execution”.  However, he could not make it 
before his execution date. 
 
The Decline of Phantom Ship Incidents 
The phantom ship type of piracy began to decline at the end of the 
1990s.  This change occurred due to two factors: one was the firm measures 
China took on smuggling along coastal provinces (to be discussed in the 
following section), and the other was the adaptation of IMO regulations on ship 
registration and identification, and the instalment of ship tracking devices on 
board ships. 
In 1998, the Chinese government banned all military involvement in 
business and took firm measures to crack down on smuggling and piracy in 
coastal provinces.  Pirates lost their main black market in China, and for fear of 
being executed, turned to other destinations for their fortunes.40 
      In 2002, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted several 
                                                        
39  The letter [in Chinese] was quoted in Hao Jiangtang, Haidaolei [The tears of a Pirate] 
(Beijing: Huawen Press), 213–15.  This version was translated into English by the author. 
40 ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January-31 
December 2004)." 
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regulations of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 
(SOLAS).  A new amendment of the Regulation 5, requires that every ship must 
be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR), which is “intended to 
provide an on-board record of the history of the ship with respect to the 
information recorded therein…The CSR shall be issued by the Administrations 
of flag states.”41  These requirements facilitate law enforcement agencies and 
port authorities to identify stolen ships, and also prevent pirates from getting a 
complete set of shipping documents without any form of evidence.  
       In addition, the IMO adopted a modification to SOLAS Regulation XI/3 
regarding the Ship Identification Number Scheme (SINS), introduced in 1987.  
The new regulation required a “ship’s identification number (SIN) to be 
permanently marked in a visible place either on the ship’s hull or superstructure.  
Passenger ships should carry the marking on a horizontal surface visible from 
the air.  Ships should also be marked with their ID numbers internally.”42  This 
regulation deters pirates from re-registering a hijacked ship. 
       Furthermore, the IMO also requires all vessels of more than 500 Gross 
Tonnage (GT) to be equipped with a Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), which 
can send an alert from ship to shore in case of a piracy or terrorist attack on 
board a vessel.   
       Apart from all IMO measures, the IMB promotes a simple transmitter 
called ShipLoc, which can continually transmit a ship’s position.  These devices 
are installed by shipowners, and even the captain and crew do not knew where 
they are located.  This tracking device can report a vessel's position up to 15 
                                                        
41IMO website, http://www.imo.org/Facilitation /mainframe.asp?topic_id=388 
42Ibid. 
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times a day, and costs about US$60 to US$70 a month per vessel, depending on 
the number of units fitted.43  Shipowners can also log on to a specific website to 
locate their ship.  Many ships now have ShipLoc installed on board.  
      The implementation of these IMO regulations and instalment of new 
tracking devices on ships has helped shipowners and law enforcement agencies 
to track down hijacked ships. These measures strongly deter pirates from 
hijacking re-registering ships, and turning them into phantom ships. These 
measures, together with the Chinese anti-piracy campaign in coastal provinces, 
which have destroyed the black market for pirates, has brought about the 
decline of phantom ships.  
 
Kidnap-for-ransom 
After the decline of phantom ship piracy, pirates changed their tactics 
from hijacking to kidnap-for-ransom.  From 2002–2005, there were 99 kidnap-
for-ransom attacks in the Straits of Malacca and the Singapore Strait.44 
Pirates take over the vessel by force in the operation, and abduct the captain and 
crew, who are held during ransom negotiations.  The IMB Piracy Reporting 
Centre (IMB-PRC) plays an important role in helping shipowners negotiate 
with pirates.  Usually, the kidnapped crewmembers will be released after the 
ransom has been paid by the crew’s employers.  Ransoms demanded for the 
                                                        
43 Straits Times "Secret Trackers Helped Vessel Recovery," The Strait Times, 7 February 
2005. 
44  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 2004)." And ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 
(1 January–31 December 2005)". 
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release of crew members can range from US$100,000 to US$200,000.45  
An example of such a case was IDATEN, a Japanese tug that was 
attacked by pirates with while plying Indonesian waters on 14 March 2005. The 
pirates in three fishing boats were well armed, with guns and rocket-propelled 
grenades (RPG). After firing at the tug, they boarded it, seized three 
crewmembers (the Master, Chief and Third Engineers) and made off with them. 
46 A week later, the Japanese shipping firm that owned the tug paid the pirates 
10 million Yen (about US$ 100,000) for the release of the hostages.47  
 
Pirate Weapons and Equipment 
Pirates in Southeast Asia are equipped with all kinds of items needed to 
carry out attacks, such as knives, machetes, ropes, pistols, amongst others.  
Since the 1990s, computers and other emerging technologies have enhanced 
pirate capabilities as much as they have those of national navies.  In recent 
years, pirates have begun making use of hand-held Global Positioning System 
(GPS) receivers, satellite phones, ultra-fast speedboats, high-powered 
telescopes, automatic weapons, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).  
                                                        
45 Davis, "Piracy in Southeast Asia Shows Signs of Increased Organization," 3. 
46  ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report (1 January–31 
December 2005)," 17. 
47 Weng Kin Kwan, "Talk Rife That Employer Paid Ransom for Sailors," The Straits Times 
23 March 2005. 
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These weapons usually come from small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) smuggling networks set up in the region. 48   In Southeast Asia, 
Cambodia is one of the biggest suppliers of small arms on the black market. 
Large quantities of small arms also come from China, Vietnam and Myanmar, 
as well as states outside the region.  Singapore and Thailand are import transit 
ports of small arms.  Small arms smugglers are active in Southeast Asia’s long 
maritime and continental frontiers, which are extremely difficult to monitor and 
police.  Small arms are easy to get hold of on the maritime borders of Indonesia, 
East Malaysia and the Philippines.  Pirates buy weapons to attack fishing 
vessels, while fishermen are armed to protect themselves against pirates.49 
On the black market, SALW can be bought at a low price; for example, 
an AK-47 or M-16 assault rifle might cost US$400-500, or it could even be 
rented from between one to three million rupiah. Indonesian navy and police 
are alleged to be involved in the transfer of illegal arms.50 
In terms of boats, pirates usually prefer wooden boats powered by 
several outboard motors, which allow them to travel at almost three times the 
speed of tankers, and which are hard to spot from the merchant ships by radar.  
                                                        
48 Small arms comprise various types of guns/rifles, including handguns, carbines, assault 
rifles and sub-machine guns. Light weapons consist of various heavy calibre guns, such as 
machine guns, and anti-tank weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades, etc. See David H. 
Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, Canberra Papers on 
Strategy and Defence, No.146. (Canberra: Australian National University Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, 2002). 
49 Capie, Small Arms Production, 24. 
50 Landry Haryo Subianto, "Small Arms Problems in Southeast Asia: An Indonesian Case," 
in Small Is (Not) Beautiful: The Problem of Small Arms in Southeast Asia, ed. Phillps Jusario 
Vermonte (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2004). 
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Pirates sometimes make use of modest radar systems to help them locate their 
targets. 51  
 
Part II. Anti-piracy Operations by Littoral Governments 
 
    Anti-piracy operations are dependent on the capacity for maritime security in 
the littoral states, which is subject to two basic elements, as maritime expert 
Sam Bateman points out: (1) law enforcement agencies and their operational 
capabilities, and (2) appropriate national legislation providing for regulation 
enforcement in maritime zones and of maritime activities.52  The following 
section analyses maritime security in the littoral states from these two aspects.   
 
Anti-piracy Law Enforcement Agencies and their Capabilities 
Indonesia  
The Indonesian Navy and Indonesian coast guard are the two main law 
enforcement agencies responsible for combating piracy.  The Indonesian Navy 
has set up Navy Control Command Centres (Puskodal) in the pirate-prone areas, 
Batam and Belawan, to combat piracy and ensure maritime security in the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore Strait.  The Puskodal gather and submit 
                                                        
51Keith Bradsher, "Threats and Responses: Seaborne Trade; Warnings from Al Qaeda Stir 
Fear That Terrorists May Attack Oil Tankers," New York Times, 12 December 2002. 
52 Sam Bateman, "Piracy and the Challenge of Cooperative Security and Enforcement 
Policy," in Ocean Governance and Sustainable Development in Pacific Region, ed. Douglas 
M. Johnston and Ankana Sirivivatnanon (Bangkok: Southeast Asian Programme in Ocean 
Law Policy and Management (SEAPOL), 2002), 354. 
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reports on piracy to the IMB.  They also give orders to the Navy units in their 
field to carry out anti-piracy operations or coordinate with their Malaysian and 
Singaporean counterparts.53  However, the Indonesian navy is notorious for its 
corruption and collusion with pirates, and ships passing through the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore Strait are reluctant to ask the Puskodal for help.54 This 
will be discussed in the third part of this chapter.  
Indonesia’s marine police and coast guard, the Kesatuan Penjaga Laut 
dan Pantai (KPLP) share responsibility for law enforcement in territorial and 
archipelagic waters. The KPLP is Indonesia’s primary anti-piracy agency. 
However, despite fairly extensive foreign assistance from Japan, the capabilities 
of both units are insufficient.55 
Besides these two law enforcement agencies, there is an inter-agency 
law enforcement body, the National Coordination Board for Sea Security 
(Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut, BAKORKAMLA), handling law 
enforcement activities at sea.  The BAKORKAMLA was established in 1972 by 
the Armed Forces Command of the Ministry of Security and Defence, the 
Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Judicial 
Affairs and the Superior Court.  It is funded by the Ministry of Security and 
Defence.  The aim of BAKORKAMLA is to optimise maritime laws and 
cooperation with neighbouring countries.56  However, the BAKORKAMLA is 
                                                        
53 Bernard Kent Sondakh, "National Sovereignty and Security in the Straits of Malacca" 
(paper presented at the "Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security 
Environment", Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 11–13 October 2004), 8. 
54 Ibid., 10. 
55  Christopher Langton, ed., The Military Balance 2006 (London: Routledge & the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006). 
56 Dewan Keamannan Laut Indonesia, "Keputusan Bersama Menteri Pertanhan-
Keamanan/Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata, Menteri Perhubmungan, Menteri Keuangan, 
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being criticised by the shipping industry for lack of efficiency, particularly since 
the separation of the police from the armed forces.57 
Indonesia’s huge geographical extent and its armed forces’ central 
Wawasan Nusantara doctrine58 require a sizable and modern navy.  Indonesia’s 
fleet currently consists of 126 warships and 120 other vessels, of which only 
about 25 vessels are currently operational at sea at any given time.59  In the 
word of the Indonesian Navy’s Admiral Sondak, ‘the new ships cannot shoot, 
the old ships cannot sail”.60  Of some 60 aircraft, including helicopters and 
fixed-wing aircraft, about 40% are not operational. 61    Rear Adm. Bijah 
Soebijanto, Director of the State Intelligence Institute, said that Indonesia 
needed to spend an estimated US$ 2.7-trillion on at least 176 more warships 
and 110 more coast guard aircraft to fulfil its mission.  The Indonesian Navy 
has begun to plan for its reconstruction following President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s taking office on 20 October 2004.  However, the requirements to 
modernise the navy substantially exceed any realistic expectation of budget 
allocation for the 46,000-man navy and marine corps.62   
                                                                                                                                                   
Menteri Kehakiman Dan Jaksa Agung-Pembentukan Badan Korrdinasi Keamanan Di Laut 
Dan Komando Pelaksana Operasi Bersama Keamanan Di Laut, " ed. Menteri Perhubmungan 
Menteri Pertanhan-Keamanan/Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata, Menteri Keuangan, Menteri 
Kehakiman Dan Jaksa Agung (1972). 
57 Hasjim Djalal, "Piracy and Challenges of Cooperative Security and Enforcement Policy," 
The Indonesian Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2002): 108. 
58 The doctrine stresses the vital importance of the integrity of the country’s island and 
maritime territory. 
59 Hasjim Djalal, "Combating Piracy: Co-Operation Needs, Efforts, and Challenges," in 
Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Responses, ed. Derek Johnson and Mark 
Valencia (Singapore: IIAS/ISEAS 2005), 145. 
60Tempo, "Interview-Navy Admiral Bernard Sondakh: 'the Navy Is Not a Security Guard'," 
Tempo (2004): 45. 
61Christopher Langton, "Responding to the Maritime Challenge in Southeast Asia " in The 
Military Balance 2006, ed. Christopher Langton (London: Routledge & the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006). 
62 Staff-Report, "Indonesia Moves to a New Strategic Age," Defence & Foreign Affairs' 
Strategic Policy, (2005). 
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The development of the Indonesian navy was hindered during the 1990s 
by a combination of funding restrictions and eccentric decision-making plans.  
The Indonesian navy now faces maritime security challenges that are more 
acute than at any time since the 1960s.  For example, in March 2005, following 
the maritime dispute with Malaysia over the resource-rich Ambalat area off 
Borneo, which escalated into a naval standoff in the Sulawesi Sea, Indonesia, 
realised that its naval capability needed urgent strengthening.63  In June 2005, 
Indonesia’s new Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Slamet Soedijanto, published the 
‘TNI-AL Blueprint 2004–2013’, which aims at achieving ‘green-water’ 
capability by 2020.  With a new naval blueprint, the present eastern fleets in 
Surabaya and western fleets in Jakarta will combine to become one fleet based 
in Surabaya, and with subordinate command points in Riau (west), Papua (east) 
and Makassar (central). The bases at these points will be upgraded. Other 
locations for the fleet at Kupang in West Timor and Tahuna in North Sulawesi 
will also receive a facelift. Other areas of improvement include the 
strengthening of the Marine Corps, and the setting up of a third brigade in 
Sumatra. A fourth brigade is planned in 2008 in Papua.64  
Ambitious navy procurement was announced in the “TNI-AL Blueprint 
2004–2013”, which highlights the importance now attached to maritime 
defence.  The Indonesian naval procurement programme currently involves four 
new Sigma-class corvettes, four Korean-built Landing Platform Dock (LPDs); 
Chinese C-802 anti-ship missiles and four Todak-class large patrol boats.65 
                                                        
63 Staff-Report, "Indonesia Moves to a New Strategic Age." 
64 Langton, ed., The Military Balance 2006, 256. 
65 Ibid, 256. 
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However, it will take several years before this equipment is operational, and 
most machines in the naval procurement are not used for anti-piracy operations 
or combating smuggling and other illegal activities at sea.  
 
Malaysia 
A number of Malaysian government agencies are responsible for 
maritime security.  These agencies include:  
The Malaysian Armed Forces (primarily Royal Malaysian Navy); 
Royal Marine Police (RMP); 
The Department of Fisheries (Marine Resources Protection Unit 
and Marine Parks Unit); 
Royal Malaysian Customs; 
The Marine Department under the Ministry of Transport; and 
The National Security Division, Prime Minister's Department.66 
In 1985, Malaysia established a Maritime Enforcement Coordinating 
Centre (MECC) under the National Security Division of the Prime Minister’s 
Department to enhance inter-agency cooperation in managing maritime security, 
especially in surveillance and enforcement functions.67 
The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) has been concentrating on building 
blue-water and war-fighting capabilities since the 1990s.  In November 2005, 
the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) was established as a 
national coast guard, with assets and personnel drawn from the police, customs 
                                                        
66 Djalal, "Combating Piracy: Co-Operation Needs, Efforts, and Challenges," 148. 
67 Ibid. 
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and fisheries department as well as the navy.68   
The MMEA’s responsibility for maritime security extends 200 nautical 
miles to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) limit. Marine police will continue 
to be responsible for security within 12 nautical miles of Malaysian territorial 
waters.69  The MMEA’s current focus is to ensure security and that the Straits of 
Malacca are free from such crimes as piracy. By July 2006, the MMEA will 
deploy 72 vessels, which will include 15 ex-RMN patrol boats. The MMEA 
also includes an air component, which aims to deploy 20 helicopters and both 
amphibious and conventional aircraft in the near future.70  In 2006, the Royal 
Malaysian Navy gave 1,300 officers and 17 vessels to the MMEA. However, 
the maritime capability of Malaysia has not yet been equal to the challenges it 
faces at sea.71 
 
Singapore 
The Singapore Police Coast Guard is in charge of combating piracy in 
its territorial waters.  The Police Coast Guard (PCG) is made up of six patrol 
squadrons and a fleet of more than 80 vessels.  The PCG works in collaboration 
with the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).  The Coastal Command of the 
RSN is the agency directly involved with deterrence and prevention of acts of 
piracy and maritime terrorism in Singapore’s territorial waters.  It is composed 
of patrol vessels, inshore fast boats and mine counter-measure ships.  The 
                                                        
68 Langton, ed., The Military Balance 2006. 
69 Ibid., 225. 
70 Ibid. 
71 New Straits Times, “Navy is Seriously Short of Men and Ships”, New Straits Times, 27 
April 2007. 
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Coastal Command collaborates closely with the Police Coast Guard, the 
Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) and the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) 
to combat piracy.  Furthermore, the Republic of Singapore Air Force provides 
maritime air surveillance support.  Singapore has been strengthening its coastal 
patrol capabilities over the last few years on a continual basis by purchasing 
new equipment and vessels.72 
Singapore’s new maritime security measures include the creation of 
Accompanying Sea Security Teams (ASSeT), which are tasked with boarding 
and escorting vessels singled out through shipping data analysis, in order to 
detect and deter any criminal activity on board these vessels and to ensure that 
the threat is neutralised.  Singapore has just completed the installation of new 
radars at Changi Naval base to increase the radar coverage of its territorial 
waters.  In addition it has increased navy and coast-guard patrols in its waters.73 
Some years earlier, in 1988, Singapore adopted the “SAF2000” modernisation 
project, which emphasised the Singapore Armed Forces’ enhancement of 
technological advantages over potential adversaries. In particular, it mentions 
advanced systems for command, control and communications (C3), intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and enhanced logistic capabilities.74 
The maritime component of SAF 2000, “Navy 2000”, consists of mine 
hunters, maritime patrol aircraft, submarines and new patrol vessels and landing 
ships.  Since the 1990s, the Singapore government has been enhancing naval 
capabilities.  Under Project Delta, Singapore will procure six Formidable-class 
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frigates (3200 tonnes, 114m), Harpoon anti-ship and MBDA Aster 15-point 
defence missiles; such advanced weaponry will significantly boost the state’s 
ability to protect its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).75  
Singapore’s current naval procurement programmes consist of plans to 
acquire six S-70B Seahawk multi-role helicopters for the frigates, and two ex-
Swedish Type A17 Västergötland-class submarines, a Landing Ship Tank (LST), 
Hydroid REMUS underwater systems and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs). 76  After 9/11, the maritime security of Singapore has further been 
enhanced with the help of the United States navy. 
 
China 
In China, there are two governmental agencies directly in charge of anti-
piracy operations: The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of 
Communications.  The Criminal Investigation Division of MPS investigates 
piracy cases, while the Frontier Police Division of MPS patrols, monitors and 
combats piracy in its coastal waters.  The Maritime Security Administration of 
China Maritime Bureau, a division of the Ministry of Communications, handles 
maritime information gathering and communication with the IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre.  Chinese maritime capability is improving rapidly, and its on-
going military modernisation programme has given the United States some 
cause for unease.  Chinese marine coast guard units have over 200 patrol boats 
to implement maritime security tasks, which, in terms of anti-piracy operations, 
                                                        
75 Langton, ed., The Military Balance 2006. 
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is sufficient to meet current demand. 77  
 
Assessment on Capabilities of Maritime Security in the 
Littoral States  
In terms of maritime capability, Singapore ranks first among the three 
littoral states, due to its highly developed economy and intensive interaction 
with armed force defence industries and R&D establishments in the United 
States.  Malaysia is the second in terms of naval capability.  Indonesia’s naval 
capability ranks the lowest of the three. Naval capability development is not an 
easy task for Malaysia and Indonesia: it not only demands a huge defence 
budget, but also requires adequate planning for infrastructure, logistics support 
and necessary training to make it operational.  Apart from naval capabilities, 
paramilitary maritime security forces, such as the marine police coast guards of 
Malaysia and Indonesia are still not able to meet the challenges posed by illegal 
operations in their territorial waters.  The Singapore Police Coast is well 
equipped and well trained. However, Singapore’s jurisdiction is only limited to 
three nautical miles around Singapore, which only covers a small area at the 
southern end of the Straits of Malacca.  
The most obvious and easiest way to solve problems relating to a lack of 
capability is to request assistance from foreign navies. Singapore is open to 
offers of foreign aid, but Indonesia and Malaysia, with a concern for a threat 
towards sovereignty over their own territory, strongly oppose any foreign navy 
                                                        
77 Jing Guoli (Deputy Director of the Criminal Investigation Division, Ministry of Public 
Security), in discussion with the author, 26 July 2006. 
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intervention.   
 
Domestic Laws on Maritime Piracy 
There is no explicit domestic law on piracy in Indonesia.  Piracy is 
prosecuted under the Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum 
Pidana, KUHP).78  Similarly, Malaysia and Singapore have not enacted explicit 
laws against piracy; piratical acts are usually subject to the penal code.79   
After the ratification of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (hereafter called “the SUA 
Convention”) in 2004, Singapore enacted the “Maritime Offences Act,” to give 
effect to the provisions of the SUA Convention in Singapore’s territorial waters.  
Activities such as the hijacking, destruction or damage of ships, and other acts 
endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation, are listed as maritime 
offences in the Act.  However, the Act does not use the term “piracy”, although 
in vernacular terms, these offences are considered to be piratical attacks.80  
The SUA Convention is another important international convention on 
combating piracy, along with the United Nations Convention on Law of Sea 
(UNCLOS).  Indonesia and Malaysia ratified the UNCLOS, but they are not 
signatories for the SUA Convention. The UNCLOS and SUA Convention will 
be further detailed in Chapter 5.  
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China has no explicit laws on piracy, either.  Piratical acts come under 
robbery or homicide offences within Chinese criminal law.  In the MV 
CHEUNG SON trial in 2000, discussed above, the Chinese court imposed the 
death sentence on 13 out of 38 suspects for killing 23 MV CHEUNG SON crew 
members, pursuant to robbery and homicide offences in Chinese criminal law.81 
The recently amended Chinese Criminal Law (2005, 5th amendment) 
stipulates that “for crimes defined in international treaties, concluded or 
acceded to by the People’s Republic of China, which are under the jurisdiction 
of the People’s Republic of China, within the framework of treaty obligations, 
this law shall apply.”82 China is the signatory of both the UNCLOS and “the 
SUA Convention”; this means that piracy can be punished under Chinese 
criminal law.83  
Interestingly, two other countries in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and 
Thailand, have enacted domestic laws on piracy.  The Philippines anti-piracy 
legislation can be traced back to colonial times.  Piracy was an offence in the 
Spanish Penal Code of 1887. 84  In the Revised Penal Code of 1930, piracy was 
punished under “the Crimes against National Security and the Law of Nations”. 
In 1974, the Revised Penal Code was modified by the enactment of Presidential 
Decree No.532, or “The Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law.”  The 
penalty of death was imposed for piracy.  Even though the death penalty was 
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generally abolished by 1987, piracy, as a heinous crime, retained the death 
penalty. 
Piracy is a criminal offence in the first Thai Penal Code (1908); however, 
the offence of piracy was deleted in the Thai Penal Code in 1956.85  In the late 
1970s, hundreds of Vietnamese “Boat People”, fleeing the communist regime 
during the Vietnam War, were brutally attacked by Thai pirates while they were 
passing through Thailand’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ).  In 1981 alone, for example, 349 boats were attacked by Thai pirates at 
an average of three times each, 578 women were raped, 228 women were 
abducted, and 881 people were killed or went missing.86   
The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) appealed to the UN 
Secretary General for concerted international action on the problem of piracy 
against asylum seekers at sea, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand.  This 
resulted in the UN General Assembly Resolution 36/125 of 14 December 1981, 
calling for “greater international efforts in the suppression of piracy on the high 
seas, in accordance with their international obligations, and to take appropriate 
action to protect asylum seekers from acts of violence at sea.”87   
In 1982, the Thai government signed an “Anti-Piracy Arrangement” with 
the UNHCR.  Thailand’s National Security Council was authorised to 
coordinate two law enforcement agencies, the Royal Thai Navy and the Royal 
Thai Police, to combat piracy in Thai waters.  The project continued for several 
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years.  In the fifth year, the Royal Thai Navy proposed that the Thai 
government should enact a separate law referring to the suppression of piracy.  
In 1991, the “Act on the Prevention and Suppression of Piracy B.E. 2534” was 
enacted.  This act adopted the UNCLOS definition of piracy, although Thailand 
is not a signatory of either the UNCLOS or the SUA Convention.88 
 In short, the capabilities of maritime security for a country can be assessed 
through its capability in law enforcement, and its appropriate national 
legislation.  Indonesia and Malaysia do not have relevant laws to combat piracy; 
therefore, pirates are prosecuted under light offences, such as theft or robbery, 
and such prosecution do not prove to be significant deterrents for piracy. 
 
Part III. Interaction between Pirates and States  
Piracy requires strong logistics support from land bases, and a smuggling 
network to dispose of the booty.  Logistics support includes weapons and 
equipment, funding and networking.  As this section details, there are grounds 
for believing that pirates have in some cases operated in collusion with local 
law enforcement officials.  
Collusion between Pirates and Law Enforcement Officials  
Indonesia 
Indonesian law enforcement agencies are criticised by members of the 
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shipping industry and the international media for being involved in piracy.89 
Corrupt officers are alleged to receive bribes or salaries from pirate gangs.  In 
return, they acquiesce to piracy by not taking action; sometimes, they are even 
directly involved in piracy.90   
For example, on March 17 2004, an Indonesian Navy patrol boat 
intercepted a general cargo ship while it was underway off Jayapura, Irian Jaya.  
According to the Master’s report, the patrol boat fired her guns and ordered the 
general cargo ship to stop.  The Master and the third officer were ordered to 
board the patrol boat for the inspection of cargo documents.  They were beaten 
and the naval officer demanded US$5,000 in exchange for their release.  The 
Master negotiated this demand down to about half the amount, and added other 
provisions.  The third officer of the ship was held captive until the Master 
handed over the ransom money.  The patrol boat was identified by the Master as 
the KAL YOUTEFA with the pennant number KAL-I-502.91 
Another incident involved a bulk carrier sailing south of Dumai. A 
group of pirates made attempts to board the ship, and despite the crew gathering 
on deck to prevent them, the gang continued to pursue the ship for twenty 
minutes.  The bulk carrier requested for help through their VHF and signal light 
projectors, but even though Indonesian naval ships were just two miles away, 
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they ignored these messages.92  
In some logging areas in Indonesia, shipowners are asked for some 
“coffee money” by Indonesian naval officials before their ships leave port.  
According to a businessman involved in the timber business, if the shipowners 
refuse, their ships will shortly be robbed by pirates.93 
 
China 
In the mid-1990s, the South China Sea became a popular region with 
pirates, particularly the Hong Kong-Luzon-Hainan Island Triangle, and the 
waters off the Philippines.  China was alleged to be a haven for pirates and 
hijacked vessels. This allegation was based on the MV PETRO RANGER case, 
which can be related as follows. On 16 April 1998, the oil tanker MV PETRO 
RANGER sailed from Singapore, with a cargo of gas, oil and kerosene bound 
for Vietnam.  The MV PETRO RANGER was pursued by heavily armed pirates 
in balaclavas in a speedboat.  Captain Blyth and his 20 crew were forced to 
surrender.  The gang leader told Captain Blyth that he worked for a 
multinational syndicate with bosses in Indonesia, Singapore, China and Hong 
Kong.94  After a further five days at sea, two tankers came alongside the MV 
PETRO RANGER and offloaded the cargo of fuel, worth about US$3 million.  
When the MV PETRO RANGER sailed into the waters close to the Chinese port 
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of Haikou, a Chinese patrol boat boarded the tanker to check the ship’s 
documents.  The Chinese authorities alleged that the vessel was engaged in 
smuggling operations.  They questioned the 12 Indonesian pirates and the crew 
for over two weeks.  Subsequently, the ship’s crew were accused of smuggling.  
The gas, oil and kerosene on board were confiscated.  On 15 October 1998, the 
pirates were sent back to Indonesia without being prosecuted.95  The cargo was 
confiscated by the Chinese authorities.  The shipowner, Petroships Pte Ltd had 
to pay a hefty fee to get their ship back, without its valuable cargo.96 
Another example of alleged collusion was the MV TENYU case.  The 
MV TENYU was a Panamanian-flagged bulk carrier, carrying aluminium ingots 
to South Korea.  It was hijacked and disappeared in the South China Sea in 
September 1998.  The ship was eventually found in Zhang Jia Gang Port. The 
MV TENYU had been repainted and renamed SANEI 1, bearing a Honduran flag.  
Her cargo and original crew, two South Koreans and 13 Chinese crewmembers, 
had vanished.97  However, the 16 Indonesian pirates found on board the ship in 
Zhang Jia Gang Port were repatriated, even though at least two of them were 
identified by the International Maritime Bureau as having taken part in the 
hijacking four years earlier of the MV ANNA SIERRA. 98   The Chinese 
authorities claimed that they had no evidence to prosecute the crew.  However, 
later, one South Korean, Lee Dong-Gul, who was jailed in South Korea for 
selling aluminium that came from the ship’s cargo, admitted in court that he had 
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bought the ship and cargo from a couple of Indonesians and had sold them to a 
Chinese company.99 
 
Part IV. Roots of the Collusion  
Why have the Indonesian National Army (Tentrara Nasional Indonesia, 
TNI) and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) been accused of to being 
in collusion with pirates, while the law enforcement agencies from other littoral 
countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, have not faced a similar charge?  
Upon examination, I found that were many striking similarities between the 
TNI and the PLA.  Firstly, both the TNI and the PLA face financial constraints 
in their budgets. 100   Secondly, the PLA and the TNI are both involved in 
commercial activities.  Those were the main reasons for their collusion with 
pirates.  Insufficient budgets forced some in the armed services to seek extra 
money.  The armed forces in Asia typically lead privileged lives, and enjoy easy 
immunity from civilian monitoring and prosecution.  When they are involved in 
commercial activities, they were likely to take advantage of these ready-made 
opportunities to engage in corrupt activities.101 
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Indonesian National Army (TNI) 
Under the doctrine of dwifungsi, or ‘dual function’, the Indonesian armed 
forces have been involved in both civilian and military domains. 102   The 
dwifungsi concept led to the development of the Indonesian Military Business 
Complex (IMBC), with the principal object of generating financial resources 
for the Indonesian military.   It was estimated that at least half the Indonesian 
military budget came from extra-budgetary sources.103  The IMBC could be 
classified into two types: formal and informal.  The formal IMBC participated 
in business activities through Yayasan or foundations.  These foundations and 
their networks operated both at central and regional levels.104  
It has been alleged that military officials have collected “protection money” 
from the ethnic Chinese community, in return for ensuring the security of their 
business operations.  In coastal areas, some military officials, mostly naval 
officers, were involved in illegal extortion from companies dealing with 
logging, fishing, oil and minerals.  Under these circumstances, the corrupt 
officers had no incentive to combat piracy, and some officers, as discussed 
above, have even participated in piracy, smuggling, drug trafficking and other 
illegal activities.105  Although Indonesia launched a great many initiatives to 
reform its armed forces after the fall of Suharto in 1998, and restricted many of 
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TNI’s institutional privileges, the territorial command structure of TNI is still 
maintained.  The territorial command system is “the power base of the armed 
forces in the regions, allowing them to tap into economic resources at the 
grassroots and defend their role as a significant player in local politics.”106    
 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)  
The PLA has a long history of being engaged in civilian activities since 
China’s revolution (1921-1949).  In December 1978, Deng Xiaopeng became 
the paramount leader in the historic Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee, which was regarded as the opening of Chinese economic reform.  
In order to carry out economic reform, the budget of the PLA, which accounted 
for an average of 17.2% of state fiscal expenditure before reform, was 
drastically reduced. 107  The PLA was said to have voluntarily subordinated 
itself to the interests of the nation’s economic development.  The PLA was told 
that its defence budgets would eventually increase as China’s economy became 
more developed.108  
The PLA had to seek for other sources for its budget.  Initially, the PLA 
engaged in industrial consolidation and agricultural production.  Later, it set up 
a Military Business Complex (MBC), and directly participated in the national 
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economy.  However, the Chinese military’s participation in the economy, in turn, 
provided ready-made opportunities for corrupt activities.  From the end of the 
1980s to the late 1990s, many of these privileged MBCs used the PLA 
infrastructure and transportation network for smuggling.  In coastal provinces, 
many MBCs were in collusion with state-owned enterprises, private companies 
and criminal syndicates, and engaged in smuggling oil and other commodities 
into China’s fast-growing markets.109  
The PLA was involved in the nation's largest corruption scandal, the 
Xiamen Yuanhua Smuggling case.  The Yuanhua Group, in collaboration with 
other individuals and firms, smuggled into the country an estimated 53 billion 
yuan (US$ 6.38 billion) worth of goods during a four-year period, from 1996 to 
1999. This smuggling represents the evasion of an estimated 30 billion yuan 
(about US$ 3.6 billion) in taxes, equivalent to the nation’s revenue from tariffs 
for the first half of 1998.  
Most of the smuggling involved refined oil.  The amount of refined oil 
alone was enormous, equivalent to a ship containing over 100,000 tons of oil 
coming into port every three days, and far exceeding the nationwide figure of 
350,000 tons of smuggled refined oil reported by customs for 1996 and 1997 
combined. 110  Top leaders and members of the investigative team have stated 
that the smuggling of oil by Yuanhua distorted national oil prices, and had an 
adverse impact on production, leading to the closure of numerous enterprises 
                                                        
109 Ibid. 
110 Xinhua, (25 July 2001). The 1996–1997 figures for smuggled oil come from Ju Bing, Fan 
Zousi Gonggao Anti-smuggling Declaration, (Jingji Ribao Press, 1999), 336. 
 160
across the nation.111 
Many PLA generals and officials and public security forces were involved 
in the case.  The highest ranking military officer implicated in the Yuanhua case 
was General Ji Shengde, the head of military intelligence in the General Staff 
Department.  The PLA navy was alleged to have escorted the smuggled goods 
into Xiamen port.  This kind of smuggling was rampant in other coastal 
provinces as well.112 
Where did such enormous amounts of refined oil come from?  They mainly 
come from the black market.  Who provided the cargo?  It was not all, but at 
least partially, cargo stolen by pirates.  These were the reasons why pirates 
targeted oil tankers and China became a poplar destination for pirates in the 
1990s.   
As discussed above, the high profile trial of the MV CHEUNG SON pirates 
in 2000, in which 13 pirates were sentenced to death, showed the Chinese 
government’s firm attitude towards combating piracy.  Thanks to the anti-
smuggling campaign and anti-piracy measures, the pirates lost their main black 
market in China.  For fear of being executed, the pirates turned to other 
destinations, and thus, since 2000, China has no longer been a haven for 
pirates.113 
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Malaysia and Singapore 
Malaysian and Singaporean armed forces are quite different from the 
armed forces of Indonesia and China in terms of history and systems.  
Compared to Indonesia and China, the salaries of Malaysian and Singaporean 
military officials are higher, and the economic pressure for military officials is 
lower.  The Malaysian police and navy are far from corruption-free: in fact, the 
Malaysian police, according to the Malaysian Transparency Perception Survey, 
are “perceived to have the lowest level of integrity and transparency compared 
with other public agencies”.114  Singapore is not squeaky clean either; however, 
the collusion between pirates and law enforcement agencies in Malaysia and 
Singapore are not as endemic as their counterparts in Indonesia. 
 
Conclusion 
The booming seaborne trade of the 1990s provided tempting targets for 
pirates, as well as a market for their booty.  The origins of petty piracy, 
especially in Indonesian waters, lay in the deteriorating livelihoods of 
fishermen in coastal villages.  Larger-scale piracy, orchestrated by international 
criminal syndicates, was driven by the economic gains it yielded.  
Roots of collusion exist in those armed forces that deal with commercial 
activities.  Enjoying privileges and immunity from civilian monitoring and 
prosecution, they are likely to become corrupt.  These officials have been 
involved in all kinds of moneymaking activities, such as piracy and smuggling.  
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With the help of these corrupt officials, Indonesia became a piracy-prone area—
the supply end—providing the stolen cargo, and China became the pirates’ 
preferred destination—the demand end—the market for the stolen cargo.  In 
terms of anti-piracy operations, if law enforcement officials can make profits 
from piracy, there is no motivation for them to combat piracy.  This attitude on 
the ground will, in return, impact on a country’s political will in bilateral and 




INTERSTATE ANTI-PIRACY COOPERATION 
 
Chapter Preview 
This chapter explores the interactions between state actors on anti-piracy 
cooperation.  After the Cold War, the tension in Southeast Asia was eased. 
Former superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, substantially 
reduced their military presence in Southeast Asia, which led to a security 
vacuum in Southeast Asian waters.  The maritime capabilities of the littoral 
states had yet to meet the challenges from non-state actors at sea, such as piracy. 
Piracy in Southeast Asia is characterised as a transnational crime. The 
suppression of piracy requires cooperation amongst the states concerned.  Since 
the early 1990s, the littoral countries have been cooperating in anti-piracy 
operations.  Anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia can be divided into two 
phases:   
Phase One (1992-2001). Anti-piracy cooperation was characterised by 
low-profile, bilateral and multilateral cooperation amongst ASEAN and East 
Asian countries.  Japan played an important role in anti-piracy initiatives.  
However, the effectiveness of anti-piracy cooperation was hampered by 
divergent national interests, priorities and incentives towards piracy in the 
littoral states.  
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Phase Two (2002-2005) The watershed for this period was the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks on America (hereafter, 9/11).  After 9/11, 
allegations of a terrorism and piracy nexus raised much concern in the maritime 
world.  The United States has dominated international conferences relating to 
maritime security issues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the 
Asian Security Summits, known as the “Shangri-la Dialogue”.  Many measures 
regarding maritime security have been implemented, such as the Regional 
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), together with the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which was created by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).   
Against this backdrop, the perceptions and policies of regional anti-piracy 
cooperation in Southeast and East Asia have changed.  The incentives and 
capabilities of anti-piracy cooperation have been enhanced, and after three 
years of concerted effort (2002–2004), piracy incidents in Southeast Asia have 
significantly declined. 
 This chapter has four parts: the first part looks at anti-piracy cooperation 
in Asia and international legal instruments on anti-piracy cooperation; the 
second part covers anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia; the third part 
examines the problems in anti-piracy cooperation in the littoral countries; and 
the final part analyses the changes in international anti-piracy cooperation after 
9/11, and the reasons for the decline in piratical incidents after 2004. 
 165
 
Part I. Anti-piracy Cooperation and International Legal 
Instruments 
Anti-piracy Agreements and Implementation 
Anti-piracy cooperation is not a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia.  In 
the 19th century, British and Dutch colonial authorities in Southeast Asia 
cooperated in several anti-piracy operations.  Anti-piracy cooperation consists 
of two aspects: governmental anti-piracy policies and agreements, or 
international legal instruments, and then their implementation.  Governmental 
anti-piracy agreements stipulate general principles of cooperation, such as 
patrols and information sharing, which are the guidelines for implementation. 
An example of this would be the anti-piracy cooperation articles in the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty in 1824, which was discussed in Chapter 2.1 
The implementation of anti-piracy agreements is always dependent on the 
capabilities of law enforcement forces.  In the colonial era, anti-piracy 
cooperation was difficult to implement, for it was hindered by the limitation of 
communication, navigation techniques and weaponry.  In the contemporary era, 
with the help of such modern technology as satellite communication systems, 
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and advanced weaponry, anti-piracy 
cooperation is easy to implement in terms of technology.  However, there 
remain other hindrances to anti-piracy operations in Southeast Asia, which will 
be elaborated in the third part of this chapter.  
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International Legal Instruments 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the 
main international law governing law enforcement on piracy.  The UNCLOS, 
which has 149 signatory states, provides the legal basis for international anti-
piracy cooperation.  The three littoral states, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore, together with China and Japan are signatory parties.  Among the 
ASEAN states, only Cambodia and Thailand are not signatory parties.2 
Piracy is defined in Article 101 of UNCLOS, as cited in Chapter 1.  The 
definition of piracy consists of five elements: (1) Illegal acts of violence, such 
as robbery, murder, assault or rape; (2) Crimes committed on the high seas, 
outside the jurisdiction of any state; (3) Such crimes are perpetrated by private 
or public ships; (4) The aims of the crimes are for private ends; and (5) An 
action which involves at least two ships. 3  However, piracy perpetrated by 
terrorists for political ends at sea is excluded.  
In Article 100, the UNCLOS reaffirms the duty and obligation of every 
state to act against piracy: “All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible 
extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside 
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the jurisdiction of any state.”4 
Article 105 of UNCLOS provides the right of seizure of a pirate ship or 
aircraft: 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state, 
every state may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by 
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the 
property on board. The courts of the state which carried out the seizure may 
decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to 
be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of 
third parties acting in good faith.5 
Article 110 provides the right of warships to visit a foreign ship on the high seas 
when the ship is suspected of engaging in piracy. Article 111 stipulates the right 
of hot pursuit, which provides a legal basis for responding to attempted acts of 
piracy. 
 
The SUA Convention and the SUA Protocol  
       After the ACHILLE LAURO incident occurred in 1985, the SUA 
Convention and the SUA protocol were signed in 1988 to cover unlawful acts 
with political ends. 6  
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As supplements to the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and the SUA Protocol 
expand the definition of piracy to include unlawful acts committed on board a 
ship or on fixed platforms (the SUA Protocol), particularly if the act is likely to 
endanger the safety of navigation.7  
The SUA Convention requires state parties to criminalise any unlawful 
acts under national law, and to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of 
such perpetrators.8  
The important difference in the SUA Convention, in comparison with 
the UNCLOS, is in the scope of application: the SUA Convention also applies 
to territorial waters.  Article 4 of the SUA Convention states that the 
Convention applies if “the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, 
through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single 
state, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent states.”9  This means 
that the right to board and search a suspect ship stipulated in the UNCLOS 
Article 105 can be exercised within the territorial waters of a signatory state.  It 
empowers law enforcement agencies with a greater right to crack down on 
piracy.  However, the two key littoral states of the Straits of Malacca, Indonesia 
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and Malaysia, have not ratified the SUA Convention.10  The reasons for this 
will be discussed later in the third part of this chapter. 
 
Part II. Anti-piracy Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Phase 
1, 1990–2001) 
 
Since the early 1990s, there have been a number of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation initiatives amongst the littoral countries.  
In 1992, bilateral agreements were signed between Singapore and 
Indonesia on coordinated naval patrols, and these states conducted periodic 
anti-piracy exercises in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Strait.11  
There was a similar arrangement between Indonesia and Malaysia.  In 
December 1992, the two countries established an operational co-coordinating 
border arrangement, to deal with maritime issues arising along their common 
border, including coordinated maritime patrol operations in the Straits of 
Malacca.  The arrangement also aimed at enhancing bilateral cooperation in 
combating illegal activities.12  
There was similar cooperation between Malaysia and Singapore, in 
which the police departments of the two countries shared information and 
                                                        
10  See Zou, "Seeking Effectiveness for the Crackdown of Piracy at Sea.”, and Roach, 
"Enhancing Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.", 97-117. 
11 Chalk, "Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia." Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 21, no. 2 (1997): 87–112. 
12Ralf Emmers, "ASEAN and Securitization of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia," The 
Pacific Review 16, no. 3 (2003). 
 170
discussed maritime issues and criminal activities.13 
In 1993, the Malaysian and Philippine governments established a 
Philippines-Malaysia Border Patrol Coordinating Group, which conducted co-
ordinated border patrol operations in the maritime areas known for piracy and 
other illegal activities.14  
 
ASEAN and Anti-piracy Cooperation 
The issue of piracy in Southeast Asia was raised at workshops 
conducted in 1990 and 1991 on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea.15  In 1996, ASEAN countries continued to discuss piracy, together 
with other transnational crimes at a number of ministerial meetings, and agreed 
to hold the first ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime, in Manila in 
December 1997.  At that conference, the participating countries signed the 
ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, the first such document to include 
piracy as an issue for the entire membership to consider.  The Declaration also 
called for the establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime, 
which would coordinate the region’s efforts to curb transnational crimes 
through intelligence sharing and the coordination of operations.16 
In 2001, ASEAN decided to set up the Special Projects Division on 
                                                        
13 Hasjim Djalal, "Combating Piracy: Co-operation Needs, Efforts, and Challenges." In 
Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues and Responses, Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia 
ed. (Singapore: IIAS/ ISEAS, 2005), 149. 
14 Hasjim Djalal , "Piracy in Southeast Asia: Indonesian & Regional Responses," Indonesian 
Journal of International Law 1, no. 3 (2004): 419–40. 
15 Hasjim Djalal, , "Piracy and Challenges of Cooperative Security and Enforcement Policy," 
The Indonesian Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2002): 106–16.  
16 Ibid., 109.  
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Transnational Crime at the ASEAN Secretariat to facilitate regional and 
international cooperation to suppress piracy.  The division deals with eight 
types of transnational crime: piracy, terrorism, trafficking in drugs, trafficking 
in persons, arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime 
and cyber crime.17   
However, little progress was made on the piracy issue; meanwhile, 
piratical attacks continued to increase in Southeast Asian waters at the end of 
the 1990s. 
 
Japanese Anti-piracy Initiatives 
Japan is greatly dependent on the flow of resources through the pirate-
infested waters of Southeast Asia.  The sea lanes passing through Southeast 
Asia are of vital importance to Japan because they deliver strategic 
commodities such as petroleum, coal, uranium, grain and iron ore, and carry 
Japanese manufactured goods to Europe, Australia, the Middle East and Africa.  
The Straits of Malacca alone carries 80% of Japan's petroleum imports. 18  
Japanese policymakers regard piracy as a direct threat to Japan's comprehensive 
security, including economic and energy security, and the safety of Japanese 
citizens.19 
                                                        
17 Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime, Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2003, available at www.aseansec.org.  
18 John F Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation 
and the Coastal State Responses," Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 3 (2004): 480–505. 
19 MOFA, Diplomatic Bluebook 2001 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2001 [cited 8 
May 2006]); available from http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/chap2-4-
d.html. 
 172
Since the late 1960s, a wide variety of programmes have been 
implemented by the Japanese to improve navigational safety and security in 
Southeast Asia.  The Japanese have been funding coastal states in the 
installation and maintenance of navigational aides and buoys, and have been 
helping the littoral countries to upgrade marine safety data management 
systems and execute hydrographic surveys.20  These assistance programmes are 
carried out both by the Japanese government and a private organisation, the 
Nippon Foundation. 21  
The Japanese media has given much coverage to reports on piracy, 
highlighting the human causalities, and seeing Japanese citizens and companies 
as victims in such assaults.22 Intensive media coverage was given in Japan on 
the hijackings of ships related to Japan, such as the MV TENYU (1998), MT 
GLOBAL MARS (2000), ARBEY JAYA (2001) and MV ALONDRA RAINBOW 
(2002).23 
                                                        
20 Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore, and Indonesia 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 42–45. 
21 John F. Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation 
and the Coastal State Responses," 486. 
22Ibid. 
23 The TENYU case was discussed in Chapter 4.  MT GLOBAL MARS is a Japanese-owned 
chemical tanker. On 22 February 2000, MT GLOBAL MARS departed Port Klang in Malaysia 
and bound for Haldia, India, with 6,000 mts of palm oil products on board.  She was attacked 
and hijacked by a group of pirates on 23 February 2000.  The crewmembers were blindfolded, 
transferred to another boat the following day, and kept captive for 13 days.  The crew were 
released and put in a small boat on 7 March 2000, and were later rescued by a fishing vessel. 
Later, MT GLOBAL MARS was found anchored off Dangan Island, near Zhuihai by the 
Chinese authorities. The ship was renamed BULAWAN. Her new crewmembers, 11 Filipinos 
and 9 Burmese were arrested but subsequently released. The ship was subsequently released 
to her owners. For details, see ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual 
Report (1 January–31 December 2000)," 15. 
The ARBEY JAYA is an Indonesian speedboat. On 25 April 2001, three Japanese personnel 
on board were hijacked by pirates armed with pistols and grenades and held to ransom. ICC-
IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (1 January–31 December 
2001)" (Essex: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2002), 29.  
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In 1997, Japan proposed the establishment of a standing ocean-
peacekeeping (OPK) fleet to conduct multinational patrols in both territorial 
and international waters in Southeast Asia.  The proposal suggested that related 
states should set up a task force as a standing body, which would provide 
comprehensive maritime security in both international and territorial waters.  
The proposal was rejected by Southeast Asian coastal countries and China.24 
In November 1999, at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Manila, Japanese Prime 
Minister Obuchi proposed that Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) vessels should 
carry out joint patrols with Southeast Asian maritime forces.  The proposals 
included:  
• establishing a regional coast guard presence, 
• strengthening state support for shipping companies, 
• improving cooperation of regional responses to attacks. 25The 
following year, two anti-piracy conferences were held in Tokyo. Delegates from 
17 countries, regional maritime law enforcement agencies, shipowners 
associations and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were present at 
these conferences.  The conference results did not reflect the reported initial 
                                                                                                                                                   
The MV ALONDRA RAINBOW was seized on 22 October 2002 by a gang of pirates armed 
with pistols and swords, shortly after the ship left the port of Kuala Tanjung in Indonesia, 
bound for Miike in Japan.  The ALONDRA RAINBOW, a new ship of 9,000 tonnes dwt, was 
carrying a cargo of aluminium ingots worth US$8m–10m. The crew of two Japanese and 15 
Filipinos were first tied up and blindfolded, and then eventually dumped into a small 
inflatable raft in which they drifted for 11 days before being picked up by a Thai fishing 
vessel. The Indonesian pirates were apprehended on 16 November 2002 by the Indian navy, 
after a high-speed chase off Goa. 
24  Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto, "Ocean-Peace Keeping and New Roles for 
Maritime Force," NIDS Security Reports, no. 1 (March 2000): 75. 
25 Nayan Chanda, "Foot in the Water," Far Eastern Economic Review 163, no. 10 (9 March 
2000). 
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enthusiasm for Obuchi's suggestions. No state supported Japanese patrols in 
foreign waters.26  However, the representatives adopted three documents:  
• “Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000”, which expressed the participants’ 
intention to cooperate in anti-piracy operations;  
• “The Tokyo Appeal”, which called for information exchange between 
governments, and endorsed the establishment of national action plans; 
• “The Model Action Plan”, which suggested specific countermeasures 
for states and shippers.”27 
In addition, Japan reached bilateral arrangements with the coastal states 
of the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, by offering anti-piracy 
training.  In November 2000, the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) conducted anti-
piracy training exercises with India and Malaysia.28 
In 2001, the Japanese proposed a regional “Maritime Coalition,” which 
would include Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) vessels in a 
multinational maritime security force.  However, the proposal was declined by 
the respective countries.29 
 
Assessment 
The first phase of anti-piracy cooperation was mainly implemented 
                                                        
26 Xu, Ke, "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters and Regional Security." Dangdai 
Yatai [Contemporary Asian Affairs], 2003. 
27 Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the 
Coastal State Responses," 491. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Hideaki Kaneda, "Japanese Maritime Strategy in the New Era," in Maritime Strategies in 
Asia, ed. Jurgen Schwarz (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2002). 
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amongst the ASEAN and the East Asian countries, namely China and Japan.  
Japan was enthusiastic about anti-piracy cooperation and put forward many 
anti-piracy proposals.  The Japanese constitution restricts the Self Defence 
Force (SDF) from operating in a traditional military manner, and the Japan 
Coast Guard is also restrained by antimilitarist prohibition.  China was 
suspicious of Japanese intentions regarding its anti-piracy proposals, and 
claimed that Japan was attempting to use piracy as an excuse to flex its military 
muscles in Southeast Asia.  In 2000, at the Mumbai ASEAN Regional Forum 
anti-piracy meeting, China opposed a Japanese proposal for joint patrols and 
multilateral solutions.30 
The littoral states, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, considering 
Japan as a useful counterbalance of power with China, have been willing to 
cooperate with Japan for pragmatic reasons.  However, Indonesia and Malaysia 
are concerned about any threat to their sovereignty and reputation in anti-piracy 
cooperation.  These perceptions are reflected in their rejection of Japanese 
proposals for a standing ocean-Peacekeeping (OPK) fleets and joint patrols.  
Singapore, as a city-state, is keen on cooperating with the Japanese, because it 
stands to gain a great deal and has relatively little to lose in anti-piracy 
cooperation.31 
In terms of outcomes for anti-piracy cooperation, as we can see in the table 
on piracy trends in Chapter 3, piracy incidents kept on growing and remained at 
a high level from 1992–2001, indicating that anti-piracy cooperation was not 
                                                        
30 Xu, Ke, "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters and Regional Security,” 
31 Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the 
Coastal State Responses," 495. 
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effective; what went wrong?  This lack of control was due to problems in anti-
piracy cooperation in the littoral states. 
 
Part III. Problems in Anti-piracy Cooperation in the 
Littoral States 
Divergent National Interests, Priorities and Incentives 
Indonesia 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are signatory parties of the 
UNCLOS and Indonesia is one of its beneficiaries.  For instance, the 
archipelagic principle, for which Indonesia has struggled for recognition since 
1957, was confirmed in the UNCLOS (1982).  Pursuant to the UNCLOS, 
Indonesia’s marine resources base has been considerably extended.  Prior to its 
recognition as an archipelagic state and other concepts under the UNCLOS, 
Indonesia’s land-based resources covered an area of about 1.9 million m2; 
following the UNCLOS (1982), Indonesia’s resources base now covers an area 
of about eight million m2.32  
However, Indonesia lacks sufficient capability of law enforcement to 
protect its vast maritime territory, as was discussed in Chapter 4.  Hence, 
Indonesian policymakers have to make full use of its limited capability to 
protect its priority aims. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Indonesian government’s priorities are 
                                                        
32 Djalal, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1995). 
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to feed its huge population by developing its maritime sector and fisheries, and 
to protect its maritime resources.  Illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, has robbed the nation of a great deal of income.  The 
Indonesian government loses an estimated US$ two billion a year in illegal 
fishing.33  There are many other urgent matters that need to be attended to, such 
as smuggling, illegal logging and sand exploitation, all of which have caused 
great losses for Indonesia: US$ one billion per year from smuggling,  30 trillion 
rupiah per year from illegal logging, and 2 trillion rupiah each year from illegal 
sand exploitation.34  
As a consequence, anti-piracy operations are not on the Indonesian 
priority list.  According to an IMB report, only a few victim ships of piratical 
attack belong to Indonesia, and the economic loss caused by piracy is 
minimal.35 Indonesian policymakers reject the prospect of devoting significant 
resources to what is perceived as such a low priority problem.  For example, an 
Indonesian representative at a piracy conference in Tokyo in 2000 dismissed the 
value of fighting piracy as irrelevant in the face of "so many islands, so many 
problems".36 
Indonesian government officials have strongly opposed the IMB 
definition of piracy, which states that piracy is “an act of boarding any vessel 
with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or 
                                                        
33MoD, Defending the Country Entering the 21st Century (Jakarta: Ministry of Defence, 
Indonesia, 2003), 30. 
34  Hasjim Djalal, "Piracy in Southeast Asia: Indonesian & Regional Responses," Jurnal 
Hukun International [Indonesian Journal of International Law] 1, no. 3 (2004): 419-40. 
35ICC-IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (1 January-31 March 2005)" (Essex: 
ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2006).. 
36 Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia: Policy Formulation and the 
Coastal State Responses," 480-505. 
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capability of using force in furtherance of that act.” 37   According to this 
definition, piracy not only refers to a criminal or illegal act perpetrated on the 
high seas, but also includes those committed in territorial waters.    
Indonesian officials argued that “piracy” as defined in the IMB report refers to 
cases of petty theft or burglary perpetrated in Indonesian ports and anchorages.  
Indonesian officials reiterate this argument in international conferences and 
media.38  They insist that the definition of piracy should be pursuant to Article 
100 of UNCLOS: piracy is an illegal act on the high seas or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any state.  In their view, the unlawful acts, which take 
place in waters under national jurisdiction, are not “piracy”, but “armed 
robbery” or “sea robbery”, which should be dealt with exclusively by the 
littoral states.39    
The Indonesian Navy Admiral at that time, Bernard Kent Sondakh, 
claimed that according to the UNCLOS definition, “ there is no piracy in the 
Straits of Malacca.”40  Sondakh also argued that the piracy situation in the 
Straits of Malacca had been deliberately exaggerated, and that it was part of an 
international strategy to justify foreign intervention in Indonesia, by portraying 
the country as weak and incapable of looking after its own waters. 41  The 
Director of Treaties for Policy Security and Territorial Affairs, Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Arif Havas Oegroseno also shared this opinion.42 
                                                        
37 ICC-IMB, Piracy Report 1992, 2. 
38 Bernard Kent Sondakh, "National Sovereignty and Security in the Straits of Malacca". Paper 
presented at the "Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security Environment", Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 11–13 October 2004. 
39 Ibid., 6. 
40 Ibid., 8. 
41 Ibid., 5. 
42Arif Havas Oegroseno, "The Straits of Malacca and Challenges Ahead: Indonesian Point of 
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The other reason for Indonesia’s lack of incentive to prioritise anti-
piracy operations is the cost.  The immediate cost of anti-piracy operations is 
too high for Indonesia.  For instance, just to set up an anti-piracy command and 
control centre between the Strait of Singapore and Jakarta would cost Indonesia 
about US$ 38.5 million.43  
Indonesian representatives frequently cite the UNCLOS Article 43 
requirement that user and coastal states share the responsibility for navigational 
safety in international straits, and complain that, apart from Japan, no user state 
is fulfilling its aid responsibilities.44  However, for fear of threats to national 
sovereignty, Indonesia strongly rejected the United States’ Regional Maritime 
Security Initiative (RMSI), which would allow the U.S. navy to patrol in the 
Straits of Malacca.45  
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, many corrupt law enforcement 
officials on the ground are in collusion with pirates.  These corrupt officials 
receive bribes from pirates or gain profits from piracy, as well as other illegal 
activities, such as smuggling.  Anti-piracy operations would reduce their 
income, and thus they have no incentive to combat piracy. 
 
Malaysia 
Malaysia has extended its maritime boundaries incrementally since 
                                                                                                                                                   
View," in "Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security Environment," (Kuala 
Lumpur: MIMA, 2004). 
43 Djalal, "Combating Piracy: Co-Operation Needs, Efforts, and Challenges," 146. 
44UN, "The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.62/122," (United Nations, 1982). 
45 Bradford, "Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives” 480-505. 
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1960s.  In 1979, Malaysia published a New Map (Peta Baru), which was 
characterised by the use of straight baselines.  In 1980, Malaysia proclaimed its 
EEZ to 200 nautical miles from these baselines. However, their proclamations 
were unconfirmed later in the UNCLOS in 1982.46 
Malaysia’s economy relies heavily on the seaborne trade passing 
through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea.  The Malaysian 
government aims to redirect cargo traffic that is being shipped through the Port 
of Singapore.  For example, Tanjung Pelapas Port, located about 45 minutes 
from Singapore, was set up to compete with Singapore as the region’s hub port.  
The Malaysian government also envisages Port Klang as a hub port for national 
and regional traffic. 47   These two main ports are located in the Straits of 
Malacca; thus, maritime security in the Straits of Malacca has a direct impact 
on Malaysian economic prosperity.  Furthermore, from the perspective of 
internal trade, Malaysia’s two geographically separated landmasses require a 
safe passage through the South China Sea.  
To safeguard security in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea 
is a priority task for the Malaysian government.  A new inter-agency Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) commenced operations in November 
2005.  The new agency, made up of personnel from the navy, police and other 
government agencies, is responsible for ensuring the security of the country’s 
                                                        
46 Hamzah Ahmad, ed., Malaysia and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
Selected Documents (Kuala Lumpur: Heng Lee Stationery & Printing Co. Sdn. Bhd, 1983). 
47 Chia, Goh, and Tongzon, Southeast Asian Regional Port Development: A Comparative 
Analysis, 41. 
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maritime zone against such threats as piracy and terrorism.48 
 
Singapore 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Singapore depends on maritime trade for its 
economic survival.  Maritime services are increasingly economically important 
for Singapore.  According to Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Law, 
“freedom of navigation through the Malacca and Singapore Straits as well as 
the South China Sea is fundamental to the survival and prosperity of 
Singapore.”49  To safeguard the sea lanes passing through the Straits of Malacca 
is its top priority.  Singapore has high incentives to combat piracy in the Straits 
of Malacca, and so swiftly ratified the SUA Convention on 3 May 2004.50  
The divergence of national interests, priority and incentives in the littoral states 
has led to different policies on anti-piracy cooperation.  
 
Anti-piracy Policies and Agreements 
Malaysia and Indonesia are not signatory states of the aforementioned 
anti-piracy legal instrument, the SUA convention.  What is the reason behind 
their refusal to sign? 
                                                        
48 Channel News Asia, Malaysia to Boost Malacca Straits Security with 24-Hour Radar 
System (Channel News Asia: 11 March 2005 [cited 18 December 2005]); available from 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/136822/1/.html  
49 Donna Nincic, "Sea Lane Security and U.S. Maritime Trade: Chokepoints as Scarce 
Resource," in Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam Tangredi (Washington: National 
Defense University, 2002), 156. 
50 United Nations, "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, 1988, Annex 2," ed. UN Treaty Series (UN, 2004). 
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As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the SUA Convention 
empowers signatory states to go in hot pursuit of suspected pirate ships into 
other countries’ territorial waters, and to extradite or prosecute pirates arrested 
in their territorial waters for crimes committed under the jurisdiction of other 
countries.  The SUA Convention removes the obstacle of jurisdiction that has 
often hampered states from prosecuting pirates, who found sanctuary in their 
territory, under the UNCLOS.  Indonesia and Malaysia both have vast maritime 
territories; hence they are concerned that their sovereignty might be eroded if 
they ratify the SUA Convention.  
 
Implementation of Anti-piracy Cooperation 
Sovereignty concerns are reflected in the bilateral and multilateral anti-
piracy patrols amongst Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  In contemporary 
Southeast Asia, there are two forms of anti-piracy patrols. One is known as a 
“coordinated patrol”, which means that the various nations’ law enforcement 
agencies coordinate while patrolling within their own territorial waters, but they 
cannot cross national sea borders.  Each law enforcement agency has its own 
commander.  The other form is the “joint patrol,” in which the law enforcement 
agencies of all the participating countries constitute one task force and patrol 
together under one commander; this task force is empowered to cross national 
sea borders.51   
In Southeast Asia, all bilateral or multilateral anti-piracy operations are 
coordinated patrols rather than joint patrols, which do not allow the pursuit of 
                                                        
51 Sondakh, "National Sovereignty and Security in the Straits of Malacca," 12. 
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pirates into a neighbour’s territorial waters.  The Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Coordinating Centre (MECC) declared, “Under no circumstances 
would we intrude into each other’s territory.  If we chase a ship and it runs into 
the other side, we let the authorities there handle it”.52  
However, this practice is very problematic. Following this principle, the 
law enforcement agencies in the Straits of Malacca are likely to miss the best 
chance to catch pirates red-handed.  In fact, in many cases, by the time the 
foreign counterparts arrived at the scene, the pirates had disappeared into the 
blue.53 
The shipping industry strongly criticised coordinated patrols as “a potential 
cause for confusion, inefficiency and misallocation of resources.”54 Under this 
pattern, pirates can take advantage of jurisdictional limits and commit their 
crimes in territorial waters of one state, then flee into another country’s territory 
waters.  In contrast, if the patrol were a joint patrol, law enforcement agencies 
could go in hot pursuit of pirates into other countries’ territorial waters, and the 
pirates would not be able escape so easily.  
In short, the coordinated patrol protects the sovereignty of coastal 
countries, but reduces the effectiveness of the patrol.  Joint patrols would 
obviously be more effective, but owing to Malaysia and Indonesia not being 
signatory parties to the SUA Convention, they cannot be implemented.  
The shipping industry and international communities have been appealing 
                                                        
52 Chalk, "Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia," 87-112. 
53 Interview with Singapore Marine Coast Guard, Capt. Lim Hean Yew, in Singapore, 24, 
March 2005. 
54 Ioannis Gatsiounis, Strait: Target for Terror (26 July 2004 [cited 12 Oct 2004]); available 
from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FH11Ae02.html. 
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to Malaysia and Indonesia to ratify the SUA Convention.55  However, there 
have been no signs of further progress towards ratification by these two 
countries.   
 
Part IV. International Anti-piracy Cooperation (Phase 2, 
2002–2005) 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which began in Bangkok on 25 July 
1994, is an informal multilateral dialogue group of 25 members that seeks to 
address security issues in the Asia-Pacific region.  The objectives of the ARF 
are “to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security 
issues of common interest and concern; to make significant contributions to 
efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-
Pacific region.”56  ARF countries, comprising the ten ASEAN countries, China, 
Japan, South and North Korea, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, New Zealand, 
Australia, Russia, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste, the United States, Canada 
and the European Union, represent approximately 80% of global GDP and 
trade.57  
Before 9/11, piracy issues had been addressed at the ARF.  In the two 
ARF Experts Group Meetings on Transnational Crime held in October 2000 
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and April 2001, the experts recognised that piracy was an increasingly serious 
transnational crime with regional security implications.  
After 9/11, the ARF adopted the Statement on Cooperation against 
Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security at its ministerial meeting in 
Phnom Penh in June 2003. 58   The participants agreed to combat piracy 
according to the following legal instruments and guidelines: 
z The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 
1982); 
z The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation 1988 (the SUA Convention); 
z Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the SUA Protocol);  
z The International Maritime Organization's recommendations and 
guidelines for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery 
against ships at sea;  
z The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (the 
SOLAS Convention), particularly the new Chapter XI-2 and the 
International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS Code).59 
 
Asian Security Summit (Shangri-la Dialogue) 
In May 2002, the Asian Security Summit or Shangri-La Dialogue, 
organised by the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, was 
                                                        
58 Ibid. 
59 ARF, “ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Security” 
(ASEAN Regional Forum, 2006 [cited 16 May 2006]; available from 
http://www.aseansec.org/14838.htm.  
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held in the Shangri-la Hotel in Singapore.  Participants included defence 
ministers and security officials from India, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, 
together with US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Woflowitz, British Defence 
Minister Geoff Hoon and the Director-General of China’s Foreign Affairs 
Bureau, Major-General Zhan Maohai.  Since the inaugural meeting in 2002, the 
Shangri-la Dialogue, which is dominated by the United States, has become a 
key event in Asian defence diplomacy.60    
At the third Shangri-la dialogue in June 2004, the United States expressed 
its intention not only to retain its “forward presence” in the Asia-Pacific region, 
but also to seek to update its military-strategic doctrines.  Some time earlier, in 
March 2004, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, the U.S. Pacific Command commander, 
unveiled the US Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in the course of 
his annual U.S. PACOM posture testimony to the United States House of 
Representatives.  The goal of RMSI was to partner the region’s nations, of all 
manner of differing capabilities, to create a relationship to observe, monitor and 
intercept any transnational threats in their waters, with the use of existing 
international and domestic legislation. 61   Singapore welcomes American 
involvement in maritime security in the straits of Malacca, but Indonesia and 
Malaysia rebuffed U.S. offers to provide intelligence, conduct joint patrols and 
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send U.S. Marines into their territorial waters.62 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the perception of piracy in Southeast Asia has 
changed dramatically, especially after the alleged piracy and terrorism nexus 
was proposed by American policy analysts.63  The alleged piracy and terrorism 
nexus speeded up the pace of cooperation on anti-piracy operations by the 
littoral states and other countries in the region.  
 
Littoral States’ Responses 
In 2002, the Malaysian and Philippine navies conducted a 6-day joint 
military anti-piracy exercise.  Furthermore, in 2002, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines signed a trilateral security pact to enhance cooperation on 
transnational crime issues.  In February 2003, Indonesia and the Philippines 
conducted anti-piracy drills with Japan, similar to those held between Malaysia 
and the Philippines.64 
On 20 July 2004, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia launched new 
coordinated patrols, the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols, or Malsindo, in the 
                                                        
62 AP, Malaysia, U.S. To Discuss Port Security (USA Today, June 6th 2004 [cited 2 June 
2006]), available from http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/press-
coverage/press-coverage-2004,/usa-today---discuss-port-security.  
63 Young and Valencia "Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and 
Utility", Contemporary Southeast Asia 25(2003): 269-283. 
64 France-Presse Agence, "Malaysia, Philippines Begin Maritime Exercises," Jakarta Post, 
13 May 2002. 
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Straits of Malacca; these new coordinated patrols involved year-round patrols 
using ships from the littoral states.65  
On 27 May 2005, the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) and the 
Indonesian navy officially launched Project SURPIC (Surface Picture) in 
Batam.  SURPIC is a sea surveillance system, which allows the RSN and 
Indonesian navies to share a common real-time sea situation picture of the 
Singapore Strait.66  
In 2005, a number of new measures were implemented in the region.  
The three littoral states, with Thailand as an observer, began coordinated air 
patrols over the Straits of Malacca to boost security in this waterway.  The three 
states each donated two planes for the patrols, which were known as the ‘Eyes in 
the Sky’ patrols.  The aerial patrols provided a valuable supplement to the 
Trilateral Coordinated Patrols, or Malsindo, carried out by the navies of the 
littoral states.  
One significant advantage of the aerial patrols is that they are able to fly 
for up to three nautical miles inside the territorial waters of the participating 
states.  Whereas in sea patrols, the navies are limited to patrolling in their own 
territorial waters; that is, operating as coordinated and not joint patrols.67  In 
2005, Malaysia announced that its navy planned to buy up to 60 modern patrol 
vessels over the next decade in order to strengthen maritime security in its 
                                                        
65 AFP, "Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Agree to Joint Malacca Strait Patrols," Jakarta Post 
30 June 2004. 
66 Graham Gerard Ong, "Charting a Unified Course for Safer Seas," The Straits Times, 25 





ASEAN in Action 
Piracy was also discussed at the Senior Officials Meeting on 
Transnational Crime (SOMTC) in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002.  The meeting 
introduced an action plan for each work program.  Regarding piracy, the 
initiatives include: 
• Establishing a compilation of national laws and regulations of ASEAN 
member countries pertaining to piracy and armed robbery at sea; 
• Compiling national studies to determine trends and modus operandi of 
piracy in Southeast Asian waters; 
• Considering the feasibility of developing multilateral or bilateral legal 
arrangements to facilitate apprehension, investigation, hot pursuit, 
prosecution and extradition, exchange of witnesses, sharing of 
evidence, inquiry, seizure and forfeiture of proceeds of a crime, in 
order to enhance mutual legal and administrative assistance among 
ASEAN members; 
•  Enhancing cooperation and coordination in law enforcement and 
intelligence sharing on incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea 
activities. 69 
These measures were expected to be implemented within three years.  
                                                        
68 ABC News, Indonesian Navy Plans Fleet Expansion to Boost Maritime Security (ABC 
News Online, 12 Feb 2005, [cited 16 October 2005]); available from 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200502/s1301509.htm. 
69 ASEAN, “Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crime,” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002, 17 May 2006 [cited 8 May 2006]); 
available from http://www.aseansec.org/5616.htm. 
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However, due to ASEAN’s non-intervention policy, these measures are not 
likely to have significant effects.  
 
China Marches On 
In 2002, China and ASEAN reached consensus on the Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which not only reaffirmed both 
sides’ commitment to maintain peace and stability in the region, but also their 
willingness to enhance cooperation on maritime environment protection, 
maritime transport and navigational safety, and fight against transnational 
crimes at sea. 
In accordance with the Joint Declaration of China and ASEAN on 
Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues, released at the 2002 
China-ASEAN Summit, China and ASEAN signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation on Non-traditional Security Issues in 
2004.  The objective of the MOU is: 
To develop practical strategies in accordance with their national laws 
and regulations to enhance the capacity of each individual country and 
the region as a whole in dealing with such non-traditional security issues 
as trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling, including trafficking in 
women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money 
laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime. 70   
                                                        
70ASEAN Secretariat, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the 
Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-
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In 2003, China ratified the UN Treaty against Organized Crimes.  In 
2004, the China-ASEAN Prosecutors-General Conference was held in China, 
and both sides agreed to work together in the fight against crimes, including 
transnational maritime crimes.71   
 
ReCAAP 
In November 2001, at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Brunei, Japanese Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed the establishment of a government-level 
working group to study the formulation of a regional anti-piracy cooperation 
agreement.  Negotiations on this issue continued for three years.  Eventually, 
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was concluded in Tokyo in November 2004 
among representatives of the ten ASEAN states and China, Japan, South Korea, 
India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.72   
The key pillar of the ReCAAP was the establishment of the Information 
Sharing Centre (ISC).  The ISC is a government-level international organisation 
that aims to facilitate communication and information exchanges between 
member countries, and improve the quality of statistics and reports on piracy 
and armed robbery against ships in the region.  The ISC, located in Singapore, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Traditional Security Issues,” (2004 [cited 4 Nov 2004]); available from 
http://www.aseansec.org/15647.htm. 
71Zhao Jianhua, "Straits Malacca and Challenges Ahead: Perspectives from Littoral and User 
States," in The Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security Environment (Kuala 
Lumpur: Maritime Institute of Malaysia, 2004). 
72MFA, Singapore, "The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (Recaap)," (Singapore: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005) 
28 April 2005. 
 192
will be run by an Executive Director with a staff of 10–12 drawn from member 
countries.73  In 2005, Singapore, Japan, Laos and Cambodia became the first 
four states to formally adhere to the ReCAAP.  As soon as an additional six 
more participating states have signed up, the ReCAAP will come into force.74 
 
Assessment 
In the second phase of anti-piracy cooperation, the United States, in place 
of Japan, began to push initiatives to combat piracy and the threat of maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia.  Since piracy in Southeast Asia does not have a 
direct impact on the United States, however, the argument of there being the 
possibility of an existence of a piracy and terrorism nexus, provides the United 
States with an excuse to intervene in Southeast Asia in the name of anti-
terrorism.  More importantly, China’s economic boom in the recent decade has 
made it necessary for the United States to re-energise its relationship with 
Southeast Asia.  US policymakers have been taking into reckoning China’s 
desire for a blue-water fleet, which will operate beyond its shores to protect its 
access to oil, most of which will be shipped through the Straits of Malacca.75  
Control over the Straits of Malacca could not only combat alleged terrorism, 
but might also cut off the vital energy supplies to China, thus deterring China’s 
intention to launch cross-strait operations against Taiwan. 
                                                        
73Ibid. 
74Julia Ng, Singapore, Japan, Laos and Cambodia Sign Pact to Fight Piracy (Channel News 
Asia 2005 [cited 18 December 2005]); available from 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/144975/1/.html  
75 Bhagyashree Garekar, "China's Rise Prompts Us to 'Re-Energise' S-E Asia Ties," The 
Straits Times, 3 June 2006. 
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IMO and Anti-piracy Cooperation 
IMO took an initiative on anti-piracy cooperation at its general meeting 
in 1983.  The meeting adopted IMO Resolution A545, which aimed to take 
“measures to prevent acts of the piracy and armed robbery against ships,” and 
urged governments concerned to “take, as matter of the highest priority, all 
measures necessary to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in or adjacent to their waters, including strengthening of security 
measures.”76  
Furthermore, the IMO requested its member governments to inform the 
IMO of any act of piracy or armed robbery committed against a ship flying their 
flags, indicating the location and circumstances of the incident and the action 
taken by the coastal states.  The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) publishes 
monthly, quarterly and annual reports on piracy activities.77  
As part of its anti-piracy measures, the IMO set up a working group in 
1992, comprising experts from ten member states, including the three littoral 
states of the Straits of Malacca, to create a report concerning the safety of 
navigation, communication, search and rescue operations, and the threat of 
piracy or armed robbery.  Based on the working group report, the MSC issued 
two main circulars to all member states and the shipping industry on the 
                                                        
76  IMO, "Measures to Prevent and Suppress Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
(1983)" in Assembly Resolutions A.545 (XIII), (London: International Maritime Organization, 
1983). 
77IMO, Introduction to IMO. www.imo.org. 
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suppression of piracy.78 
One of the circulars is No.MSC/Cir.622/Rev.1, entitled “Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships: Recommendations to Governments for 
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships”.79  The 
other is circular No. MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
ships: Guidance to ship owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on 
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships”.80  
These circulars prescribe detailed measures against piracy, including 
establishing a security plan, applying preventive measures at anchor or in port, 
taking measures during watch-keeping and on-board patrols, and taking 
required measures during a pirate attack, and afterwards in terms of report filing.  
 Of special note, the IMO strongly discourages the carrying and use of 
firearms for personal protection or protection of a ship.  The rationale behind this 
advice is: 
The carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms, thereby 
escalating an already dangerous situation, and any firearms on board may themselves 
become an attractive target for an attacker.  The use of firearms requires special 
training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board ship is 
great.  In some jurisdictions, killing a national may have unforeseen consequences 
                                                        
78 Tanaka and Takase, "Piracy and Ship's Safety: A View from the Shipping Industry," 167. 
79 IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Recommendations to Governments for 
Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (Msc/Circ.623/Rev.3) 
(International Maritime Organization, 2002 [cited 5 Nov 2005]); available from 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D5378/623r3.pdf. 
80  IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Guidance to Shipowners and Ship 
Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships (29 May 2002 [cited 1 Nov 2005]), available from 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D5378/623r3.pdf. 
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even for a person who believes he has acted in self defence.81 
However, this policy, in some sense, has encouraged pirates to be more daring in 
attacking ships, for the risk of the crew defending themselves is lower.  
  
IMO Responses after 9/11  
In the wake of 9/11, in November 2001, the IMO Assembly called for a 
review of the existing international legal and technical measures to prevent and 
suppress terrorist acts against ships at sea and in port.82 
After the IMO Assembly, a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime 
Security was held at the London headquarters of the IMO from 9–13 December 
2002, which was attended by 109 governments contracted to the 1974 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention).83  
The Conference adopted a number of amendments to SOLAS and implemented 
the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).84 
 
ISPS Code 
The ISPS Code is “a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the 
security of ships and port facilities developed in response to the perceived 
threats to ships and port facilities.”85  The aim of the ISPS Code is to “provide a 
                                                        
81 Ibid. 
82 IMO, "IMO Assembly Resolution A.924 (22)," (London: International Maritime 
Organization, November 2001). 
83 IMO, "Consideration and Adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code, Consideration and Adoption of the Resolutions and Recommendations and 
Related Matters (Solas/Conf.5/34)," (London: International Maritime Bureau, 2002). 
84 Ibid. 
85 IMO, “What is ISPS Code?” http://www.imo.org/Safty/mainframe.asp?topic_id=897. 
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standardised, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to 
offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships and port 
facilities through determination of appropriate security levels and 
corresponding security measures.”86  The ISPS Code contains detailed security-
related requirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies 
in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how 
to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B).  The 
ISPS Code applies to ships “engaged on international voyages” and port 
facilities serving these ships.87  All the ships and port facilities belonging to this 
category were required to comply with the ISPS Code before 1 July 2004.   
In 2004, Southeast Asia witnessed the implementation of the ISPS Code.  
The implementation of the ISPS code not only significantly increased security 
awareness in the shipping industry, but also effectively deterred the source that 
threatens the security of ships and port facilities.  For this reason, amongst 




The suppression of piracy calls for international cooperation.  From 1990–
2001, anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia was mainly limited to ASEAN 
and East Asian countries.  In terms of interstate anti-piracy cooperation, many 
                                                        
86 Ibid. 
87 IMO, ISPS Code, Part A, 3 Application.   
88 K. Matthews, “Trade and Shipping: A Common Interest of the Asia-Pacific”, Australian 
Maritime Affairs, 10, 2003, 54. 
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international cooperation agreements have been discussed in international 
forums and conferences, and much bilateral and multilateral anti-piracy 
cooperation has been implemented.  However, in the first phase, (1990–2001), 
anti-piracy cooperation in Southeast Asia was hampered by the divergence of 
national interests and incentives in the littoral states, which are reflected in anti-
piracy policies and agreements. At the same time, the incapability of law 
enforcement agencies in some littoral states has caused ineffectiveness in the 
implementation of anti-piracy operation.  
In the aftermath of 9/11 in 2002, the intriguing piracy and terrorism nexus 
in Southeast Asia has evoked widespread international concern.  In the name of 
anti-terrorism, the United States has attempted to re-establish its influence over 
Southeast Asia.  Southeast Asia, especially the Straits of Malacca, has once 
again become the hot-zone for rivalry amongst foreign sea powers.   
There have been some paradigm shifts in the littoral states on anti-piracy 
policies,89 and incentives and capabilities of the littoral countries have been 
enhanced.  The littoral states, Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, enhanced 
their maritime capabilities, in order to show that they were capable of 
safeguarding their own waters and to prevent foreign navies from intervening in 
the name of protecting the Straits of Malacca. In addition, the implementation 
of the IMO’s ISPS Codes has significantly reduced opportunities for crimes 
committed at ports and anchorages.  After three years efforts, (2002–2004), 
piracy incidents have declined significantly in Southeast Asia after 2004 until 
today.
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This dissertation explains the rise and fall of piracy in contemporary 
Southeast Asia, and focuses on two processes of contemporary piracy: its evolution, 
and anti-piracy cooperation in the littoral states.  The analysis of the evolution of 
piracy explains why piracy increased in frequency from 1990–2004; while the 
identification of problems facing states in their anti-piracy actions helps explain 
why piracy remained at high levels during these years, and also explains the later 
significant decline in piracy incidents from 2004 until now, as these problems have 
been partially resolved. 
 
Explaining the Evolution of Contemporary Piracy  
Piracy in contemporary Southeast Asia was fostered by interrelated political 
and economic factors. 
Firstly, the external political economic factors; after the Cold War, the 
tension in Southeast Asia was eased. Former superpowers, the Soviet Union and 
the United States, substantially reduced their military presence in Southeast Asia, 
which led to a security vacuum in Southeast Asian waters.  The maritime 
capabilities of the littoral states had yet to meet the challenges from non-state 
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actors at sea, such as piracy.  At the same time, economic development in East 
Asian countries had been generating a large volume of cargo passing through the 
Straits of Malacca, which provided tempting targets for pirates.  
Secondly, the poor economic situation in Southeast Asia played an 
important role in the recrudescence of piracy.  The massive amount of sea traffic 
passing through the Straits of Malacca not only led to navigational congestion in 
the Straits, but also imposed a negative impact on the local maritime environment, 
such as the degradation of fish habitats, and a slump in profits from fishing. 
Consequently, this aggravated the economic crisis of coastal and especially 
Indonesian fishermen.  Poverty provided strong incentives for coastal people to 
turn to piracy as an alternative source of income.  The Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997–1998 further exacerbated the Indonesian economic situation, and led to a 
dramatic increase in piratical incidents in 2000.  
Thirdly, apart from the poor, small-time pirates in the Straits of Malacca, 
criminal syndicates were also much involved in piracy.  These syndicates had a 
long history in dealing with smuggling and other criminal activities, such as 
piracy.1  They were equipped with advanced weaponry, and had well developed 
international networks through which to dispose of stolen goods.  These syndicates 
were capable of dealing in “big stuff”—the hijacking of ships, disposal of stolen 
cargoes and re-registration of ships as phantom ships.  Pirate attacks were aimed at 
the ships, cargo and crew.  In modern times, the crew on board a ship are 
                                                        
1 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast 
Asian Frontier, 1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). 
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substantially reduced in number, and for fear of escalating the situation, the crew 
have been discouraged from fighting back. This has encouraged pirates to be more 
daring in their attempts to seize ships.2   
Fourthly, maritime geographies in Southeast Asia, especially in the Straits of 
Malacca, have made it easy for pirates to operate.  The Straits of Malacca, one of 
the world’s busiest sea-lanes, surrounded by many islands and river networks, is 
an ideal place for pirates to launch attacks from small swift boats, and retreat to 
the nearby islands and inland rivers without ever being found. 
The above-mentioned factors have contributed to the evolution of 
contemporary piracy.  However, why is it that piracy went unchecked before 2001?  
This was due to dilemmas in the shipping industry and problems in anti-piracy 
cooperation in the littoral states.  
 
Dilemmas in Shipping Industry  
The shipping industry is the direct victim of piracy; maritime security and 
safety are its priority concern.  However, shipowners in the shipping industry have 
met with a cost and effect dilemma.  In order to maximise their profits, shipowners 
try their best to minimise operation costs.  Many shipowners register their ships 
under Flags of Convenience (FOC).  The FOC countries have no genuine link with 
                                                        
2 IMO, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, 
Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships (29 May 2002 [cited 1 Nov 2005]); available from 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D5378/623r3.pdf. 
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the ships carrying their flags; more importantly, they have no capability and 
intention to protect these ships.  Ships without strong flag state protection are 
vulnerable to pirates, such as Chinese junks in colonial Southeast Asia, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
On the contrary, FOC registration makes ship fraud highly convenient for 
pirates.  Pirates have been able to take advantage of the lax administration of FOC, 
hijack ships, re-register them and turn them into phantom ships.  Later, these 
phantom ships were used to commit all kinds of illegal activities, such as 
smuggling, human and drug trafficking and maritime fraud.   
Apart from phantom ships, as discussed in Chapter 5, most piratical attacks 
in Southeast Asian waters were said to be petty theft, aiming at stealing cash and 
valuables on board ships. The economic losses incurred in such attacks were 
usually insufficient to cover deductibles on marine insurance policies, which 
meant that shipowners had to cover the entire loss without being reimbursed by 
insurance companies. Fearing the reputation of being vulnerable and facing a 
possible increase in insurance premium, many shipowners were reluctant to report 
these kinds of piracy incidents.  This impeded law enforcement authorities from 
understanding the real situation at sea. 
 
Incentives regarding anti-piracy operations in the littoral states 
The littoral states have the main responsibility for cracking down on piracy.  
The national interests of the littoral states form the basis for building their anti-
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piracy policies.  The three littoral countries have differing perceptions of piracy, 
and therefore different diagnoses of the problems it presents.  For example, in the 
eyes of Indonesian officials, piracy in Southeast Asia is petty theft, which does not 
have a great impact on its national interest.  In fact, they have a point: the majority 
of victims’ ships are foreign ships, not Indonesian ones.  The Indonesian 
government is reluctant to spend money on protecting these foreign users of their 
shipping-lanes, who do not contribute to the cost of safeguarding maritime 
security in the Straits of Malacca.   
The Malaysian government is also unwilling to spend money on “free 
riders;” however, the main Malaysian ports, such as Port Klang and Tanjung 
Pelepas Port, are situated along the Straits of Malacca, and maritime safety and 
security in the Straits of Malacca are important for the Malaysian economy.  The 
Malaysian government cannot ignore the interests of shipping industry nor their 
appeal for protection.  Facing similar budget constraints and insufficient maritime 
capability to Indonesia, the Malaysian government has appealed for a “Burden-
Sharing Scheme”, urging other users of the Straits of Malacca, together with Japan, 
to share the cost of maintaining and enhancing maritime safety and security in the 
Straits of Malacca.3 
Singapore, as a city-state, is greatly dependent on its ports, and considers 
piracy as a serious threat to its national security.  Although Singapore has the 
                                                        
3 The “Burden-sharing Scheme” is not discussed in this dissertation; however, this topic became 
very hot in the media while I was finishing the dissertation in July, 2006.  For more background 
information on the “Burden-Sharing Scheme”, see Abd. Rahim bin Hussin, "The Management of 
Straits of Malacca: Burden Sharing as the Basis for Cooperation" (paper presented at the LIMA 
International Maritime Conference 2005, Awana Porto Malai, Langkawi, Malaysia, 2005).   
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highest incentive to combat piracy, however, only the southern tip of the Straits of 
Malacca is under Singapore’s jurisdiction, and thus, Singapore cannot be of much 
help. 
In short, incentives regarding anti-piracy operations differ in the littoral 
countries.  Piracy was rampant in the countries where the government had little 
incentive to combat it, and this is most true of Indonesian waters. 
 
Capabilities 
Maritime capacities have long been a problem in Southeast Asia: the 
constraints in defence budgets have hampered their capabilities; the lack of funding 
for anti-piracy operations constitutes a bottleneck for some poor countries like 
Indonesia in implementing anti-piracy operations.  For example, the Indonesian 
navy chief said of the Indonesian navy: “Old ships cannot sail, new ships cannot 
shoot”.4  With their current material capabilities, the law enforcement agencies of 
Indonesia cannot successfully implement anti-piracy operations.  In terms of 
maritime capability, Indonesia is the lowest, Singapore is the highest, and Malaysia 
comes somewhere in between. 
Furthermore, the collusion between law enforcement agencies and pirates 
obviously reduces the effectiveness of anti-piracy operations.  As discussed in 
Chapter 5, corrupt officials get paid from pirates by taking no action, or providing 
                                                        
4 Bernard Kent Sondakh, "National Sovereignty and Security in the Straits of Malacca," (paper 
presented at the "Straits of Malacca: Building a Comprehensive Security Environment", Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia, 11–13 October 2004). 
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information and logistics supports to pirates; not surprisingly, such corrupt officials 
have no incentive to combat piracy even if they were requested to do so, since they 
stand to gain.   
In terms of law implementation, sovereignty is the main concern in bilateral 
and multilateral anti-piracy patrols involving Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, all the multilateral patrols in the Straits of Malacca at 
present are coordinated, not joint patrols, showing that trust and confidence among 
the littoral countries have yet to be established.5  
 
Historical Turning Points and the Fall of Piratical Incidents 
The first turning point relating to piracy in Southeast Asia was in 1998.  That 
year, the Chinese government first banned the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
from engaging in business activities.  The PLA companies were notorious for their 
involvement in coastal smuggling.  The Chinese government then took firm 
measures to crack down on smuggling in coastal provinces, as well as on piracy in 
the South China Sea.  Pirates lost their favourable destination for offloading stolen 
or contraband goods.  These measures had an immediate impact on piracy in the 
South China Sea.  In addition, with the aid of advanced ship tracking devices 
installed on ships since then, the most serious type of piracy, phantom ship piracy, 
                                                        
5 Coordinated Patrol: the law enforcement agencies coordinate while patrolling within their own 
territorial waters, but they cannot cross national sea borders.  Each law enforcement agency has 
its own commander.  Joint Patrol: all law enforcement agencies of the participating countries 
constitute one task force and patrol together, under one commander; this task force is empowered 
to cross national sea borders. 
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has declined.  However, this did not lead to an immediate decrease in piratical 
accidents: on the contrary, the total number of piratical incidents drastically 
increased and reached a peak in 2000.  This phenomenon was due to the 
unexpected Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, which seriously hit Southeast Asian 
countries, particularly Indonesia.  Desperate and financially ruined, many poor 
coastal fishermen and unemployed sailors subsequently turned to piracy.   
The shipping industry has been taking actions on combating piracy, as 
mentioned above. Shipowners have fixed high-tech devices on ships to deter 
pirates. At the same time, they have urged the littoral governments to take greater 
action on the suppression of piracy.  Under great pressure from ship industry, the 
littoral states have begun to deal with the problem.  Some unilateral actions have 
been taken in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, as was discussed in Chapter 5.  
However, the suppression of piracy needs all of the littoral states to cooperate.  Due 
to problems in anti-piracy cooperation, which led to ineffectiveness in anti-piracy 
operations, piracy incidents continued to increase until the critical turning point in 
2001.   
This turning point was the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 
September in 2001 (known as 9/11).  In the aftermath of 9/11, the allegation of a 
terrorism and piracy nexus, yet to be proved, raised world concern.  The United 
States has led the global anti-terrorism campaign, and integrated anti-piracy 
policies as a part of its maritime security project.   
As discussed in Chapter 5, after 9/11, piracy was high on the agenda of many 
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international government level forums and meetings, such as the ARF and ASEAN 
meetings and Asian security summits.  There were paradigm shifts in the littoral 
states on anti-piracy policies.6  Incentives and capabilities in the littoral countries 
were enhanced.  The littoral states, Malaysia and Indonesia in particular, enhanced 
their maritime capabilities, in order to show that they were capable of safeguarding 
their own waters, and so as to prevent foreign navies from intervening in the name 
of protecting the Straits of Malacca.  From 2002 onwards, the littoral states 
enhanced bilateral and multilateral patrols, with such initiatives as Malsindo patrols 
and the “Eyes in the Sky” project, which were sufficient to reduce piracy on the 
open sea.   In addition, the implementation of the IMO’s ISPS codes, which 
provide a standardised and consistent maritime security framework for ships and 
port facilities, has significantly reduced the opportunities for crimes to be 
committed at ports and anchorages, as was discussed in Chapter 5.  After three 
years efforts, (from 2002–2004), pirates lost their crime scenes at ports, anchorages, 
and on the open sea.  Eventually, piracy declined significantly in Southeast Asia 
after 2004 until today. 
 
Historical Continuity and Transformation 
There are many intriguing parallels between piracy in contemporary 
Southeast Asia and piracy in Southeast Asian history.   
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Piracy is caused by complicated political and economic factors.  Piracy has 
been common in the chokepoints or sea-lanes of booming seaborne trade, at times 
when local governments lack the capability or interest to suppress it.  In terms of 
anti-piracy strategies, there are many interesting similarities in these two periods: 
firstly, governments took firm measures to control ships, cargoes and ports, and 
then patrolled in the chokepoints and in the open sea.  For example, the 
implementation of the ISPS codes is very similar to the pass system implemented 
by colonial ports, which focused on ships and ports. Anti-piracy cooperation 
agreements were signed between the littoral states to cooperate in anti-piracy 
cooperation, for example, the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Agreement, and its counterpart in 
the contemporary era, the ReCAAP agreement. 
In Chapter 2, four variables influencing piracy were discussed: prey, pirates, 




Table 3The Continuity of Piracy in Southeast Asia 
 




Piracy rises in times of booming seaborne trade.  
 
Piracy becomes rampant when the prey is vulnerable and 
the risk of being avenged or prosecuted is low.  
 
Piracy and smuggling are interrelated. 
 
Poverty provided strong incentives for coastal people to 











Piracy is committed in ports, at chokepoints of seaborne 
trade, coastal waters and the high seas 
Politics/economic 
    
 
 




Political economy shapes the scopes of piracy, determining 
whether governments have the incentive and capacity to 
combat it. 
 
Anti-piracy cooperation agreement, naval patrols, 
information gathering and sharing, focusing on ships, ports 





A major difference between past and present is the definition of piracy.  The 
definition of piracy in colonial times was politically coloured, serving to justify 
colonising activities.  Thus, many so-called pirates in the colonial era were 
privateers or state actors, who had bases and strongholds, and who acted as semi-
governments in their controlled areas.  At the height of the colonial period, the 
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colonisers expanded their colonial domains through the suppression of piracy, as 
was discussed in Chapter 2.  In the early 20th century, large-scale piracy was 
extinct; piracy or sea raiding, although never eradicated, dwindled to a low level. 7   
After the Second World War, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia gained 
their independence from Britain and Holland.  From the 1950s to the 1960s, in 
some parts of the southern Philippines and East Malaysia, piracy and sea robbery 
still existed. 8   However, in the contemporary era, pirates are non-state actors, 
aiming at economic gains.  See the following Table 4 for major changes since the 
colonial era. 
                                                        
7 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast 
Asian Frontier, 1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 115–116. 
8 Stefan Eklof, The Return of Piracy: Decolonization and International Relations in a Maritime 
Border Region (the Sula Sea), 1959-63, Working Paper No. 15. 2005, Centre for East and 
Southeast Asian Studies (Sweden: Lund University, 2005), 3–8. 
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Table 4 The Transformation of Piracy in Southeast Asia 
 
Variables  Colonial era Contemporary era 
Prey Chinese junks and ships (usually 
armed) 
 
Large number of crew  
 




Victims fought back 
Unarmed ships  
 
 
Small number of crew  
 
Valuables, cash and equipment on 
ships. Crew for ransom 
 





State actors, privateers or sea lords, 
quasi-governmental pirate groups  
 
Large scale  
 
With strongholds and land bases 
 
Non-state actors: fishermen, 
gangsters, international criminal 
syndicates 
 
Small in number  
 




River mouths, coastal villages and 
villages along inland rivers (for 
slave-hunting) 
 
Ports, anchorages, coastal waters, 



















European colonisers: British, Dutch 
and Spanish; remaining semi-
independent indigenous polities until 
early 20th century 
 
Attack pirate bases and strongholds 
by brutal killing in the name of anti-
piracy operations. 
 
Strong incentives to suppress piracy 















Divergent incentives in the littoral 





In a nutshell, these four variables contribute to the rise and fall of piracy.  
By examining these four variables, we can predict piracy in future.  In terms of the 
prey, East Asian economies will continue to grow rapidly, providing an increasing 
potential prey for pirates.  However, the politics and pirates variables changed 
significantly after 9/11, as the incentives and capabilities of the littoral countries 
have been enhanced; thus, the trend in piracy incidents will continue to decline, at 
least in the foreseeable future. 
Intriguingly, the place variable might be changed in future. The main users 
of the Straits of Malacca have been considering using alternative routes to reduce 
their dependence on maritime security in the Straits of Malacca.  For example, 
China wants to build an oil pipeline in a deep-water port in Myanmar, linked to 
China’s Yunnan province by 2007, which will reduce China’s dependency on 
imported oil shipped via the Straits of Malacca.9  Thailand also plans to dig the Kra 
Canal, or to build up a “Land bridge” for transporting goods from the Indian Ocean 
to the South China Sea without using the Straits of Malacca.10  Recently, Malaysia 
also proposed a multi-billon dollar project for the construction of an oil pipeline 
across northern peninsular Malaysia. 11   If these proposals are realised, the 
importance of the Straits of Malacca will be diminished and the piracy-prone areas 
will assuredly be relocated.  
                                                        
9 Xinhua, “Construction of China-Myanmar Oil Pipeline Expected to Start This Year” 21 April 
2007. 
10 Jose L. Tongzon, “Whither the Malacca Straits? The Rise of New Hub Ports in Asia,” in 
Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Web 
Check this (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 206. 
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 2.  Piratical Attacks in Southeast Asia, Indian Subcontinent and the Far East, 2005 
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5. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP Agreement) 
 
The Contracting Parties to this Agreement, 
Concerned about the increasing number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in Asia, 
Mindful of the complex nature of the problem of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships, 
Recognizing the importance of safety of ships, including their crew, exercising the 
right of navigation provided for in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982, hereinafter referred to as "the UNCLOS", 
Reaffirming the duty of States to cooperate in the prevention and suppression of 
piracy under the UNCLOS, 
Recalling "Tokyo Appeal" of March 2000, "Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges 2000" of 
April 2000 and "Tokyo Model Action Plan" of April 2000, 
Noting the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
and the relevant resolutions and recommendations adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization, 
Conscious of the importance of international cooperation as well as the urgent need 
for greater regional cooperation and coordination of all States affected within Asia, 
to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships effectively, 
Convinced that information sharing and capacity building among the Contracting 
Parties will significantly contribute towards the prevention and suppression of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, 
Affirming that, to ensure greater effectiveness of this Agreement, it is 
indispensable for each Contracting Party to strengthen its measures aimed at 
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships, 
Determined to promote further regional cooperation and to enhance the 
effectiveness of such cooperation, 
Have agreed as follows: 
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 Part I Introduction 
Article 1 
Definitions 
1. For the purposes of this Agreement, "piracy" means any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, 
and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship, or against persons or property on 
board such ship; 
(ii) against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). 
2. For the purposes of this Agreement, "armed robbery against ships" means any of 
the following acts: 
(a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends and directed against a ship, or against persons or 
property on board such ship, in a place within a Contracting Party’s 
jurisdiction over such offences;  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with 
knowledge of facts making it a ship for armed robbery against ships;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). 
  
Article 2 
General Provisions  
1. The Contracting Parties shall, in accordance with their respective national laws 
and regulations and subject to their available resources or capabilities, implement 
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this Agreement, including preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, to the fullest extent possible. 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of any 
Contracting Party under the international agreements to which that Contracting 
Party is party, including the UNCLOS, and the relevant rules of international law. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the immunities of warships and other 
government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. 
4. Nothing in this Agreement, nor any act or activity carried out under this 
Agreement shall prejudice the position of any Contracting Party with regard to any 
dispute concerning territorial sovereignty or any issues related to the law of the sea. 
5. Nothing in this Agreement entitles a Contracting Party to undertake in the 
territory of another Contracting Party the exercise of jurisdiction and performance 
of functions which are exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other 
Contracting Party by its national law. 
6. In applying paragraph 1 of Article 1, each Contracting Party shall give due 
regard to the relevant provisions of the UNCLOS without prejudice to the rights of 




1. Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with its national laws and 
regulations and applicable rules of international law, make every effort to take 
effective measures in respect of the following:  
(a) to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships;  
(b) to arrest pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships;  
(c) to seize ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed robbery against 
ships, to seize ships taken by and under the control of pirates or persons who have 
committed armed robbery against ships, and to seize the property on board such 
ships; and  
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(d) to rescue victim ships and victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 2. 
Nothing in this Article shall prevent each Contracting Party from taking additional 
measures in respect of subparagraphs (a) to (d) above in its land territory.  
  
Part II Information Sharing Center 
Article 4 
Composition 
1. An Information Sharing Center, hereinafter referred to as “the Center”, is hereby 
established to promote close cooperation among the Contracting Parties in 
preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
2. The Center shall be located in Singapore 
3. The Center shall be composed of the Governing Council and the Secretariat. 
4. The Governing Council shall be composed of one representative from each 
Contracting Party. The Governing Council shall meet at least once every year in 
Singapore, unless otherwise decided by the Governing Council. 
5. The Governing Council shall make policies concerning all the matters of the 
Center and shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of 
selecting its Chairperson. 
6. The Governing Council shall take its decisions by consensus. 
7. The Secretariat shall be headed by the Executive Director who shall be assisted 
by the staff. The Executive Director shall be chosen by the Governing Council. 
8. The Executive Director shall be responsible for the administrative, operational 
and financial matters of the Center in accordance with the policies as determined 
by the Governing Council and the provisions of this Agreement, and for such other 
matters as determined by the Governing Council. 
9. The Executive Director shall represent the Center. The Executive Director shall, 
with the approval of the Governing Council, make rules and regulations of the 
Secretariat.  
  




1. The Center, as an international organization whose members are the Contracting 
Parties to this Agreement, shall enjoy such legal capacity, privileges and 
immunities in the Host State of the Center as are necessary for the fulfillment of its 
functions. 
2. The Executive Director and the staff of the Secretariat shall be accorded, in the 
Host State, such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of 
their functions. 
3. The Center shall enter into an agreement with the Host State on matters 




 1. The expenses of the Center, as provided for in the budget decided by the 
Governing Council, shall be provided by the following sources: 
(a) Host State financing and support;  
(b) Voluntary contributions from the Contracting Parties;   
(c) Voluntary contributions from international organizations and other entities, in 
accordance with relevant criteria adopted by the Governing Council; and   
(d) Any other voluntary contributions as may be agreed upon by the Governing 
Council. 
2. Financial matters of the Center shall be governed by a Financial Regulation to be 
adopted by the Governing Council. 
3. There shall be an annual audit of the accounts of the Center by an independent 
auditor appointed by the Governing Council. The audit report shall be submitted to 
the Governing Council and shall be made public, in accordance with the Financial 
Regulation. 




The functions of the Center shall be: 
(a) to manage and maintain the expeditious flow of information relating to 
incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships among the Contracting Parties;  
(b) to collect, collate and analyze the information transmitted by the Contracting 
Parties concerning piracy and armed robbery against ships, including other relevant 
information, if any, relating to individuals and transnational organized criminal 
groups committing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships;  
(c) to prepare statistics and reports on the basis of the information gathered and 
analyzed under subparagraph (b), and to disseminate them to the Contracting 
Parties;  
(d) to provide an appropriate alert, whenever possible, to the Contracting Parties if 
there is a reasonable ground to believe that a threat of incidents of piracy or armed 
robbery against ships is imminent; 
(e) to circulate requests referred to in Article 10 and relevant information on the 
measures taken referred to in Article 11 among the Contracting Parties;  
(f) to prepare non-classified statistics and reports based on information gathered 
and analyzed under subparagraph (b) and to disseminate them to the shipping 
community and the International Maritime Organization; and  
(g) to perform such other functions as may be agreed upon by the Governing 
Council with a view to preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery 




1. The daily operation of the Center shall be undertaken by the Secretariat. 
2. In carrying out its functions, the Center shall respect the confidentiality of 
information provided by any Contracting Party, and shall not release or disseminate 
such information unless the consent of that Contracting Party is given in advance.  
3. The Center shall be operated in an effective and transparent manner, in 
accordance with the policies made by the Governing Council, and shall avoid 
duplication of existing activities between the Contracting Parties.  
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1. Each Contracting Party shall designate a focal point responsible for its 
communication with the Center, and shall declare its designation of such focal 
point at the time of its signature or its deposit of an instrument of notification 
provided for in Article 18. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall, upon the request of the Center, respect the 
confidentiality of information transmitted from the Center. 
3. Each Contracting Party shall ensure the smooth and effective communication 
between its designated focal point, and other competent national authorities 
including rescue coordination centers, as well as relevant non-governmental 
organizations. 
4. Each Contracting Party shall make every effort to require its ships, ship owners, 
or ship operators to promptly notify relevant national authorities including focal 
points, and the Center when appropriate, of incidents of piracy or armed robbery 
against ships. 
5. Any Contracting Party which has received or obtained information about an 
imminent threat of, or an incident of, piracy or armed robbery against ships shall 
promptly notify relevant information to the Center through its designated focal 
point. 
6. In the event that a Contracting Party receives an alert from the Center as to an 
imminent threat of piracy or armed robbery against ships pursuant to subparagraph 
(d) of Article 7, that Contracting Party shall promptly disseminate the alert to ships 
within the area of such an imminent threat.  
  
Article 10 
Request for Cooperation 
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1. A Contracting Party may request any other Contracting Party, through the Center 
or directly, to cooperate in detecting any of the following persons, ships, or aircraft: 
(a) pirates;  
(b) persons who have committed armed robbery against ships;  
(c) ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed robbery against ships, and 
ships taken by and under the control of pirates or persons who have committed 
armed robbery against ships; or  
(d) victim ships and victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 
2. A Contracting Party may request any other Contracting Party, through the Center 
or directly, to take appropriate measures, including arrest or seizure, against any of 
the persons or ships mentioned in subparagraph (a), (b), or (c) of paragraph 1 of 
this Article, within the limits permitted by its national laws and regulations and 
applicable rules of international law. 
3. A Contracting Party may also request any other Contracting Party, through the 
Center or directly, to take effective measures to rescue the victim ships and the 
victims of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 
4. The Contracting Party which has made a direct request for cooperation pursuant 
to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article shall promptly notify the Center of such 
request. 
5. Any request by a Contracting Party for cooperation involving extradition or 
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters shall be made directly to any other 
Contracting Party.   
  
Article 11 
Cooperation by the Requested Contracting Party 
  
1. A Contracting Party, which has received a request pursuant to Article 10, shall, 
subject to paragraph 1 of Article 2, make every effort to take effective and practical 
measures for implementing such request. 
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2. A Contracting Party, which has received a request pursuant to Article 10, may 
seek additional information from the requesting Contracting Party for the 
implementation of such request. 
3. A Contracting Party, which has taken measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article, shall promptly notify the Center of the relevant information on the 
measures taken.  
  
Part IV Cooperation 
Article 12 
Extradition 
A Contracting Party shall, subject to its national laws and regulations, endeavor to 
extradite pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships, and 
who are present in its territory, to the other Contracting Party which has 
jurisdiction over them, at the request of that Contracting Party.  
  
Article 13 
Mutual Legal Assistance 
A Contracting Party shall, subject to its national laws and regulations, endeavor to 
render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, including the submission of 
evidence related to piracy and armed robbery against ships, at the request of 




1. For the purpose of enhancing the capacity of the Contracting Parties to prevent 
and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships, each Contracting Party shall 
endeavor to cooperate to the fullest possible extent with other Contracting Parties 
which request cooperation or assistance. 
2. The Center shall endeavor to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in providing 
capacity building assistance. 
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3. Such capacity building cooperation may include technical assistance such as 
educational and training programs to share experiences and best practices.  
  
Article 15 
Cooperative Arrangements  
Cooperative arrangements such as joint exercises or other forms of cooperation, as 
appropriate, may be agreed upon among the Contracting Parties concerned.   
  
Article 16 
Protection Measures for Ships 
Each Contracting Party shall encourage ships, ship owners, or ship operators, 
where appropriate, to take protective measures against piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, taking into account the relevant international standards and practices, 
in particular, recommendations adopted by the International Maritime Organization.  
  
Part V Final Provisions 
Article 17 
Settlement of Disputes 
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, 
including those relating to liability for any loss or damage caused by the request 
made under paragraph 2 of Article 10 or any measure taken under paragraph 1 of 
Article 11, shall be settled amicably by the Contracting Parties concerned through 
negotiations in accordance with applicable rules of international law.  
  
Article 18 
Signature and Entry into Force 
1. This Agreement shall be open for signature at the depository referred to in 
paragraph 2 below by the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the 
Kingdom of Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, the 
Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the 
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Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the 
Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.  
2. The Government of Singapore is the depository of this Agreement.  
3. This Agreement shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which the tenth 
instrument of notification by a State listed in paragraph 1, indicating the 
completion of its domestic requirements, is submitted to the depository. 
Subsequently it shall enter into force in respect of any other State listed in 
paragraph 1 above 30 days after its deposit of an instrument of notification to the 
depository. 
4. The depository shall notify all the States listed in paragraph 1 of the entry into 
force of this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article. 
  
5. After this Agreement has entered into force, it shall be open for accession by any 
State not listed in paragraph 1. Any State desiring to accede to this Agreement may 
so notify the depository, which shall promptly circulate the receipt of such 
notification to all other Contracting Parties. In the absence of a written objection by 
a Contracting Party within 90 days of the receipt of such notification by the 
depository, that State may deposit an instrument of accession with the depository, 
and become a party to this Agreement 60 days after such deposit of instrument of 




1. Any Contracting Party may propose an amendment to this Agreement, any time 
after the Agreement enters into force. Such amendment shall be adopted with the 
consent of all Contracting Parties. 
2. Any amendment shall enter into force 90 days after the acceptance by all 
Contracting Parties. The instruments of acceptance shall be deposited with the 
depository, which shall promptly notify all other Contracting Parties of the deposit 





1. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Agreement at any time after the 
date of its entry into force. 
2. The withdrawal shall be notified by an instrument of withdrawal to the 
depository. 
3. The withdrawal shall take effect 180 days after the receipt of the instrument of 
withdrawal by the depository. 
4. The depository shall promptly notify all other Contracting Parties of any 
withdrawal.  
Article 21 
 Authentic Text This Agreement shall be authentic in the English language.  
Article 22 
 
Registration This Agreement shall be registered by the depository pursuant to 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the 
undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have 
signed this Agreement. 
(Source: http://www.recaap.org/publish/recaap/about/agreement.html) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
